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Abstract 
 
The postmodern criticism of humanist agency initiated by Dilip Gaonkar nearly 
twenty years ago set in motion a discipline wide discussion concerning the 
conceptualization rhetorical agency. Rhetorical agency is difficult but vital to 
conceptualize because the term bears directly on the discipline’s theorizing about the 
speaker or rhetor, the effect of the speaker or rhetor’s rhetoric on an audience, and the 
extent to which the speaker or rhetor’s agency is constrained by ideology and discourse. 
What emerged from this discussion about agency did distance the discipline from the 
humanist conceptualization of rhetorical agency that persisted at the time Gaonkar 
published his argument, but conceptualizing rhetorical agency remains an evolving 
endeavor. The postmodern critique created two interrelated problems for the 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency in the discipline. The first concerns the role of 
discourse in the formation of rhetorical agency; the second concerns the impact ideology 
has on the formation of rhetorical agency. The response to the critique often assumes 
postmodern philosophy maintains the subject or agent is determined by discourse, and 
second, that the philosophy suggests ideology is virtually totalizing for subjectivity. I 
believe no postmodern author actually maintains either of these positions. The 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency which emerges in the recuperative effort 
predicated upon these two phantom criticisms results in the rehabilitation of the humanist 
paradigm Gaonkar’s criticism suggests we reject. I argue we need not rehabilitate those 
 iii 
aspects of agency postmodernism calls into question, but rather should direct our 
attention to the conceptualization of rhetorical agencies that Gaonkar presumes exist in 
discourse practices. Lacan’s theory of discourse corrects for these errors because it 
assumes there are four discrete manifestations of rhetorical agency in discourse. The 
psychoanalytic terminology Lacan provides compliments the study of rhetoric not only 
because rhetoric was central to Lacan’s thinking, but also because his theory provides a 
model for isolating and explaining rhetorical agency in discourse practices.  
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INTRODUCTION 
To provide a context for conceptualizing rhetorical agency via recourse to 
Lacanian discourse theory, I divided the dissertation into five chapters. In the first 
chapter, I revisit the arguments made by some speech communication theorists about 
rhetorical agency to show how the conclusions about rhetorical agency reached 
encourage a rehabilitation of rhetorical agency according to the humanist paradigm, 
instead of revising the concept wholesale in light of the postmodern critique. In addition, 
chapter one assesses the impact Lacan’s thinking on rhetorical agency has had on the 
discipline. Rather than recuperate the humanist paradigm, it is my argument rhetorical 
agency should be conceptualized according to a posthumanist paradigm. The 
posthumanist paradigm, as I explain, accounts for agency in discourse practices in 
keeping with the postmodern critique, but makes allowances for the objections to 
postmodern rhetorical agency some theorists in the discipline make. To ground a 
posthumanist conceptualization of rhetorical agency in a theory and method for 
conducting analysis, the second chapter identifies and defines the terms Jacques Lacan 
incorporated to describe his theory of the four discourses. Also in chapter two, I use the 
terminology to describe the methodology Lacan proposes for analyzing rhetorical agency 
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in a discourse. The purpose of the second chapter is to recuperate the concept of 
rhetorical agency according to Lacanian discourse theory. In chapters three and four, I 
describe how the posthumanist conceptualization of agency that emerges from Lacan’s 
theory guides the analysis of rhetorical agency in what I am calling “Tea Party” and 
“Gender Identity Disorder” rhetoric. The fifth and final chapter contains a summary of 
dissertation findings and proposes limitations to the conceptualization of rhetorical 
agency I am advocating. 
Tea Party and GID rhetoric constitute a discourse premised upon practices in the 
culture that function to regulate the distribution of desire in either a sexual or a political-
economic context. Both case studies function to advance the recuperation of rhetorical 
agency according to the posthumanist conceptualization Lacan’s theory provides because 
they reflect the four different types of rhetorical agency at work in discourse as a 
consequence of the unconscious logic of desire. The purpose of analyzing the rhetoric 
collected in these case studies is to demonstrate how rhetorical agency is best 
conceptualized as a function of desire in discourse, the practice of which arrests or 
produces a transformation in the economy of enjoyment at work in the culture.  
The conceptualization of rhetorical agency that emerges in the first case study 
shows how “Tea Party rhetoric” is contingent upon four distinctive kinds of rhetorical 
agency, the interaction of which helps us explain how the rhetoric is structured to 
transform or arrest change to the political-economy of the United States. The second case 
study, the rhetoric surrounding the inclusion of “Gender Identity Disorder” (GID) in the 
fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V), examines how the 
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various discourse practices that constitute the debate reveal the workings of four different 
rhetorical agencies, the interaction of which helps us explain how the rhetoric either 
transforms the heteronormative order that drives the economy of desire in North 
American culture, or arrests changes to those heterosexual norms. In locating the 
transformative or arrested potential of rhetorical agency in these contexts, it is my 
purpose to expand the conceptualization of rhetorical agency, thereby advancing our 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency to fit the postmodern emphasis on discourse. It is 
my belief the postmodern turn in many ways sidelined rhetoric, but a Lacanian theory of 
discourse helps us recover and redefine the relationship between rhetoric and discourse in 
a way that clarifies what we mean as a discipline when we are referring to rhetoric and 
discourse in our interpretive practices. 
The case studies chosen represent different types of rhetorical agencies at work in 
the discourse designed to create different kinds of relationships or social links predicated 
upon the circulation of desire. By conceptualizing rhetorical agency as a function of 
discourse, and by articulating how the structure of discourse shapes a specific kind of 
agency, it is my hope to better articulate how our conceptualization of rhetorical agency 
can be adapted to account for the various ways subjects or agents manifest rhetorical 
agency in their discourse practices.   
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CHAPTER ONE: RHETORICAL AGENCY 
Humanist Rhetorical Agency and the Neo-Aristotelian Interpretive Turn 
Rhetorical agency is a central concept in the speech communication discipline 
because it bears directly on oratory and public address. Since oration and public address 
entail a speaker, a message, and an audience, some scholars in the discipline use the term 
in a traditional sense to refer to the speaker or rhetor’s capacity or ability to use rhetoric 
to change the beliefs and behaviors of the audience. However, the postmodern 
philosophical turn has enveloped this traditional view of rhetorical agency in a cloud of 
questions. Up until the late eighties and into the early nineties, the study of oratory and 
public address in the discipline subscribed to a liberal humanist conceptualization of 
rhetorical agency; one influenced chiefly by Aristotle, but decidedly classical in its 
orientation. Liberal humanist agency and the Neo-Aristotelian critical practices assumed 
that rhetorical agency was a function of the speaker, and that the speaker consciously and 
intentionally invented rhetoric by choosing arguments capable of persuading an audience 
(principally through appeals to reason), so that the speaker’s agency was measured in part 
by the extent to which the message changed audience beliefs and behaviors. As Philip 
Nel describes it, where Aristotle serves as the point of theoretical departure, “the study of 
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rhetoric is the study of how people argue to get an adjudicating audience to assent to a 
controversial claim.”1   However, since the capacity or ability to use rhetoric to change 
beliefs and behaviors is symbolically and materially constrained by ideology and 
discourse, most contemporary conceptualizations of rhetorical agency to which theorists 
subscribe acknowledge the theoretical limitations inherent in conceiving of rhetorical 
agency as relatively autonomous, that is, free of constraints and consciously derived 
through the process of invention by a speaker. The liberal humanist view of agency and 
the Neo-Aristotelian paradigm underlying it came under increasing scrutiny as the 
discipline began to question the merits of conceptualizing rhetorical agency as a 
relatively autonomous function of the speaker—a disciplinary trend that accelerated in 
the nineties. Dilip Gaonkar’s foundational essay The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of 
Science is a key reference for this reason. 
Gaonkar’s essay is a critical appraisal of the Neo-Aristotelian conceptualization of 
rhetorical agency that prevailed in the speech communication discipline when it was 
published nearly twenty years ago. Gaonkar’s criticism of the Neo-Aristotelian 
interpretive turn and his indictment of the humanist paradigm of agency generated a 
sustained and productive dialogue about the discipline’s conceptualization of rhetorical 
agency. The 1997 book Rhetorical Hermeneutics, and the conference organized to 
address the question “How Ought We to Understand Rhetorical Agency?”, sponsored by 
the Alliance of Rhetorical Societies in 2003, both feature Gaonkar’s essay as a key point 
of departure for conceptualizing rhetorical agency. It is useful then, to retrace the 
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historical development of rhetorical agency as a concept in the discipline by first 
revisiting the 1993 essay.  
The Postmodern Critique of Humanist Rhetorical Agency and Neo-Aristotelian 
Criticism 
In the original essay, Gaonkar pointed out “by and large, our critical studies are 
sustained by the vocabulary of classical rhetoric.”2 While Gaonkar includes Cicero and 
Quintilian as key sources of the vocabulary sustaining critical studies at the time, it is 
Aristotle’s influence that seemed most influential and enduring. The “interpretive turn in 
contemporary rhetorical studies,” he claims, despite the effort to “break free from a 
‘restrained’ vision of Aristotle,” remained “fatally bound to the Aristotelian vocabulary.”3 
He contended the classical vocabulary is too “thin” to serve the purposes of critical 
studies and, more importantly, argued classical rhetorician’s like Cicero, Quintilian and 
Aristotle, viewed rhetoric as a practice and were therefore conceptualizing rhetoric along 
performative and not theoretical lines.
4
 As he pointed out, the terms ethos, pathos and 
logos, despite their widespread use in critical studies of the time, are particularly good 
examples of classical vocabulary that refer to specific rhetorical practices in broad 
categories that offer too little in the way of clarity to meet the conceptual demands 
encountered when formulating a view of rhetorical agency—much less as a foundation 
for articulating criticism. For him, “The abstract quality of the traditional vocabulary, as 
illustrated…in the tripartite scheme of proofs…enables one to find its presence in 
virtually any discourse practice.”5 As a consequence, key concepts like rhetorical agency 
remain contingent upon the currency of the classical lexicon in a contemporary era, even 
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though “The question remains unanswered as to whether this vocabulary of performance 
can be adequately translated into a vocabulary of interpretation.”6  
Translating the classical lexicon is especially troublesome when we consider the 
fact that the speech communication discipline no longer limits its conceptualization of 
rhetorical agency to speeches and public speaking as strongly as it did when the essay 
was published. In an essay published in 2002, Gaonkar remains convinced “the 
privileging of public address and political oratory (and the frequent collapsing of that 
distinction) has been under revision and challenge,” a trend he thinks is best reflected “in 
the determined effort to extend the object domain of rhetorical criticism beyond oratory.” 
However, he nonetheless maintains “it is possible to argue...the paradigmatic status of 
oratory” remains unchanged because scholars lean on the “conceptual resources and 
strategies originally fashioned to analyze oratory” without undertaking the “significant 
modifications” needed to fully adapt them to fit a contemporary context.7   In sum, 
Gaonkar’s criticism concerning the conceptualization of rhetorical agency indicts the 
discipline for leaning too heavily on a lexicon poorly suited, both practically and 
theoretically, for a contemporary conceptualization of rhetorical agency, and second, for 
failing to account for the expansive definition of what the discipline considers an 
appropriate artifact or object of study. What was called for, in light of these challenges, 
was a “reflexive critical engagement,”8 intended to conceptualize rhetorical agency in a 
way that did not belie the difficulties posed by the discipline’s classical leanings. 
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The Postmodern Alternative to Humanist Neo-Aristotelian Rhetorical Agency 
For Gaonkar, the “reflexive critical engagement” initially required a 
thoroughgoing examination of the “ideology of human agency” implied in the classical 
vocabulary.
 9
 As he described it, the ideology of human agency entails a 
view of the speaker as the seat of origin rather than a point of articulation, a view 
of strategy as identifiable under an intentional description, a view of discourse as 
constitutive of character and community, a view of audience positioned 
simultaneously as “spectator” and “participant,” and finally, a view of “ends” that 
binds speaker, strategy, discourse and audience in a web of purposive action.
10
 
The critical studies of the time, what went under the banner of “rhetorical criticism,” 
adhered to the “humanist paradigm of agency…based on a reading of classical texts, 
especially those of Aristotle and Cicero,” and assumed the speaker is  
seen as (ideally) the conscious and deliberating agent who ‘chooses’ and in 
choosing discloses the capacity for ‘prudence’ and who ‘invents’ discourse that 
displays an ingenium and who all along observes the norms of timeliness (kairos), 
appropriateness (to prepon), and decorum that testify to a mastery of sensus 
communis.”11   
The defect of adhering to the humanist paradigm of agency in his view was its 
emphasis on the rhetor’s role in what he called the “intentional model of persuasion,” a 
model that reduces the “agency of rhetoric…to the conscious and strategic thinking of the 
rhetor.”12   
The humanist paradigm of agency is theoretically deficient for Gaonkar because it 
assumes the “conscious and deliberating agent,” is a “seat of origin” for discourse rather 
than a “point of articulation” in a “discourse practice.” 13 Assuming that the speaker is a 
“seat of origin” for the discourse results in criticism that reads a “given discourse practice 
(or text) as a manifestation of the rhetor’s strategic consciousness,” thereby marginalizing 
as “so many items in the rhetor’s design”14 those “structures that govern agency: 
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language, unconscious, and capital.”15  Instead of factoring in these governing features as 
primary to our conceptualization of rhetorical agency, Neo-Aristotelian critical practices 
replace them in the order of conceptual importance with a theoretical focus on 
consciousness, will, and intent.  
Ideologically, what is suspicious is the way in which agency in the theory is 
conceptually disconnected from the material and symbolic limitations that a speaker faces 
in any rhetorical situation. The criticism of the ostensibly autonomous speaker or rhetor 
who calls upon their skills with the language to convince others in the culture simply 
does too little to account for the role ideological and discursive constraints play in the 
communicative process. Since rhetorical criticism at the time remained wedded to the 
classical lexicon and its attendant conceptualization of humanist agency, but did little to 
adapt to the postmodern philosophical turn the discipline was undergoing at the time, 
Gaonkar concludes these conceptual defects about the purposive “conscious and 
deliberating agent,” with its strategies and designs, simply beg the question, “How should 
our translator deal with this particular ideology of agency,” if in fact such an undertaking 
is desired at all?
16
  
While he does not provide a direct answer, Gaonkar does suggest “The choice one 
makes will depend upon one’s sense of the historical conjuncture—the postmodern 
condition—in which the translation is being attempted.”17 Although Gaonkar’s writing 
poses the choice in simple and stark terms, it is the “sense of the historical conjecture” 
about the “postmodern condition” that presently defines some of the scholarly discussion 
about rhetorical agency in such problematic terms.  
  10 
The Criticism of Rhetorical Agency and the Postmodern Turn: Discourse and 
Ideology 
While it is accurate to conclude the discipline is no longer, on the whole, 
committed to the theoretical view of humanist agency Gaonkar critiqued as part of the  
Neo-Aristotelian interpretative turn, it is also accurate to conclude the discipline is still 
reconciling the implications a postmodern turn entails for conceiving of rhetorical 
agency. Cheryl Geisler’s summary of the proceedings of the Alliance of Rhetoric 
Societies conference dedicated to addressing the question of agency notes “Most scholars 
at the ARS acknowledged, explicitly or implicitly, that recent concern with the question 
of agency arises from the post-modern critique of the autonomous agent.”18 In part, “the 
recent concern” Geisler is referring to is the perceived failure of the postmodern critique 
to account for action. In a humanist paradigm, the speaker or rhetor executes their 
capacity to consciously choose rhetoric in order to articulate a persuasive strategy bent on 
changing beliefs and behaviors in a process that is more or less autonomous, that is, free 
of ideological and discursive constraints. In a postmodern paradigm, the speaker or 
author is materially and symbolically constrained by the structures of language, capital 
and the unconscious, in an ideological system that situates a speaker or author in a subject 
position—thereby directly limiting agency. What remains puzzling for some in the 
discipline is how a subject or agent in a postmodern condition takes action despite the 
ideological constraints postmodern philosophy openly acknowledges and attempts to 
account for in a discourse practice. As Herndl and Licona put it, “The question of agency 
in contemporary social and rhetorical theory might best be seen as a response to the 
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failures of the philosophy of action and its humanist social actor.”  As they see it, and put 
the issue so clearly,  
In cultural studies the question of agency is an attempt to theorize the possibilities 
of radical counter hegemonic action, especially in the face of powerful cultural 
formations...In rhetorical theory, we might rephrase this as a question of how 
rhetors effect social change.
19
  
What makes this question of how rhetors effect social change especially difficult to 
answer is the assumption that postmodern subjectivity does not allow for an actor capable 
of overcoming the constraints inherent in ideology and discourse to force changes to the 
status quo. To some, postmodernist conceptualizations of rhetorical agency presume 
agency is erased from the theory due to overwhelming effects of discourse and ideology. 
The belief is, if the speaker or rhetor is not a seat of origin for rhetorical agency that is 
capable of acting to resist the effects of language, then how does postmodern philosophy 
account for rhetoric’s capacity to act as an instrument for resisting ideological domination 
and discursive determination?  
For this reason, the criticism of postmodern rhetorical agency that emerged since 
Gaonkar’s essay often reflects a certain discomfort with the role of the rhetor, speaker, or 
author in postmodern and post-structuralist theory. This discomfort is understandable, 
given that so much of our tradition and history as a discipline deals with oratory and 
public address, and we therefore assume agency in part refers to the capacity of a speaker 
or rhetor to use rhetoric to change the beliefs and behaviors of the audience so that the 
result reflects a more equitable distribution of power and resources in a culture. The 
natural impulse then is to conceptualize rhetorical agency so that the result preserves the 
power of speakers or rhetors in the theory to overcome the effects of discourse and 
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ideology, thereby protecting the traditional view of rhetoric as an instrument for 
meaningfully effecting the distribution of power and resources in a culture. Campbell 
speaks to the importance of preserving the capacity of a rhetor or speaker by way of a 
rhetorical question which hints at her suspicion that postmodern theory does not account 
for the speaker or rhetor as change agent in the way rhetoricians have traditionally 
understood the concept. She asks  
What do current debates about agency and authorship tell us about problems in 
our theorizing, such that we struggle to produce rejoinders to claims about the 
‘death of the author’ by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault, 
among others, and to retain a sense of agency that makes sense in rhetorical 
terms?
20
 
Campbell’s rhetorical question implies that postmodernism cannot account for rhetorical 
agency in a way that makes sense in rhetorical terms because she mistakenly presumes 
that postmodernism maintains the subject or agent has virtually no power to affect 
ideology or discourse. Yet postmodernism and post-structuralist theory, as Gaonkar 
demonstrated, forces us to reconcile the autonomous agent conceptualization of rhetorical 
agency and the ideology of consciously directed and intentional use of rhetoric it is 
founded upon with a conceptualization of rhetorical agency that assumes the rhetor, 
speaker or author is de-centered and fragmented—constrained by the impacts of 
discourse and ideology in ways Neo-Aristotelianism cannot explain. That does not imply 
postmodernism cancels out the subject or agent’s capacity to act in ways that makes sense 
in rhetorical terms. It simply suggests rhetorical agency cannot be premised upon a 
conceptualization that ignores the effects of discourse and ideology on the formation of 
subjectivity. 
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Campbell’s rhetorical question locates the debate about agency within the broader 
discussions at work in the humanities generally about the theoretical implications of 
postmodernism and post-structuralist subjectivity and identity. The central objection here 
concerns the belief that postmodernism posits a subject or agent who is incapable of 
acting because of the way discourse determines their subjectivity and the way ideology 
snuffs out their ability to resist domination. However, her question also reveals the 
substance of what amounts to a phantom criticism of postmodernism philosophy 
articulated by some in the speech communication discipline. No postmodern theorist 
maintains discourse or ideology makes it futile or impossible for a subject or agent to 
resist ideological domination because discourse determines their subjectivity. However, 
this is precisely the criticism Dana Cloud makes in a way that echoes Campbell’s 
reservations about postmodernity.  
Cloud’s discomfort with the role of the speaker or agent in the theory and their 
capacity to take action is manifest in her belief that postmodern philosophy assumes 
discourse determines the subject. For this reason, Cloud takes particular issue with the 
influence of Foucault in the discipline, as she contends, according to his writing 
…in the world of ubiquitous discipline, discourse exists without agent, system 
without center, and interventions without intent. The subject does not speak but is 
spoken; resistance is necessarily another form of discipline constituted primarily 
in discourses. On this argument, power is productive of discourses regulating 
eventually self-disciplining bodies, emanating not from a discernible, repressive 
center (such as the state or the employer) but rather appearing as a set of shifting 
discursive formations that establish themselves what is real and true. Power on 
this view is productive of subjectivity and the organization of life without 
necessary reference to external interests or motivation. This argument has been 
profoundly influential across the humanities.
21
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The belief that Cloud makes evident here assumes postmodern philosophy presumes that 
discourse virtually determines the subject’s ability to resist ideological domination 
because discourse determines the subject. However, taken as a whole, Cloud’s appraisal 
of Foucault’s impact on the discipline’s thinking about rhetoric erases the efforts he made 
to link his scholarship to social and cultural change. Foucault plainly and repeatedly 
claimed his work changed the way sexuality was viewed, especially in France. He argued 
in an interview that “Reforms do not come about in empty space, independent of those 
who make them. One cannot avoid considering those who will have to administer this 
transformation.
22
 Foucault did not think that individuals or people do not make changes 
or transform the social or cultural order with their discourse. Some subject or agent is 
necessary to “administer this transformation.” In fact, Cloud might very well agree with 
Foucault, when he argued 
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are. It 
consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, 
unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based…We need to free 
ourselves of the sacrilization of the social as the only instance of the real and stop 
regarding that essential element in human life and human relations—I mean 
thought—as so much wind.”23  
Foucault does not assume people and individuals, as the generators of thoughts 
and ideas, are to be treated in the theory as if their speech was somehow inconsequential, 
or as he puts it, so much “wind.” Rhetorical agency in his conceptualization does 
preserve the individual’s ability or capacity to resist the effects of discourse. Cloud’s 
reading of Foucault suggests he did not think individuals or people could meaningfully 
affect political or economic change because of the all-pervasive power of discourse—but 
this is not the case. Discourse or language in Foucault’s theory is not totalizing. However, 
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the assumption that postmodernist or post-structuralist theory cancels out the capacity of 
the individual to resist discursive and ideological determination persists because, as is 
reflected elsewhere in the literature, her claim rests on the presumption that postmodern 
and post-structuralist theories of language and discourse maintain that language or 
discourse determines the subject. She is not alone in criticizing postmodern philosophy 
along these lines, and would find an enthusiastic sympathizer in Sharon Crowley, who 
maintains the theoretical defectiveness of postmodernism for conceptualizing rhetorical 
agency is clear. 
Postmodernism is deeply implicated in the problem of discerning a space of 
operations for rhetorical agency, not only because it delineated the limitations of 
liberal humanist notions of agency, but because some versions of postmodernism 
forward a linguistic determinism that nearly eliminates individual or collective 
human agency altogether, subsuming it in the flow of discursive power.
24
  
As a result, some efforts to recuperate rhetorical agency in a way, as Campbell put it, that 
makes sense in rhetorical terms, assume that it is necessary to conceptualize rhetorical 
agency so that the end product preserves the capacity of the speaker or rhetor to affect 
change because postmodernism does not. Again, the focus on this requirement is 
understandable given that our discipline emphasizes the important part rhetoric plays in 
resisting ideological domination, not to mention the sense of powerlessness we 
experience in our everyday life-world. As Jodi Dean rightly acknowledges, 
 Everything in the global capitalist consumer-entertainment economy moves 
quickly . . . but little changes; or, better, the idea of effecting change--making a 
difference--seems extraordinarily difficult, even naive. The truly committed 
appear as fanatics or fundamentalists, or, more mildly, as quaint throwbacks 
refusing to accept the fact that the sixties are over.
25
 
It makes sense then that Campbell, like Cloud and likeminded thinkers in the discipline, 
would insist rhetorical agency must, at a minimum, entail the capacity of the rhetor to act 
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to resist ideological and discursive determination. This theoretical line in the sand is 
drawn to preserve the capacity of the speaker or rhetor to act by resisting ideological and 
discursive determination, thereby preserving invention, consciousness and choice as key 
to conceptualizing rhetorical agency. As Campbell maintains, “Whatever else it may be, 
rhetorical agency refers to the capacity to act, that is, to have the competence to speak or 
write in a way that will be recognized or heeded by others in one’s community.”26 Cheryl 
Geisler’s summary of the Alliance of Rhetorical Societies conference makes a similar 
observation about the participant’s estimation of rhetorical agency. Geisler claims “At the 
core of our common understanding of rhetorical agency at the ARS was the capacity of 
the rhetor to act.”27 She continues, arguing, “As rhetoricians, we generally take as a 
starting point that rhetoric involves action. This is perhaps the distinguishing 
characteristic of a rhetorical approach to discourse.”28 As Campbell argues, being capable 
of action by inventing rhetoric “permits entry into ongoing cultural conversations and is 
the sine quo non of public participating, much less resistance as a counter-public.”29  The 
cornerstone of this belief is lodged in the false idea that postmodernist conceptualizations 
of discourse washout or cancel the subject or agent’s ability to choose or meaningfully 
affect the distribution of power or resources in the culture, thereby eliminating any 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency that does not presume the speaker or rhetor 
maintains their capacity to exercise some control over the invention of rhetoric. The 
strength of this assumption about postmodern theory and its implications for theorizing 
about discourse is evident in a heuristic Crowley supplies to illustrate the importance of 
preserving choice in our conceptualizations of rhetorical agency. She says,  
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In a heuristic spirit…imagine (or if you have a pen and paper actually to draw) a 
line labeled “agency” whose ends are labeled “big” and “little.” “Big agency” is 
on the right and “little agency” is on the left. (Left and Right do not carry the 
usual political valence here). The criterion I use to distinguish big from little is the 
degree to which human volition is posited by a given theorist as an available 
source of invention within a rhetorical situation. Linguistic determinism 
represents the leftward end of the spectrum, while biological determinism marks 
its rightmost end.
30
  
The error here is in assuming there is a postmodern theorist who presumes discourse 
determines the subject or agent because they are linguistically determined. However, 
Crowley cites no author, nor does she attribute this belief to anyone in particular because 
no postmodern theorist subscribes to this view. It is not clear that postmodernism 
incapacitates or fails to account for the subject or agent and their ability to change the 
status quo or resist ideological domination. As Joshua Gunn and Christian Lundberg 
point out, both implicating Crowley and directly responding to the work of Geisler cited 
above, “None of these critics [Foucault, Derrida and Lacan] of a common-sense doctrine 
of agency deny that the subject or representations of the subject exert significant effects, 
nor do they deny the subject a kind of social effectivity or agency.”31 Yet, as Herndl and 
Licona read it, in a manner closely in keeping with Cloud, Geisler and Crowley’s 
assessment, 
In framing the question of agency, theorists, typically struggle with the dilemma 
of the postmodern subject and her ability to take purposeful political or social 
action. This has been an important question across the humanities over the last 
decade.
32
 
What none of these critics of postmodernism are able to prove however is that 
postmodern theory and its proponents do assume discourse determines the subject or 
agent. Thus, the efforts undertaken to recuperate a sense of rhetorical agency that makes 
sense in rhetorical terms results in a conceptualization that stresses the capacity of the 
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rhetor to invent and therefore resist the ideological conditions materially and 
symbolically constraining the status quo—even though this capacity was never really in 
question. Ronald Greene persuasively argues  
Rhetorical studies has too often relied on a model of rhetorical agency that 
privileges a strategic model of political communication. Alternative models of 
communication have been suggested, but the replacement  of one model for 
another leaves unexamined the presupposition that rhetorical  agency as 
communication primarily mediates the dialectical relationship between structure 
and social change.
33
  
It is my contention Greene’s criticism applies to scholars like Campbell, Geisler, Cloud 
and Crowley because each in their own way do not get after the underlying assumption 
that agency is a function of the speaker whose rhetoric is significant because it is 
designed to transform or change the distribution of power and resources in the culture. 
The criticism that results too often divides the rhetorical landscape into a world in which 
there are only two rhetorical agencies. The first assumes rhetoric is invested with the 
capacity to preserve the status quo, and is in this sense hegemonic, or it reflects agency in 
its counter-hegemonic potential to destabilize the distribution of power and resources in a 
culture. To be fair, in Cloud’s case, the criticism of postmodern philosophy stems chiefly 
from the fact that postmodernity is not avowedly Marxist and therefore counter-
hegemonic; Cloud makes her critical orientation refreshingly clear in part to distance her 
work from postmodern confusions. Her indict of postmodern philosophy largely hinges 
on her disagreement with the way in which interpellation guides the discipline’s 
understanding of ideology as it is informed by the work of Lois Althusser. Nevertheless, 
none of these scholar’s conceptualizations of rhetorical agency try to reconcile their view 
that agency is connected to the capacity of the speaker to create change in the status quo. 
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If agency is always connected to the capacity of the speaker or rhetor to use 
rhetoric to alter the status quo, that is to advocate for some transformation of the existing 
distribution of cultural power, then the conceptualization of rhetorical agency that results 
assumes there are only two kinds of rhetorical agency: discourse practices either support 
the status quo (because they are hegemonic discourse practices), or they are counter-
hegemonic discourse practices, which means rhetorical agency is conceptualized as 
essentially counter-hegemonic. Ultimately, the result of this conceptualization of 
rhetorical agency crowds out the inclusion of discourse practices in which subjects or 
agents are clearly invested, despite the fact that their rhetorical agency is not avowedly 
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic.  
Ronald Greene identifies the problem entailed in this insistence that rhetorical 
agency should above all else preserve the capacity of the rhetor or speaker to change the 
status quo. Rhetorical agency is both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic, but the fact that 
it is both should not imply our work as critics is only meaningful if it adopts some 
advocacy bent on undoing the status quo’s distribution of power.  We all agree our work 
in the discipline is important for other reasons in addition to our endeavors as social 
justice advocates. But if we assume our discourse practices are most important because 
they are counter-hegemonic, we ignore the various ways in which subjects or agents 
articulate agency in discourse practices that are neither hegemonic nor counter-
hegemonic. Instead, what results, as Greene points out, is anxiety. It is his argument the 
belief that agency is either counter-hegemonic or hegemonic generates anxiety, which is 
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expressed in criticism by some in the literature as a sort of “moral entrepreneurship.”34    
Specifically, Greene argues the 
attachment of rhetorical agency to a vision of political change…pushes rhetorical 
critics and theorists into becoming moral entrepreneurs scolding, correcting, and 
encouraging the body politic to improve the quality and quantity of political 
participation.
35
   
The theoretical contention driving the anxiety and the emphasis placed on a “vision of 
political change” is misplaced, as postmodernism does not maintain the speaker is 
somehow powerless or irrelevant unless our conceptualizations of rhetorical agency can 
preserve the connection between the speaker, their message, and the capacity of that 
message to cause changes in belief and behavior. More importantly, despite what these 
scholars may presume about postmodern philosophy, no postmodern thinkers maintain 
that discourse determines the agent. Greene rightly acknowledges that this emphasis on 
conceptualizing rhetorical agency so that it preserves the notion of speaker as change 
agent has created a sense of anxiety for scholars in the discipline—a conclusion I believe 
is especially persuasive given the phantom nature of the critique of postmodernity these 
scholars advance.  
I will concede the belief that postmodernism is deterministic is not without any 
foundation. Much of the time, this view that postmodern theorists subscribe to a theory of 
ideology in which rhetorical agency is virtually sapped of its resistive capacities is 
credited to Louis Althusser and his work on interpellation. Indeed, Cloud is quick to 
recognize this tendency and provides a stout criticism meant to rebut Althusser’s 
conclusions. The belief is that Althusser’s explanation of how ideology interpellates the 
subject into a process of domination in which the subject is unwittingly complicit offers 
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proof of the pitfalls of discursive determinism the postmodern philosophy implies. Cloud 
argues “Sue Clegg and Ellen Wood have noted, Althusser’s obsession with the structures 
of language and consciousness both rejected economic struggle and negated any notion of 
the subject as political agent within a class.”36 But Cloud’s evidence does not assume 
Althusser’s theoretical formation is incorrect. Instead, she assumes it is inadequate for 
grounding a conceptualization of rhetorical agency according to her Marxist prerogatives. 
Yet Terry Eagleton points out,  
Althusser's imaginary subject really corresponds to the Lacanian ego, which for 
psychoanalytic theory is merely the tip of the iceberg of the self. It is the ego, for 
Lacan, which is constituted in the imaginary as a unified entity; the subject ‘as a 
whole’ is the split, lacking, desiring effect of the unconscious, which for Lacan 
belongs to the 'symbolic' as well as the imaginary order.
37
 
Althusser confused Jacques Lacan’s view of the imaginary order with a psychoanalytic 
account of the ego. The ego is the part of the psychological make-up of the subject, but 
the identifications the ego assumes (or images it aligns with) are not imaginary in the 
sense that they are false or worse, some aspect of false-consciousness or not real (a 
fantasy, in the conventional sense the term is most often used). Althusser reads Lacan’s 
imaginary order as if Lacan were referring to ideological mystification, and not the 
assemblage of images the ego identifies with or against in order to represent itself to itself 
as coincident of the signifier. So, when someone is hailed, the ego drives the compulsion 
to either identify or dis-identify with the pronouncement, but the subject underlying this 
psychological process of ego identification is in no way made whole or completely 
determined by language—the subject remains undetermined, fragmented and de-
centered—and therefore the capacity to consciously resist the hailing remains undisturbed 
because the identification or dis-identification the subject or agent undergoes is always a 
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temporary fix for a deeper and more enduring problem that afflicts the process of 
subjectivity generally.  
Ideological interpellation according to Althusser then wrongly assumes Lacan 
thought the imaginary order was the same as what Marxists refer to as ideological 
mystification, and based on this error, interpellation has come to define the manner in 
which language and ideology interact to strip the subject or agent of their rhetorical 
agency. Where Campbell or Cloud cite Althusser as a proponent of a theory of discourse 
in which language determines the subject or agent, they are simply reproducing a 
fundamental error present in Althusser’s reading of Lacan.  
In sum, the belief some theorists have that postmodernism assumes discourse or 
language determines the subject is overstated. Additionally, where scholars are leaning 
on the work of Althusser to theorize about ideology and rhetoric, they recapitulate the 
error Althusser made in crafting his views about interpellation. The result of this 
misunderstanding produces a conceptualization of rhetorical agency that rehabilitates the 
liberal humanist version of agency Gaonkar criticized by simply amending the criticism 
to allow for a speaker to possess agency without dealing directly with the deeper 
theoretical implications that capital, the unconscious and language play in the 
fragmentation of the subject or agent and the articulation of agency. In addition, the 
ideology of humanism Gaonkar criticized goes untouched. Rehabilitating rhetorical 
agency to preserve the notion that the speaker possesses agency and maintains the 
capacity to change the status quo based on their ability to invent rhetoric suitable for 
resisting ideological domination, reinforces the view that there is only one genuine 
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conceptualization of rhetorical agency—the kind that is bent on changing the status quo, 
which of course assumes there are other subjects and agents that have unconscious, 
capitalistic and linguistic incentives for entrenching the status quo. In no way could this 
be exhaustive of rhetorical agency, which is why I suggest rather that rehabilitating 
rhetorical agency to preserve the capacity of the speaker to act, we should instead seek 
out those discourse practices in which rhetorical agency is manifest despite the fact that it 
is not necessarily counter-hegemonic or hegemonic. 
The Influence of Jacques Lacan on the Speech Communication Discipline 
Lacan’s thinking has gradually gained more attention in the discipline; and in 
particular its conceptualization of rhetorical agency, but, Lacan has never been as visible 
as Foucault. Perhaps Foucault’s response to a question asked after one of his lectures 
explains why Lacan has remained, until recently, of peripheral importance in the 
discipline. Foucault, in the response I am referring to that followed one February 1982 
lecture at the Collège de France, said  
Let’s say that there have not been many people who in the last years—I will say 
in the twentieth century—have posed this question of truth. Not that many people 
have posed the question: What is involved in the case of the subject and truth?
38
  
Only to add, “As far as I am concerned, I see only two. I see only Heidegger and 
Lacan.”39 He then confessed, “Personally…I have tried to reflect on all this from the side 
of Heidegger…However, you cannot avoid Lacan when you pose these kinds of 
questions.”40 In light of these broader questions concerning truth and subjectivity, it is not 
possible to underestimate the impact Foucault’s thinking has had on the speech 
communication discipline’s development of rhetorical theory and its attendant 
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conceptualization of rhetorical agency, but Lacan’s impact on both theory and agency 
remained, at least throughout the nineties, peripheral at best.   
In our discipline, the first substantial mention made of Lacan in reference to 
rhetorical theory is Lyod Pettegrew’s 1977 essay Psychoanalytic Theory: A Neglected 
Rhetorical Dimension in Philosophy and Rhetoric.
41
  Although no one took up the 
challenge immediately, Pettegrew argued more than two decades ago that 
“psychoanalytic theory is a useful conceptual tool which can be of service in the study of 
rhetoric in its contemporary context.”42 Michael Hyde’s book review of Alan Sheridan’s 
1977 translation of Ecrits: A Collection brought Lacan’s thought back into the journals, 
but Hyde’s work after 1980, as his well-regarded book The Life Giving Gift of 
Acknowledgement
43
 clearly shows, turned toward the work of Heidegger and Emmanuel 
Levinas and not Lacan, which suggests in the end he, like Foucault, followed Heidegger. 
Nonetheless, as did Pettegrew’s essay three years prior, Hyde’s essay Jacques Lacan's 
Psychoanalytic Theory of Speech and Language, in the February issue of the 1980 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, did at least confirm a nascent interest in making Lacan’s 
work relevant for the discipline.
44
  Thomas Douglass, again treating Lacan as peripheral 
source of intrigue but little more, wrote a thorough going appraisal of Lacan in his essay 
Burke, Neitzsche, Lacan: Three Perspectives on the Rhetoric of Order in 1993,
45
 but it 
seems neither Pettegrew, Hyde nor Douglass captured enough attention to raise Lacan’s 
visibility for speech communication scholars. Despite the low profile Lacan’s work 
operated under in the seventies and eighties, it is in the work of Barbara Biesecker 
throughout the nineties that Lacan’s import for the discipline is best demonstrated.  
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Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Barbara Biesecker 
In a 1998 book review, Barbara Biesecker initially argues Lacan “will have 
already been the great theorist of rhetoric for the twenty-first century,” only to qualify her 
prognostication in the next breath by amending her claim to the  
more modest proposal that the work of contemporary rhetorical theorists and 
critics will be considerably enriched by risking contact with the best and brightest 
of the ‘new’ psychoanalysts of culture and society whose primary aim is to move 
Lacanian psychoanalysis out of the rarefied space of the analytic situation and 
press it insights into the service of ideological critique.
46
  
Biesecker remains Lacan’s most tireless proponent in the discipline, as she has for nearly 
two decades incorporated Lacan’s work into her writing in the overarching interest of 
securing a foothold for Lacanian psychoanalytic understandings of the subject and 
rhetoric. In a 1992 essay, Biesecker cites Lacan to explain her criticism of Campbell’s 
Man Cannot Speak for Her, and in keeping with what I am claiming in this dissertation, it 
is Biesecker’s argument Lacanian subjectivity demonstrates how agency cannot be 
conceptualized as solely a product of “individual consciousness and will.”47 Campbell’s 
work, by Biesecker’s reading, assumes  
social change is thought to be more or less a function of each individual woman's 
capacity to throw off the mantle of her own self-perpetuated oppression, to 
recognize her real self-interests,[and also] to intervene on behalf of those 
interests.
48
  
For Biesecker, Campbell is correct in insisting “women’s access to subjectivity is 
indispensable to a political program that seeks,” among other goals, “the empowerment 
of women,” but Biesecker remains suspicious of the ability to transcend individual 
identity markers like income, age, race, etc., in a politics premised upon the agency of 
“sisterhood” Campbell endorses.49 Biesecker is convinced, “following the cues of both 
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Jacques Lacan (who has taught us to be more than a bit skeptical of ‘the talking cure’)” in 
addition to feminist scholars “working between the post-Freudian and materialist 
perspectives who have warned us of the perils of sifting women's problems” as she puts 
it, “through pathologizing filters,” that Campbell’s theoretical take on “female 
subjectivity” results in a “conceptualization wherein the ideology of individualism and 
the old patriarchal alignments are reinscribed.”50 At this early juncture, Biesecker is 
already showing how Lacan’s conceptualization of subjectivity informs our theory of 
rhetoric, agency, and above all, any political strategy our discipline advocates to 
transform the status quo.  
As Biesecker is illustrating in her criticism of Campbell’s view of rhetorical 
agency, the key issue, as it remains today, is the debate about how best to conceptualize 
rhetorical agency in light of the critique of humanist agency. As Biesecker argues, what is 
suspicious is the presupposition that  
Effective rhetorical discourse, that is to say rhetoric worthy of inclusion in the 
canon, is the outcome of strategic choices made among available techniques of 
persuasion on the part of an autonomous individual.
51
  
Lacan’s conceptualization of subjectivity was indispensable in advancing this discussion, 
as Biesecker’s work in responding to Campbell suggests. Encouragingly, the move to 
incorporate Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that Biesecker urged in 1998 was soon 
followed-up by Joshua Gunn and Christian Lundberg, who have since joined Biesecker 
as Lacan’s chief advocates in the literature.  
Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Joshua Gunn 
For Lacanians in the discipline, Gunn’s 2003 essay Refiguring Fantasy: 
Imagination and Its Decline in U.S. Rhetorical Studies, marks a significant turn in the 
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literature, as it represents the most comprehensive and thorough inclusion of Lacan’s 
teaching into the discussion about rhetorical theory, subjectivity and agency since 
Biesecker’s initial work in the early nineties.52 Gunn followed this essay up with a 
similarly titled work a year later, Refitting Fantasy: Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity and 
Talking to the Dead.
53
  Gunn’s purpose in both papers is to connect Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory and its attendant understanding of rhetoric to the broader debates 
about rhetorical theory and agency already underway in the discipline. In keeping with 
what we must consider a theme for Lacanians in the discipline, rhetorical agency for 
Gunn is not reducible to the conscious direction of an autonomous individual’s will or 
intention. As Gunn says in the rejoinder to Lundberg published a year after Refitting 
Fantasy, “Owing to the longstanding commitment to the autonomous, self-transparent 
subject, many roads have not been taken in rhetorical studies.”54 Again, it is Lacan’s 
theory of subjectivity and the role of the unconscious in producing agency that proves 
indispensable in advancing the critique of the humanist subject, thereby suggesting an 
alternative theoretical path our discipline may choose to follow concerning rhetorical 
agency. Gunn’s reading of psychoanalytic theory provides both the proof for his criticism 
of the concept of agency and a method for interpreting rhetoric. In brief, Gunn believes 
agency is a fantasy, driven by the misrecognition of desire underlying the Imaginary 
order of the unconscious. Gunn draws upon Lacan’s theory to explain the distinction 
between what fantasy means in a psychoanalytic sense, and what fantasy means in a 
conventional sense. The distinction is necessary for Gunn’s method, as he suggests the 
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process of interpreting rhetoric entails “fixing” the fantasy before interpreting it 
according to the unconscious desire at work in the Imaginary order of the human psyche.  
To explain the distinction in Refitting Fantasy, and to locate the discussion within 
the debate about subjectivity and agency, Gunn revisits a familiar reference to every 
disciplinary initiate: fantasy theme analysis courtesy of Ernest Bormann. The move is 
intended to illustrate how fantasy for Bormann seems to suggest a way in which groups 
of people converge around a consistent set of symbols and thereby participate in some 
delusion, or in less derisive terms, an agenda that is common to the group. In a thoughtful 
move, Gunn revisits one of Bormann’s key sources about fantasy, Robert Freed Bales, in 
order to show how Bormann’s conventional understanding of the word fantasy obscures 
the more nuanced meaning Bales sought to describe—one that is decidedly 
psychoanalytic. With Bales as his resource, Gunn deftly works in Lacanian terminology 
and the psychoanalytic theory the terminology is meant to support in order to show the 
reader how Lacan’s theory of subjectivity accounts for agency in the formation of 
subjectivity via the fantasy. Gunn’s essay deserves much credit for linking rhetorical 
theory to Lacan’s thinking by showing how unconscious desire in the Imaginary order 
underwrites the “imaginary fantasy” Bormann’s method is meant to describe. 
Putting this distinction in place is necessary for Gunn to put the Lacanian order of 
the Imaginary to theoretical use. In this way, Gunn uses his understanding of Lacan and 
the Freudian resources Bales provides to show how a fantasy in a psychoanalytic sense, 
the one Bormann ignores, is not some active misunderstanding, agenda, or even delusion 
that has no basis in reality or is even constitutive of reality for a group, but rather is an 
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active misrecognition of what cannot be expressed that underlies existence as such in 
reality. As I will explain in just a moment, for Gunn, reality is distinguishable from the 
Real order; and it is the interaction between the Imaginary and Real order that the fantasy 
is formulated. Back to the point here, the distinction between fantasy as a delusion or 
agenda and fantasy as a manifestation of the human psyche is essential, as Gunn’s 
analysis of clairvoyants in the essay proves, a fantasy, no matter how fictional, persists as 
a specific articulation of desire and is therefore not simply some abstract comment on 
reality that is wrong or incorrect; instead it indicates the existence of an underlying 
structure that rhetoricians can and should interpret: the Imaginary.  
Gunn maintains the Imaginary order operates by way of a misrecognition inherent 
in the act of fantasizing itself, and in this way, the specific fantasy made present in speech 
is a cover for the fundamental fantasy driving agency. Thus, for Gunn agency “is born at 
precisely at the moment one gives up autonomy,” an experience which is simultaneously 
“traumatic and pleasurable,” but an experience that remains, nonetheless, necessary in 
order for the subject to act.
55
 While fantasies are, in the conventional sense the word 
typically confers, constituted in speech via a consistent set of symbols and construct an 
agenda or delusion for the subject, it is the very act of fantasizing itself that Gunn is 
determined to describe—which is why he draws upon Lacanian concepts like the Real, 
and in particular the Imaginary order to explain agency.  
Out of necessity, as these terms in Lacan’s thought are knotted together so that 
one cannot be understood without reference to the others, Gunn explains what he means 
in using the registers or orders Lacan labeled the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real to 
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account for agency. These three registers or orders underlie the Lacanian theory of 
subjectivity and ultimately help Gunn to define agency. A brief detour into the specific 
meaning of these three terms is needed before I redirect the reader’s attention to the 
import of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the speech communication discipline.  
The Real, Imaginary and Symbolic Orders 
The Real for Gunn suggests “something akin to an external absolute that cannot 
be imagined or symbolized,” but “is only understood in distinction from the symbolic and 
imaginary.”56 To enrich Gunn’s point, it is notable that in the seventies Lacan maintains 
the Real is defined as the lack of a lack for a subject,
57
 which for Gunn, as its opposite 
rightly implies, means a whole or complete subjectivity. The Imaginary order is 
“imaginary” in the sense that wholeness or fully complete subjectivity is a fantasy, one 
that is symptomatic of the subject’s desire to be Real in the sense they are whole or 
complete; lacking nothing, or a lack of a lack.
58
  For Lacan, the Imaginary order confers 
this sense of completeness for the subject in the way the ego identifies with the image of 
the body as it appears in a reflecting surface; a notion which in Lacan’s thought is 
referred to as the “mirror stage.” As Gunn argues in Refitting Fantasy,  
For Lacan, the mirror stage of development marks the emergence of the imago or 
spectral self, akin to a self-concept, which we internalize as children at the 
moment when language and image come together in the psyche.
59
  
At no point does Gunn suggest he believes such a wholeness of subjectivity is achievable 
in the Imaginary order—as that is precisely his point—undivided subjectivity or 
autonomy is the fantasy in its fundamental form that underwrites the Imaginary order and 
all fantasies as such.
60
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It is clear the Imaginary and the Real orders are of prime importance to Gunn’s 
way of thinking about Lacan, but he does not neglect the Symbolic order completely. The 
Symbolic order in Gunn’s thinking consists of “the use of speech,” that is significant 
because it “marks an audible submission to an exteriority: the Law, initially linguistic 
rules, but later social codes, morality, contracts and the like.”61 For the Lacan of the late 
sixties and early seventies, the Symbolic order does refer to speech use, but Lacan 
increasingly emphasized the role of culture and language generally in defining the 
Symbolic order. For this reason Lundberg criticizes Gunn’s underdevelopment of the 
Symbolic order in Refitting Fantasy. As Lundberg sees it, “Although Gunn should be 
commended for his use of the Imaginary as an interpretive category” it remains the case 
that “the category of the Symbolic remains underexplored.”62  
 As Lacan stresses in these later years, the Symbolic order always entails the 
Other because desire is the desire of the Other, which means the subject’s desire is 
produced in its initial form by the language which is the Other in the subject’s culture. 
While desire clearly entails the desire of other people, or the “other,” for the purposes of 
thinking through the importance of speech use for the subject, Lacan used the uppercase 
“Other” to designate how desire is produced by language in the culture generally. For 
Lundberg, who admits the distinction may amount to the splitting of hairs, the difference 
is important because it links our interpretive practices and use of psychoanalytic theory to 
rhetoric. The move to locate rhetorical interpretation in the Imaginary order weakens 
Lacan’s import for the discipline because it reduces the importance Lacan placed on 
speech use in the formation of subjectivity and agency.   
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In the Symbolic order, speech that seems to confer the Real is often reflected in 
the ways people or individuals cannot come up with words to describe their pain, or 
vainly try to describe the sublime or awesome character of an experience (like a beautiful 
sunset, having a baby, or in speech bent on reconciling death or explaining the orgasm). 
What gets lost in the abstraction is the sense in which a subject’s failure to articulate the 
essential experience is also a symptom of the way in which every subject is precluded 
from experiencing the wholeness of being that drives any attempt to articulate the 
sublime or the awesome in the first place. It is clear Gunn assumes the production of 
desire for a subject is unconscious, but these unconscious workings manifest themselves 
as consciously articulated fantasies about desire for a subject which, when interpreted 
psychoanalytically, reveal the workings of the Imaginary order. However, this important 
relationship between speech, subjectivity and the Symbolic order gets lost in Gunn’s 
essay. Before elaborating further, and now that the definitions of the Real, Imaginary and 
Symbolic orders are in place, I would like to redirect the reader’s attention to the impact 
of Lacan’s thinking in the discipline by detailing the debate Gunn’s essay sparked with 
Christian Lundberg. 
Lundberg’s Response to Gunn 
Even a charitable reading of Gunn’s work leaves the impression that the Symbolic 
order is not as important as the Real or Imaginary orders, a curious fact given that the 
Symbolic order is the one in which Lacan’s import for the study of rhetoric is most 
clearly established. Since the Symbolic order produces for the subject the desire of the 
Other, and desire of the Other is conveyed via tropes and schemes (principally metaphor), 
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Gunn’s rendering of the Symbolic order washes out the rhetorical ingredient of Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic theory. The irony of this move is that it results in the same oversight 
Gunn criticizes Lawrence Grossberg for committing in Grossberg’s rejection of motives 
in favor of events and practices.
63
 Thus, for Lundberg, while Gunn’s command of this 
literature and the theory it conveys is impressive, what remains to be seen is how Lacan’s 
Symbolic order also fits into the formation of subjectivity and agency.  
The effect of Gunn’s attempt to stabilize interpretation through the fantasy of 
agency comes at a certain cost…[By] Framing psychoanalysis as a middle 
position in debates regarding agency, ‘Refitting Fantasy’ misses the opportunity 
to traverse the Imaginary and confront the Symbolic on its own terms. By 
confronting the Symbolic and restoring its primacy in Lacanian interpretation, 
rhetoricians can draw on Lacan’s suggestive use of specifically rhetorical 
thematics.
64
  
Thus, in the rebuttal to Gunn’s argument, it is Lundberg who seeks to engage that 
portion of Lacan’s thinking that is of most use to rhetoricians. I am intrigued, as is 
Lundberg, by Lacan’s extensive reliance upon rhetoric as a source for conducting 
psychoanalytic interpretation, as the overlap reflected in his clinical concerns fits exactly 
what rhetoricians are already equipped to do: read tropes and schemes and provide an 
interpretation of them. Lacan’s thought certainly evolved over the many decades he 
hosted his seminars, however, one consistent resource for Lacan was rhetoric. As he says 
in Seminar XX,  
The universe is a flower of rhetoric, this literary echo may perhaps help us to 
understand that the ego (moi), can also be a flower of rhetoric, which grows in the 
pot of the pleasure principle…65  
As this quotation illustrates, Lacan believed the subject’s rhetoric reflected their desires, 
and any careful analysis of the subject’s rhetoric reveals the relationship between the 
subject’s unconscious and the pathways through which their unique desires travel. As 
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rhetoricians, Lacan’s Symbolic order illustrates precisely how rhetoric is connected to 
and reflects the subject’s unique network of pleasures and pains which, in turn, aids our 
inquest into how agency is articulated. 
The Future of Lacan in the Discipline 
While it is clear both Lundberg and Gunn, in conjunction with Biesecker, are 
doing their part to advance the import of Lacanian psychoanalysis for the discipline, these 
works also suffer from a defect not of their own making. Lacan’s seminars are now 
receiving more attention from translators, but when these pivotal essays were published 
by Gunn and Lundberg, one of Lacan’s vital seminars, Seminar XVII, remained available 
only in the original French. Since this work is now available, as Russell Grigg’s 
translation of Seminar XVII was published in 2007,
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 we can see more clearly how 
Lacan’s view of the Symbolic, discourse, and language had become in later part of his 
teaching. In this Seminar Lacan maintains for the first time, and it becomes a point he 
reiterates in the 1972 Seminar, that  
discourse is…a necessary structure that goes well beyond speech, which is always 
more or less occasional.  What I prefer…is discourse without speech…discourse 
can clearly subsist without words…in fundamental relations which would literally 
not be [maintainable] without language.  Through the instrument of language a 
large number of stable relations are established, inside which something that is 
much larger and goes much further than actual utterances [enonciations] can, of 
course, be inscribed.
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This work is a good resource because it distinguishes between speech, discourse, and 
language in Lacan’s theory, thereby clarifying what the Symbolic order entails when 
conducting psychoanalytic rhetorical analysis. This is a key point that advances what 
Lundberg advocates is one of the reasons Lacan should be considered a resource in his 
rebuttal to Gunn.  
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Seminar XVII is also important because it contains the best developed 
explanation of Lacan’s theory of the four discourses. In part, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to revisit Seminar XVII in order to articulate how Lacan’s teaching that 
year suggests there are four rhetorical agencies. These four different manifestations of 
rhetorical agency in discourse are not only elaborated upon in greater detail than in any 
previous seminar available in English, Lacan also spends time developing the analytical 
models he suggests analysts use to interpret the rhetoric comprising a subject or agent’s 
speech. Thus, while my work in this dissertation shares many affinities at a theoretical 
level with the Lacanians working in the discipline, the dissertation means to be the first 
systematic effort in our discipline to develop and apply Lacan’s theory of the four 
discourses as it is laid-out in Seminar XVII.  As I will show in chapter two, Lacan’s 
strengths as a resource for our discipline begins to show best when psychoanalysis is 
connected to the theory of the four discourses and the method it entails.   
Posthumanist Rhetorical Agency 
The conceptualization of rhetorical agency which emerges from Lacan’s 
philosophy clarifies the impasses created by the postmodernist debate about rhetorical 
agency at work in the literature. Rather than viewing rhetorical agency as determined by 
discourse or ideologically totalizing, which puts conceptualizations of rhetorical agency 
into a theoretical corner whereby agency is either complicit in or opposed to the political-
economic status quo, Lacan’s theory suggests there are at least four rhetorical agencies— 
none of which assume discourse is completely deterministic or ideologically totalizing. 
The argument is posthumanist psychoanalytic philosophy opens up the theoretical space 
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rhetoricians need to access the distinctively different ways in which subjects or agents (be 
they individuals or persons or otherwise) affect the structures of discourse with rhetoric 
while acknowledging the impact ideology and discourse play in the formation of 
subjectivity. I agree in part with Campbell and Cloud in particular, because both insist in 
their own way on the fundamental importance of a conceptualization of rhetorical agency 
that explains resistance to the political-economic status quo, a point I am not disputing. 
What is at issue, and I think Greene’s work is especially important here, is the theoretical 
and methodological problems inherent in conceptualizing rhetorical agency as essentially 
comprised of resistance to the status quo on the part of a speaker or rhetor. Lacan’s  
theory of discourse accounts for the way rhetoric is put to the service of changing the 
status quo, but it also accounts for the way rhetoric is bent on entrenching the status quo.  
Most importantly, Lacan’s theory presumes agency is also reflected in discourse practices 
that are not necessarily counter-hegemonic or hegemonic.  
The explanatory power Lacan’s theory of discourse provides in this regard is in 
part why I think psychoanalytic philosophy has much to offer the discipline’s 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency. As a corrective to the postmodern impasse 
Gaonkar’s criticism provoked in the discipline, Lacan’s theory of discourse includes 
hegemonic agency and counter-hegemonic rhetorical agency, but makes allowances for 
the articulation of agency that does not fit into either one of these categories. All four 
articulations of rhetorical agency help speech communication theorists explain the 
nuances of rhetorical agency. Where postmodern philosophy in the discipline often ends 
unproductively in a simple acknowledgment of the merits of the postmodern critique, 
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Lacan’s work gives rhetoricians access to a theory that explains rhetorical agency in a 
way that goes beyond the belief that discourse practices are either counter-hegemonic or 
hegemonic. In this way we can sidestep the impacts of anxiety ridden conceptualizations 
of rhetorical agency Greene thoroughly criticized in 2006. 
Lacan does say “the agent is not at all someone who does but someone who is 
caused to act.”68 But he is not using the word “cause” in the sense that a person or 
individual takes up some stance against some social injustice and lobbies others to correct 
it; he is trying to explain how the cause that drives an agent of a subject is unconscious 
and therefore not the result of adherence to a particular ideology or political-economic 
agenda or prerogative. The cause of action is not determined by the subject or agent’s 
capacity to resist material or symbolic ideological constraints because it is foundationally 
caused by desire. This means, in contrast with the rehabilitated humanist version of 
rhetorical agency Campbell, Crowley, Cloud and Geisler’s work suggests, an agent or a 
subject is produced in a discourse structure as a result of some stimulus that drives or 
compels the subject to speak regardless of their ideological suspicions and the imposition 
of constraints. Unlike conceptualizations of rhetorical agency that assume the rhetor or 
speaker possesses agency because they seek to change the status quo, which assumes a 
priori that a subject or agent exists before the status quo, the agent or subject in Lacanian 
theory is not pre-given, but always exists at the intersection between language and its 
effect on a subject in the process of subject formation in the status quo. Subjectivity is an 
effect of the signifier. The speaker or rhetor’s agency is not derived from its capacity to 
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resist the status quo; it is an effect of the rhetoric in the particular articulation of a 
discourse practice.  
So many discourse practices make up our everyday lives it seems futile to 
catalogue them, but it is clear all of these discourse practices make-up what we call 
rhetorical agency. What gets lost in the belief that agency is either counter-hegemonic or 
hegemonic is the fact that agency is always expressed in terms that do not fit either 
category. Lacan enriches our conceptualization of rhetorical agency by suggesting the 
relationships that constitute agency in an everyday sense are varied, and are not 
distinguishable on the basis of their resistance to the status quo or acquiescence to it. 
Lacan asks, “What does 'agent' mean?” before adding  
The verb agir, 'to act' has more than one resonance in our language, beginning 
with that of actor. Actionnaire, 'shareholder,' also -- why not, the word is made 
from action, and this shows you that une action, 'a share,' is perhaps not quite 
what one thinks it is. Activiste also -- doesn't the activist properly speaking define 
himself on the basis of the fact that he tends to consider himself to be rather the 
instrument of something…And finally, what one quite simply calls mon agent, 
'my agent'.'  You can see what this means in general: 'I pay him for that.'  Not 
even, 'I compensate him for having nothing else to do,' capable of doing 
something else.
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What Lacan’s etymology of the word reveals is that an act is not reducible to capacities 
or invention, as the word refers to a much wider set of phenomena. Rhetorical agency is 
manifest in many different types of discourse practices. The nuance of the term is lost in 
many conceptualizations of rhetorical agency because some assume postmodern accounts 
of rhetorical agency crowd out the capacity for action since they do not entail a rhetor. 
This is not a defect of postmodern theory per se, so much as it is a misguided effort to 
recuperate the speaker centered theory from the humanist tradition.  
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In Campbell and Geisler’s writing, the terms “speaker” or “author” and, in 
particular, the “rhetor,” are terms used interchangeably with “agent” or “subject,” and the 
concepts of “subjectivity” and “subject positions” in the discussion about rhetorical 
agency. There is considerable tension generated in the ambiguity of these terms. The 
confusion the terminology creates, in my view, is caused by the inability of the theory to 
distinguish between the individual and person, that is, the flesh and blood embodiment 
that is a human being, from the subject or the agent that is created when we consider 
language as a structure. The subject is a theoretical term meant to refer to the effect of the 
signifier on a flesh and blood embodiment of a human being. This means, the speaker, 
author or rhetor is a human being, but to be a subject or agent, it is not necessary that you 
be a human being—the signifier is the only necessary condition. The conceptualization of 
rhetorical agency Campbell, Geisler, Crowley and Cloud articulate assumes the 
individual or the person is a necessary condition for conceptualizing rhetorical agency. 
The result is a conceptualization that does not distinguish between the person or the 
individual and the subject or agent. Failing to distinguish between people or individuals 
and subjects or agents creates a conceptualization of agency that remains committed to a 
critical practice in which the critic seeks out and speculates about the rhetor’s conscious 
intentions and seeks to locate those intentions within a political framework in which 
agency is defined by the capacity of the speaker or rhetor to resist ideological 
domination. But this view does not answer the theoretical predicament Gaonkar’s 
criticism meant to remedy.  
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For example, since Campbell and Geisler remain committed to a 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency that does not adequately distinguish between 
people or individuals and rhetors, speakers or authors, but they are aware of Gaonkar’s 
critique, they are forced to reconcile the criticism by contending that rhetors, speakers 
and authors use rhetoric to articulate a subject position or are pressed into a subject 
position as a result of the imposition of an ideology. For them, a subject’s position in the 
culture is constituted through rhetoric, which means the subject or agent is constrained by 
the forces of the language at work in the culture but is not wholly determined by 
language. The solution they present then to the criticism Gaonkar made preserves the 
capacity of a person or individual to resist the constraints imposed upon rhetorical agency 
by the language and ideology, so the rhetor, speaker or author’s agency is not wholly 
determined by the language, but, in the end, we are left with a conceptualization that is 
limited because it insists that rhetorical agency is a function of a speaker defined by the 
capacity of the speaker or rhetor to resist ideological domination.   
The key argument here is that rhetorical agency is not necessarily produced by a 
speaker or a rhetor that is indistinguishable from a person or individual. What else are we 
to make of rhetorical agency and advertising jingles, or expletives uttered when no one 
other than the individual or person is there to hear them? It seems we would recognize 
that rhetoric exerts a force in both circumstances, even though both of these examples do 
not entail a speaker or a rhetor. The question concerning rhetorical agency then requires a 
conceptualization that does not see a speaker or rhetor as conditions necessary to account 
for rhetorical agency.  
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Gunn and Lundberg argue that the “usual suspects,” those scholars who insist 
rhetorical agency as a theoretical concept must presuppose that the “human subject [is] 
‘given’...instead of produced,” commit an error in thinking that the human subject is not a 
product of discourse.
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  Their criticism identifies precisely the error at work in 
conceptualizations of rhetorical agency where agency is thought of as a function of the 
speaker or rhetor. While it is clear individual human beings exist independent of the 
language, agency in the literature means to refer to the flesh and blood persons, a discreet 
individual using language. However, subject and agent are entirely theoretical terms 
meant to refer to the alienating effect of language on the individual or person. 
Analytically speaking, the subject or agent as theoretical concepts accounts for the extent 
to which the individual or person is a product of language or, more closely, an effect of 
speech. Inclusion in the culture depends upon language, and in this respect all persons or 
individuals are subject to the culture because they are subjected to speech. This means 
human beings produce speech, but they are also produced by speech. Theoretically 
speaking, as Lacan suggests, “the subject that concerns us here, the subject not insofar as 
it produces discourse but insofar as it is produced [fait], cornered even [fait comme un 
rat], by discourse, is the subject of the enunciation.”71  
The subject of enunciation could be a speaker, but it could also be God, or 
science, or any other agency invested with value or meaning for the subject or agent that 
sets desire in motion through speech. Since Lacan is focused on desire, his theory of the 
subject or agent is content to trace both the conscious and unconscious operations that 
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drive the logic of desire at work in a discourse, but it is in the unconscious logic of desire 
that Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory has purchase for rhetorical studies.  
For the purposes of theorizing about rhetoric, the speaker-centered 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency not only forces the theory to limit the explanatory 
power of rhetorical agency to only those instances in which a person or individual 
generates the rhetoric, it also theoretically presumes that rhetoric always corresponds to 
consciousness, and that rhetoric is always put to the service of motivations and intentions 
that are known to individuals or persons in a transparent manner. A person’s 
consciousness in the conceptualization pre-exists the rhetoric, as the person or individual 
in the theory is pre-given and exists prior to language. Preserving theoretical space for the 
self-conscious individual or person who uses rhetoric to achieve some desired objective 
results in a defective conceptualization of rhetorical agency. These theorists stress the 
importance of invention, to establish the a priori necessity of a speaker, someone 
indistinguishable from an individual, who harnesses the persuasive power of the language 
to produce a consciously determined objective. This may all be very well for a speaker or 
rhetor or author centered approach to the question of agency, but where rhetorical agency 
is concerned, it is my argument we need to look for rhetorical agencies in discourse and 
not assume that rhetorical agency is locatable and identifiable within a person or an 
individual or as a function of ideological resistance. For the purposes of theorizing about 
rhetorical agency as a concept, it is necessary to distinguish between the person or 
individual and the subject or agent so that we can account for different kinds of agency 
structured in discourse.  
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People or individuals are meant to refer to the living, breathing body that exists 
independently of language—even when that body is comatose. Subjects or agents are 
distinct from persons or individuals because people and individuals need not breathe or 
live to persist as subjects and agents for other people or individuals. If it is the case that 
liberal humanist agency, with its stress upon the will, the intention, the conscious, self-
invented rhetorician is theoretically defunct, that does not mean it’s opposite, the 
unwilled, unintended and unawares rhetorician becomes the theoretical alternative. But 
this is precisely the theoretical alternative Campbell, Crowley, Geisler and Cloud 
attribute to postmodern and post-structuralist  theory—despite the fact such a view is 
decidedly not postmodern or post-structuralist . 
I am not contending that facts and describing the states of affairs in the world 
accurately is not important or is somehow unrelated to the concept of rhetorical agency. 
Kenneth Burke is quick to point out this basic function of rhetoric, i.e. setting the facts 
straight, is not to be overlooked. As he says,  
Of course, there is always the possibility of ‘mystification,” in the sense that 
language can be used to deceive. And at least as a kind of rough preparation for 
finer scrutiny, rhetorical analysis should always be ready to expose 
mystifications…72 
However, when rhetorical agency is conceived of as a function of the speaker, and the 
speaker is indistinguishable from a person or individual who creates change or resists 
ideological domination, then the theory about rhetorical agency that results becomes a 
theory about an individual’s consciousness. The key error here is in assuming that the 
speaker or author is dispensing rhetoric in a way that is somehow fully intended or 
motivated by the “I” that is the individual or person.  
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The criticism of rhetorical agency I am making is that all of these scholars treat 
rhetorical agency as if it were a function of the speaker or author in keeping with 
Gaonkar’s intentional model of persuasion—it is adapted to suit the elements of 
rhetorical agency that persist once the full weight of postmodern and post-structuralist 
criticism is brought to bear on traditionalist assumptions about rhetorical agency. The 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency that emerges assumes if there must be a speaker or 
author, and speakers or authors are always individuals or people, then rhetorical agency 
must be a function of an individual or person. There is no room here for distinguishing 
theoretically between agency and people or individuals. Since individuals or persons are 
conscious, they self-direct, in a way that is presumably transparent to them, those 
intentions or motivations that allow them to connect what they desire in terms of belief or 
behavior to the capacity to change belief and behavior in others. This is the use of speech 
to get what you want, which presumes that you know why you want it in some sort of 
conscious, transparent or directed and unmediated, deliberative thought process. 
Preserving theoretical space for the speaker or author as an individual or person who uses 
rhetorical agency to affect social or cultural change is important, but it unnecessarily 
fuses rhetorical agency to self-consciousness, will and intent, thereby reproducing the 
fundamental conceptual defect of rhetorical agency Gaonkar criticized.  
As Gunn and Lundberg suggest, pointing out that “the subject is constructed and 
not naturally given,” delineates “one of our scholarly tasks as that of tracking the 
rhetorical effects of doctrines of agency.”73 It is not the purpose of their essay to 
reconstruct an alternative theory of rhetorical agency, but they do provide guiding 
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principles for reformulating rhetorical agency according to Lacanian psychoanalytic 
philosophy. They argue Lacan’s teaching 
Attributes agency to tropes, to the Symbolic, and to enjoyment (Lacan, Ecrits 
138-168; also see Lacan, Seminar XX 3, 56). This agency possesses the subject, 
thereby bringing the fantasy of the agent to life. For Lacan, the 'response'-ible 
reading of the dynamics of subjectivity requires reference to rhetoric (Lundberg 
500-501).
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For Lacan, analyzing a patient’s discourse began by listening closely to the 
metaphors the patient incorporated to articulate their symptoms. Metaphors often contain 
clues about the underlying unconscious logic of desire driving the patient’s compulsion to 
create a relationship with a therapist (i.e. seek out therapy). In this way, Lacanian 
psychoanalytic methods are entirely complimentary to the interpretation and criticism of 
rhetoric. This is why Gunn and Lundberg conclude “Lacanian psychoanalytic theory can 
help rhetoricians navigate the posthumanist theoretical landscape in a characteristically 
rhetorical way.”75 However, setting the methodological complementarity aside, 
psychoanalytic theory also helps clarify what we mean when using the terms agent and 
subject to account for rhetorical agency. Rather than assuming the speaker or rhetor pre-
exists the discourse, the subject in a posthumanist paradigm only exists as a product of 
discourse. In this way, a posthumanist paradigm accounts for the structural impact of 
language on the formation of subjectivity. 
Gunn and Lundberg elaborate on this point, arguing “The subject, or rather the 
idea of an identity that is presumed synonymous with the human subject,” merely exists 
“as a suture that attempts to mediate the alienating process of signification.”76 This means 
the agent or subject is not necessarily a speaker or an individual person, but rather is a 
subject or agent by virtue of the fact that signifiers are necessary to have an identity in the 
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first place. Individual people mediate the alienating effects of language acquisition by 
assuming signifiers that represent for that person or individual what they signify to other 
people, objects, and subjects.  
The inability of signifiers to match our identity, coupled with the fact that words 
are necessary for identity, produces alienation—this is what Lacan’s maxim “the signifier 
represents the subject for another signifier” cryptically refers to. Agent and subject are 
theoretical constructs meant to describe how rhetorical agency is language governed, 
determined in part by speech use, and structured by discourse. The common sense 
version of rhetorical agency as a function of the speaker cannot theoretically account for 
the subject or agent because the assumption that the subject or agent exists independent 
of and prior to the discourse subsumes the “radical contingency” of the human subject, 
“its fragmentary qualities, and/or its dependence on generative systems beyond the seat 
of an insular individual consciousness.”77 The conclusion here is rhetorical agency as a 
concept, when it is presumed to be agency if and only if it is a product of the speaker, 
captures neither the radical contingency nor fragmentation of the subject or agent as 
theoretical constructs. Distinguishing between theory and practice yields a better 
criticism because the unconscious, capital and language structures are the focus and not 
consciousness or intent.  
The Unconscious as a Factor in Rhetorical Agency 
Rhetorical agency is not restricted to individuals and people directing 
consciousness in the interest of creating social change, and Lacan’s version of rhetorical 
agency does not depend upon an individual directing consciousness. For Lacan, language, 
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capital and especially the unconscious, all play an integral part in explaining how 
rhetorical agency is constituted in discourse. Lacan’s philosophy holds a certain 
advantage in this regard, as his contention that the subject is an effect of the signifier is 
decidedly rhetorical: it necessitates speech and presupposes the centrality of language in 
producing the subject or agent. The advantages of assuming the subject or agent is 
constructed and not a pre-given condition makes it possible to assess the effect of rhetoric 
instead of speculating about its origins. 
The contribution Lacan brings to rhetorical agency and the theory in general is his 
consideration of the unconscious as a factor in speech. Since rhetorical agency has 
typically been associated with will and intent, and consciousness is considered to be the 
mechanism for activating rhetorical agency, the unconscious or latent forces at work in 
rhetorical agency remain neglected in the theory and criticism of rhetoric. Further, 
because Lacan analytically distinguishes between people or individuals and subjects or 
agents, his psychoanalytic philosophy proves resilient in trying to explain how rhetorical 
agency moves even where it is not bent on changing someone’s mind or the social 
injustices inherent in the status quo. Lacan distinguishes between the person or individual 
and the subject in the most rhetorical statement, “I am lying.”78 The paradox here reveals 
the workings of the unconscious, a domain that influences rhetorical agency even though 
rhetoricians do not typically focus on it.  
If the statement “I am lying” is true, then paradoxically the conclusion must be I am not 
lying—this necessarily entails the workings of some other agent who is distinct from the I 
that is the subject of the statement. If the statement is false, then I am not lying, but that 
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does not mean this is the same I that is telling the truth. Either way, the disambiguation is 
not reducible to the existence of some “I” that exists independent of discourse. There is 
an I in the ambiguity that is only explicable if it is granted that some auditor other than 
another person or individual is being responded to by the I that is the subject of the 
statement. If the statement depends upon an auditor, an audience, a receiver, etc. to 
disambiguate its content, but the same auditor, audience or receiver, etc. is not the only 
arbiter of the message, then the disambiguation of the message is contingent upon an 
auditor other than the person or individual to whom the statement is supposedly directed. 
In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the Other is this intermediary to which the I that is the 
subject of the statement is responsive; a silent operator at work in speech which regulates 
the distribution of desire in unconscious ways. Locating the Other at work in a statement, 
and separating it from the other people or individuals to whom the statement is directed, 
reveals the analytical working of the unconscious in the distribution desire in a discourse. 
In a practical way, the distinction between the other and Other is operative in the 
discourse whenever people or individuals claim they are acting out the will of God or just 
doing what they are told. The audience of other people and individuals who receive the 
message are distinct from the Other for whom the speech is directed. The I that is 
passively and latently responsive to the Other is unconscious. Lacan argues,  
It is quite clear that the I am lying, despite its paradox, is perfectly valid. Indeed 
the I of the enunciation is not the same as the I of the statement, that is to say, the 
shifter which, in the statement designates him.
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The conclusion is the I as such only exists in the discourse if the Other is there to 
distinguish it from itself. There is an I that is more or less directly responsive to the other 
person or individual in the statement, but there is simultaneously an I that is always 
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already responsive to the Other. Although it is commonplace in rhetorical theory to fuse 
the I that is the subject of the statement with the person or individual who articulates it, 
thereby erasing the ambiguous source of the I thought to wholly encompass the subject of 
the statement, rhetorical theory benefits from the understanding that there is an 
unconscious operation at play in the statement that too deserves analysis. The I uttering 
the statement is not the same as the “I” who is also always an individual or a person.  
Individual people utter the rhetorical equivalent of the statement “I am lying” 
every time they deflect praise or pay a back-handed compliment, but these are more than 
just figures of speech. In discourse, false-modesty and back-handed compliments alike 
are statements made to other people and individuals that are responsive to the Other, in 
the sense that individuals or people often go through the motions or enact social 
perfunctory to satisfy demands they are consciously uncomfortable with, like receiving a 
compliment or passively insulting someone else. There is a nugget of truth in both false 
modesty and back-handed compliments, and the recognition of this persistence of truth 
escapes conscious intervention even in the exact moment in which the “I am lying” 
confers truth as its opposite. The purpose of conceptualizing rhetorical agency for 
rhetorical theory, according to the authors cited, is to recover the capacity of the rhetor or 
speaker to affect change from a phantom argument. Even though all of the authors I cite 
take care to couch their conceptualizations of rhetorical agency in terms that do not run 
afoul of the postmodern critique, it is clear the specter of postmodernity forces the 
conceptualizations that emerge to accept remnants of the liberal humanist paradigm 
Gaonkar criticized.
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  To conceptualize rhetorical agency according to the dictates of the 
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criticism requires a rejection of all aspects of liberal humanist agency—rehabilitating 
rhetorical agency to preserve the centrality of the speaker or rhetor as a source of agency, 
and their rhetoric as a measure of their ability to resist the status quo, is no longer 
adequate. Instead, we should adopt a theoretical disposition that accounts for rhetorical 
agencies rather than one version of agency. It is this argument that forces us to clarify 
what Gaonkar is referring to when he talks about discourse practices as rhetorical agency. 
While he is not clear on exactly what constitutes a discourse practice, I believe we can 
draw upon Lacan’s work to clarify this important concept. 
Rhetorical Agency as a Function of Discourse 
According to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the formation of links or social 
bonds is what defines discourse and makes it distinguishable from rhetoric. Where 
rhetoric is constituted in a discourse, it is the structure of the discourse that determines 
the relationship that connects the subject or agent with the other. Discourse, for Lacan, is 
a social link—a relationship created through speech. The simplicity of Lacan’s definition 
of discourse as a social link should not detract from its explanatory power. Discourse is 
strictly and simply speaking a relationship constituted rhetorically between subjects in 
and through the culture with themselves, other individuals, and objects, in a more or less 
organized exchange designed to regulate the satisfaction of desire. For psychoanalytic 
purposes, speech then is the particular instance of language use by a person or individual 
in a discourse structure. Speech in the psychoanalytic theory is both a product of desire, 
that is, desire is what foundationally drives language, but speech also produces desire, in 
that it generates desire where no desire existed before the articulation of speech. Humans 
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exchange speech to create relationships, and all human relationships, even if the person is 
comatose or marooned on an island, are predicated upon desire mediated by speech. So it 
is desire structured in a discourse as a practice, not argumentation or the capacity of the 
speaker to resist ideological domination, which best explains how a culture changes over 
time as a result of rhetorical agency. 
Posthumanist Rhetorical Agency: Discourse and Ideology 
If we assume that discourse and ideology are at least partially responsible for 
driving the formation of subjectivity, but insist, as postmodern philosophy does, that 
discourse and ideology do not determine the subject or agent, then how is the subject or 
agent’s rhetorical agency affected by ideology and discourse? How is an account of 
rhetorical agency that makes allowances for the relationship between rhetoric, discourse 
and ideology theoretically conceptualized? In keeping with Lacan’s theory of the four 
discourses, it is my belief rhetorical agency is constituted in four different discourse 
structures, and further, that each discourse is distinguishable from the other by the way 
desire is articulated in the subject or agent’s rhetoric. If rhetorical agency does imply 
rhetoric has the capacity to transform beliefs and behaviors, thereby changing the culture, 
but we know change does not happen only in those instances in which people change 
their minds due to the impact of knowledge, then our conceptualization of rhetorical 
agency must identify some other factor at work in the rhetoric that can explain how 
rhetoric promotes stasis and creates change. Desire is the phenomena our discipline 
should incorporate when conceptualizing rhetorical agency. For scholars like Mark 
Bracher who are committed to explaining rhetoric’s capacity to transform the culture, the 
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theoretical centrality of desire is clear. As he argues in accordance with Lacanian 
psychoanalytic philosophy, it is the case that  
If culture plays a role in social change, or in resistance to change, it does so 
largely by means of desire. Insofar as a cultural phenomenon succeeds in 
interpellating subjects--that is, in summoning them to assume a certain subjective 
(dis)position--it does so by evoking some form of desire or by promising 
satisfaction of some desire. It is thus desire rather than knowledge that must 
become the focal point of cultural criticism if we are to understand how cultural 
phenomena move people.
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The conclusion Bracher reaches identifies precisely the advantage had when 
conceptualizing rhetorical agency as an effect of desire because he acknowledges the 
central part desire plays in affectively driving the subject or agent to speak on behalf of 
change and stasis. Subjective dispositions, if they are not totalizing or determined by 
discourse and ideology, are nonetheless derived from language and are analyzable as 
such in terms of the ways the rhetoric reflects the articulation of desire. The precise 
character of any subject position any agent or subject assumes is contingent upon the 
articulation of desire, a requirement antecedent to its instantiation as knowledge in a 
discourse.  
Knowledge does not activate a transformation in belief or behavior because 
knowledge only justifies the change in belief and behavior retroactively. Knowledge is ad 
hoc, as the reasons given for supporting changes to beliefs and behaviors by an individual 
or person are supplied only after the affective impact of desire exerts its effect on the 
rhetoric constituting the discourse. Our theoretical outlook on ideology should 
acknowledge this fact; knowledge plays only a partial role in the formation of belief and 
behavior. Supporting a candidate for office, for example, is not necessarily reducible to 
the conscious exercise of choice.
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 Support for a point of view or ideological preference 
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is often simply expressed as a feeling, an intuition, a hunch or gut reaction— all of which 
refer to the fact these feelings affecting the person are not reducible to consciousness but 
instead are unconscious and caused by desire. Ideologically speaking, rhetorical agency 
must account for the unconscious logic of desire at work here, but the fact that these 
desires are not conscious does not mean we do not have access to or cannot analyze them 
in a discourse practice. As Bruce Gronbeck says,  
Those other strata of consciousness, however, are not only submerged. They also 
can operate on the grand, visionary scale that Bormann (1972) attributed to 
rhetorical fantasies. This is the world of myth, of dream, of individual and 
collective desire, of what Lacan (1988) discussed as a state…where we are able to 
connect the wished-for with the here-and-now.
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Gronbeck’s conclusion lends credence to the belief that desire makes itself felt in a 
discourse practice as a wish or an expression of what the subject or agent would prefer if 
they had their way. Desire in speech drives the subject or agent to distinguish what is the 
case from what they wish was the case, which is really a more specific way of analyzing 
ideology. Thus, a theory of rhetorical agency should account for the conscious and 
unconscious factors at work in discourse practices by attending to the effect of desire on 
the rhetoric because desire is the factor in speech that expresses the transformative 
potential of rhetoric for the subject or agent.  
Rhetorical agency does function to change minds, but its transformative potential 
to arrest or promote beliefs and behaviors is best conceived of as the regulation or 
distribution of perceived excesses of desire had by other subjects or agents in the culture. 
Theoretically, desire underlies rhetorical agency in any discourse practice, but we can 
refine our understanding of how desire affects a discourse practice by identifying how the 
rhetoric suggests some agents or subjects enjoy the satisfaction of their desires more than 
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other people or individuals in the discourse. Envy, resentment, jealousy, incredulity and 
shock are words often used to express how speech of this sort feels, but Lacan used a 
specialized term to refer to this feature of discourse: surplus jouissance. This term is 
directly related to desire, but specifies a certain excessive enjoyment of desire had by 
other subjects or agents than the subject or agent articulating the discourse. Lacan’s use 
of the word jouissance captures in the French the orgasmic and sublime connotations he 
is trying to convey in talking about desire in its excesses in a discourse practice. Thus, if 
desire underlies rhetorical agency, and in discourse it is often the perceived excesses of 
desire that the other enjoys that specifies how desire is constituted in a discourse practice, 
then rhetorical agency is often best seen in the differences between the subject or agent 
doing the wishing and the subjects or agents whose wishes are fulfilled. Ideologically 
speaking, this concept is useful for describing how a discourse practice incorporates 
desire to move people or individuals in both conscious and unconscious ways.  
Lacan’s theory of the four discourses gives us an analytical language for 
interpreting rhetoric in a discourse practice according to four different structures, each of 
which constitute rhetorical agency as jouissance in distinctive arrangements that reflect 
differences in the unconscious logic of desire driving speech. Rhetoric impacts beliefs 
and behaviors through the affective force of jouissance, and not instinct or intellect alone 
can explain this key facet of rhetorical agency. Thus, it is conceptually beneficial to 
locate agency in discourse practices by identifying the underlying structures in which 
discourse facilitates the articulation of desire by a subject or agent. 
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To recuperate rhetorical agency, I suggest a conceptualization which assumes for 
theoretical purposes there are four rhetorical agencies, each fitted to a discrete Lacanian 
discourse, and each type of rhetorical agency lends itself to analysis according to the 
unique structural features intrinsic to the discourse in which the specific kind of rhetorical 
agency is constituted. Rhetorical agency is an effect of speech in the discourses, 
constituted through tropes such as metonymy and synecdoche, in the symbolic and 
imaginary codes (otherwise designated as signifiers and images respectively) that align 
enjoyment with objects and ideas that are invested with meaning and value for subjects. 
The source of the investment of meaning or value is oftentimes a speaker, and that 
speaker could be a person or an individual, but since rhetorical agency is a function of 
discourse and not necessarily an individual or a person, Lacan’s theory is adaptable to 
those instances when rhetorical agency is not directly attributable to a speaker who is 
necessarily a person or an individual. I am arguing that fitting the concept of rhetorical 
agency to Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse theory corrects for the confusion created in 
the literature when agency and subject or agent are used interchangeably, and also offers 
an alternative for the conceptualization of rhetorical agency endorsed by Campbell, 
Crowley, Geisler, and critiqued by Ronald Walter Greene in reference to Cloud.
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What is needed then is a theoretical outlook that combines the lessons learned 
from the postmodern and post-structuralist philosophical tradition while accounting for 
the capacity of subjects or agents to resist the totalizing effects of language that modernist 
critics unfairly assume post-structuralism and postmodernist implies. As Marshal Alcorn 
notes, “In some respects Lacan's account of the subject follows the lines of a rhetorical 
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analysis,” because “Lacan is interested in figures of speech and how speech, creating 
systems of desire and identification, moves the subject.” He elaborates on the 
methodological benefits of incorporating Lacan by pointing out that  
On the one hand, this analysis is highly theoretical: Lacan is fully engaged in all 
the conceptual resources formulated by post-structuralist thought. But on the other 
hand Lacan's analysis is highly practical. As an analyst, Lacan confronted subjects 
who resisted, denied, and displaced linguist effects. This forced him to formulate 
a description of the subject much more active and resistant than the subject 
imagined by post-structuralist thought.
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Recuperating the term according to Lacan’s theory preserves the conceptual value 
rhetorical agency serves in formulating rhetorical theory and operates as a powerful 
heuristic for rethinking our assumptions about rhetorical agency as a concept. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY: POSTHUMANIST RHETORICAL 
AGENCY AND THE FOUR DISCOURSES 
Rhetorical agency cannot be fully accounted for in conscious terms alone, and to 
recover the concept of rhetorical agency, I suggest Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse 
theory provides an analytical terminology and set of models designed to explain how 
rhetorical agency is a function of discourse and not a function of a speaker consciously 
inventing rhetoric. Lacan’s theory of discourse draws a distinction between discourse and 
rhetoric. Discourse refers to a relationship, which is an intersubjective, intrapersonal or 
interpersonal link formed between people, subjects and objects. Rhetoric is the specific 
instance of language use that constitutes a discourse structure, and Lacan’s theory 
identifies four discrete structures or what Gaonkar calls discourse practices. Lacan’s 
theory of the four discourses allows us to see how rhetorical agency is manifest in 
discourse practices in ways that follow a particular logic predicated upon the articulation 
of unconscious desire.  
The theoretical value of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory lies in its incorporation 
of desire as an unconscious factor always already present in speech. To explain how 
Lacan’s theory of the four discourses helps us analyze rhetoric and conceptualize agency 
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in ways that conform to Gaonkar’s criticism without forcing us to rehabilitate the 
humanist paradigm, I will lay-out those aspects of psychoanalytic philosophy that are 
necessary to give the conceptualization of rhetorical agency I am proposing explanatory 
power. I will begin by reinforcing what I have said about desire before turning the 
reader’s attention to the remaining aspects of psychoanalytic philosophy which are 
needed to conceptualize rhetorical agency. 
Desire 
Desire is the result of biological needs mediated by language via the demand. 
Infants, Lacan assumes, are so helpless that they are utterly incapable of satisfying basic 
biological needs. Consequently, the infant must make demands on someone else in order 
to satisfy them. In western cultures usually, though clearly not always, this other is the 
mother. The obvious example of an infant’s need is hunger, which is only satiable after 
the demand (crying) is articulated and the caretaker responds. It does not matter that this 
biological need is sated with a bottle or a breast, what is important is the fact that the 
infant associates their articulation of the need with satisfaction from the other. What the 
demand/need relationship establishes for the child is a dependency on the language to 
mediate the satisfaction of needs. Once this basic behavior is set in motion, it is only a 
matter of time before the demands are no longer linked to biological needs and become 
associated with substitutes for basic needs—we call the result desires. Desire is a circuit 
or loop the subject or agent follows because all human beings, according to the theory, 
are bent on achieving satisfaction—even though satisfaction will always elude the subject 
or agent in discourse because desire is never sated. This fact is part of our elementary 
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psychological make-up. As Dylan Evans points out, the relationship between a caretaker 
and the infant is foundational in this regard, as it generates the fundamental structure that 
drives the formation of desire. As he puts it,  
…because the object which satisfies the child's need is provided by another, it 
takes on the added significance of being a proof of the Other's love. Accordingly 
demand too becomes a demand for love. And just as the symbolic function of the 
object as a proof of love overshadows its real function as that which satisfies a 
need, so too the symbolic dimension of demand (as a demand for love) eclipses its 
real function (as an articulation of need). It is this double function which gives 
birth to desire, since while the needs which demand articulates may be satisfied, 
the craving for love is unconditional and insatiable, and hence persists as a 
leftover even after the needs have been satisfied; this leftover constitutes desire.
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Demand is more than just asking for the satisfaction of a biological need, because in the 
very asking and the satisfaction of the need there is a surplus produced that repeats the 
cycle even where no biological demand, strictly speaking, persists. The surplus is what 
we commonly refer to as love. In this way, in the articulation of a demand, desire is 
formed as surplus of enjoyment for the infant because more than the biological need is at 
play here—there is a deeper satisfaction that requires our attention as it forms the basis 
for our psychology as we mature into adulthood. The ancillary benefit of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic philosophy for rhetorical theory is this grounding in child psychology. To 
fully explain, we must recognize that for Lacan the relationship between the infant and 
the caretaker is an analogy for the relationship between the subject and the language.  
Desire is the Desire of the Other 
In psychoanalytic theory, the upper case “Other” refers to language, whereas the 
lower case “other” refers to what is understood as another ego. Demands necessitate 
language as the Other, but demands are always directed at someone else: the “other”. As 
Herman Lang puts it,  
  63 
language forces anyone who wants something from it into its order. In other 
words, purely vital intentionality needs articulation, the besoin [need] needs the 
demande (sic).
87
 
There is a kind of pleasure associated with having the demand answered—above and 
beyond the satisfaction of the biological need—and this satisfaction is what we are 
referring to when we use the word love. Even where and when the biological need is met, 
the need for the Other to continue to acknowledge that the infant is demanding 
recognition as such persists unabated; it is desire qua desire which we call love. Love is, 
at least at a basic level, the desire to be or have the desire of the Other, reflected in the 
desire (usually) of other people’s affections (although in cases it is attached to animals 
and objects).  
The subject in psychoanalytic theory is driven by the desire to be desired and/or to 
have what is desired. Thus, the subject in Lacanian theory is divided between the desire 
to be and the desire to have the object that the other desires. So, the subject in discourse is 
a product of this being/having relationship with desire whereby, in a direct sense, the 
subject is divided by desire (a) because “to be” implies the subject lacks what is 
necessary for desire and (b) because “to have” implies a certain surplus of what is 
sufficient for desire, an excess of enjoyment. In either case, the subject in discourse is 
divided as a consequence of the desire of the other, whether it is of the having or being 
sort.  
Lacan’s maxim, desire is the desire of the Other, confers the sense that desire is 
mediated (having/being) by other people and the language in which the subject or agent is 
immersed. The fact that desire is mediated by the language (or the Other), which also 
implies desire is mediated by other people (or the other), led Lacan to devise a term 
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(divided subjectivity) and a symbol (a “S” for subject) and a bar to strike the subject 
out—designated as a S. Although I will return to this important feature of Lacan’s theory 
of discourse, at this point it is enough to say the bar in the S is meant to represent the way 
the subject is not an agent in charge of their desire, but is dependent upon the Other for 
desire—hence, the notion that the subject is divided in discourse by desire. Ellie Ragland 
captures how this desire qua divided subjectivity sounds in language, as for her, “it is a 
desire that takes the form of thinking, ‘If so-and-so would only do this, be this, feel this, 
think this, then I...’”88 Rather than focus on the definition of the terminology, I think it is 
important to recognize what this type of speech implies is a lack; something is missing 
and/or someone has “it,” that thing which would complete our psychology, thereby 
rendering the subject a complete an undivided person or individual. Since a complete or 
wholly undivided subjectivity is the implicit goal but remains elusive because satisfaction 
of this sort is impossible, then subjectivity as such in psychoanalytic theory remains 
open-ended—the loop of desire never stops, it simply attaches itself to new objects 
(either inanimate or animate in the case of demands articulated to other human beings or 
even animals) thereby locking human subjectivity into a process which undergoes 
consistent reformation but never ends (except in death).  
Desire is the Desire of the Audience 
Desire as the desire of the Other, can be further theoretically clarified if we think 
about desire as the speaker’s expectations about the audience’s desires. Again, this is a 
familiar concept to rhetoricians who have for centuries asked, “How do I adapt my 
rhetoric to the audience?” This is in many ways a practical answer to a theoretical 
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question that is foundational to every subject’s existence: what does the Other want from 
me or desire of me? However, at a theoretical level, this becomes more than a question of 
what does the other person want from me, or even what does the other person want from 
me so I can get what it is that would satisfy the cause driving the desire. 
Methodologically speaking, the analysis of desire in speech begins by identifying the 
signifiers and images that signify for a subject the missing or absent object; what is 
referred to in the theory as lack because it is what is missing or lacking that causes desire 
in the first place. While the missing object could be something material like keys, in 
psychoanalytic theory desire is manifest in signifiers that metaphorically link the 
unconscious to the articulation of desire in a word like “keys”. For Slavoj Žižek,  
what ultimately distinguishes man from animal is not a positive feature (speech, 
tool-making, reflexive thinking, or whatever), but the rise of a new point of 
impossibility designated by Freud and Lacan as das Ding, the impossible-real 
ultimate reference point of desire.
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These signifiers and images that represent desire for the subject are referred to in 
psychoanalytic terminology as the objet a.  
Objet a 
For Lacanian discourse theory, the objet a is both a cause and source of desire, 
and serves as desire’s signifier or image in speech for a subject or agent. The objet a is 
any object which sets desire in motion, be it someone else’s body, a car, or even an 
individual’s sense of self-worth. Bruce Fink distinguishes between the object as 
satisfaction itself from the object as a cause of desire.  
Since the object is a cause of desire and not something that it would satisfy, it 
highlights insatiability as a key feature of desire. Its relationship to desire is that 
desire circulates around the objet a, either by ruminating or by obsessing about 
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the cause or fixating on an object – an actual thing – be it an image or a collection 
of signifiers.
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This phenomenon, the fact that humans get fixed on objects, is so commonplace we 
hardly notice it, but it is a vital concept to understand because it theoretically grounds our 
discussion of what is moving about rhetoric in the value or meaning invested in objects 
by people or individuals. As Bracher notes,   
The object a is that part of the subject's being that is simultaneously left out of 
and produced by the identity established for the subject...As such, the object a 
holds the key to understanding both the nature of jouissance and 'what the 
incidence of the signifier in the destiny of the speaking being is all about'. The a 
thus figures the lack of being that causes all desire, and it underlies affect as well. 
And as the cause of desire and the ground of affect, the object a is what animates 
the psychology of the group or the masses.
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The meaning or value invested in an object by a person or individual is critical, as this 
meaning or value helps to clarify what the experience of desire feels like for a subject. 
Jouissance in psychoanalytic philosophy refers to the affective force exerted by desire as 
it is experienced by a subject or agent via the objet a. Since it is clear desire affects 
subjects and agents differently, this term means to refer to the specific experience of 
enjoyment, satisfaction and pleasure or pain the subject or agent feels in desiring 
generally. The phenomena Lacan’s term refers to underlie every affective disposition a 
subject experiences: love, anxiety, fear, even confusion. In short, all of those sensations 
that distinguish the dead from the living are manifestations of a uniquely human 
experience Lacan called jouissance.  
Jouissance 
We should initially define jouissance as enjoyment, but the reader should know 
the French captures the orgasmic and sublime dimension of enjoyment that the English 
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translation fails to connote in either the words desire or enjoyment. Jouissance is a key 
term in psychoanalytic theory because it refers to the non-instinctual drive that animates 
agency generally. The pain and pleasure of desiring to desire itself is what is at stake 
here.  
The derailment or prohibition of jouissance generates rhetorical agency because it 
is the lack of fulfillment or satisfaction that causes the subject or agent to demand; 
satisfying the demand is the object of rhetorical agency for the subject or agent. However, 
Lacan’s theory points out that the satisfaction of jouissance is unachievable, and for that 
reason, is never exhausted until death snuffs it out.  
My father told me a joke that illustrates in a political context the way in which 
desire affects rhetoric in the experience of jouissance. A baker, a teacher and a banker are 
all seated around a table eyeballing the plate of fresh cookies in front of them, when the 
banker reaches out and takes eleven, looks at the baker and says “That teacher wants to 
take your cookie.” The reasoning in the punch line is humorous because the banker’s 
greed is obvious, and so the attempt to conceal it by scapegoating the teacher makes the 
banker’s arrangement all the more outrageous, and hence, laughable. In this way, the joke 
clearly appeals to our sense of reason, as our acculturated ideas about fairness makes us 
see that the arrangement disproportionately benefits the banker, and the outcome of the 
banker’s action seems unreasonable since no reason except the banker’s greed justifies 
the hoarding. The joke also works because the baker might be duped by the banker—
which is why one might laugh at the person who does not understand the punch line. In 
this way, the joke reflects how rhetoric agency is used to conceal the truth, which would 
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imply the purpose of rhetorical criticism then becomes to reveal the act of concealment or 
deception at work in the speech.  
There is more to criticism than can be accounted for though in this approach 
because, above all else, the banker’s accusation works because it assumes the baker 
wants the cookie—and this may seem obvious too—but I contend it is a rich place to 
begin analyzing the rhetoric in the punch line. The banker’s rhetorical agency gets its 
force from the derailment of the baker’s desire, not the empty accusation made of the 
teacher. What is most telling about the joke is the way it informs our understanding of 
how desire is regulated in the culture. Change or transformation of beliefs and behavior is 
the function of rhetoric via desire, and in so far as rhetoric makes these changes possible 
in a culture, it is desire and not knowledge that catalyzes the response.  
What the banker produces with his accusation is resentment, but the cause of the 
resentment for the baker would persist even if the baker hated cookies—it is the desire 
looped around the satisfaction that drives the banker’s rhetoric. In this way, the baker’s 
desire for the cookie is manufactured by the accusation that the teacher is planning to 
take the cookie. In other words, while the baker may not have desired the cookies, the 
very act of taking the cookies away from her caused the baker to desire the cookies. The 
lack of the object which would ostensibly satisfy the subject becomes the source of their 
desire. Here we see the precise way in which rhetoric works by latching on to the 
receiver’s response to lack—what is taken away becomes the driving force animating the 
rhetoric. As the banker’s rhetoric in the punch line suggests, there is a part for desire to 
play in our rhetorical analysis.  
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Rhetorical Agency as Desire, as Object and as Jouissance 
In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, speech is also intrinsically rhetorical; it 
consists of tropes (like synecdoche and metonymy), that re-present images and signs that 
in turn link people together affectively through the experience of enjoyment, both 
symbolic and imaginary, but always borrowed from the language. For humans, 
enjoyment is a function of speech and is not restricted to the avoidance of pain and the 
preference for pleasure. Since pleasure and pain are mediated by the signifier, even acts 
that are clearly painful can become enjoyable for the person experiencing the pain, if the 
discomfort reaps symbolic praise (like burns sustained in rescuing a child from fire or 
BDSM practices). Fundamentally, the extremes of pain (e.g., sadomasochism) and 
pleasure (e.g., hedonism), are not regulated by instinct or biology, and the experience of 
both for humans is mediated by the signifier. Humans are unlike all other animals in this 
regard. An animal chews or cuts off its limb when trapped, but only humans invest the 
amputation with symbolic value or meaning. The investment of meaning and value in the 
symbolic and imaginary order constitutes the partial formation of desire in speech, and in 
this respect, desire is not instinctual or driven by genetics, it is symbolic and imaginary 
and circulates through the medium of speech as the real psychic foundation underlying a 
discourse structure. Rhetorical agency is constituted in a discourse through tropes and 
schemes which are signs recognized in the culture and associated with the distribution of 
desire for subjects or agents. The currency of these signs, the reason they are invested 
with value or meaning by subjects or agents, are rooted in the fantasies about satisfaction 
that exist in the culture or Other. Culture persists in part in the ways enjoyment is 
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conditioned according to what is permitted or forbidden for subjects or agents. In this 
way, the distribution of desire operates according to the fantasies that abound in a culture.  
Although I will return to the concept, a fantasy in the culture makes itself known 
in the ways a society regulates sexual expression (straight or transgendered), food 
consumption (disgusting or appetizing, dieting or going to the buffet), and the 
expenditure of leisure time (playing golf or taking methamphetamines), etc. Fantasies 
define the limits of tolerability and intolerability, acceptability and unacceptability of 
those pleasures and pains used to service the individual prerogatives and social 
expectations about enjoyment in the culture. As we can see, jouissance is a dense and 
difficult concept, but it is vitally important for conducting rhetorical analysis and can be 
applied by asking whether the object is connected through jouissance to meaning-
making, that is the feeling that one has when they “get it,” or if the object is connected to 
jouissance as a function of castration – which is the feeling one has when denied the objet 
a, and the heightened intensity felt because of the denial. And finally, the objet a is 
connected to jouissance through the desire of the Other. The objet a is the diacritical 
feature in a discourse that propels desire along its circuit, thereby establishing the 
uniqueness of a particular rhetorical agency in so far as it is lured along by a particular 
object of desire in a discourse caused by lack. Desire is the engine of a discourse, but its 
effect on the subject in the speech refers to another one of the four diacritical features 
inherent in all discourses: the divided subject. 
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The Divided Subject (S) 
For Lacanian psychoanalysis, the divided subject (S) is a concept that refers to 
several theoretical assumptions simultaneously. First, the bar through the S refers to the 
fact that language acquisition itself during the course of the child’s early life turns the 
body into an object. Not only does this mean learning the actual signifiers that represent 
the body for the subject in a culture, signifiers like hand, ear, eye and so on. It also means 
learning to discipline the body, to treat it like a tool (an object) capable of performing 
some function (like clapping, holding a pencil, etc.) for someone else.  
It is clear being caught in language implies a loss for the human being at the level 
of the body -- as much of his body as of the body of the other. This loss appears as 
a loss of being whose tongue carries its trace: one does not say of man that he is a 
body, but rather that he has a body.
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Thus, from the child’s earliest experiences and throughout its adult life, the body will be 
an object—an object distinct from the subject who is thought to inhabit it. This means the 
subject’s body is an effect of the signifier, an object mediated by the signifier and 
whatever imaginary and symbolic relations these signifiers might confer in the culture. 
More importantly, what is produced in the process is the subject, which is wholly an 
effect of language.  
By the fact that he speaks, the human being is no longer a body: a disjunction is 
introduced between the subject and his body, the latter becoming an external 
entity from which the subject feels more or less separated. The subject that the 
effect of language brings into existence is as such distinct from the body.
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This fundamental relation presupposed in western cultures not only makes the body an 
object for the subject, it also means that the subject is an effect of the signifier. Signifiers, 
in this sense, are not just words that exist in a vacuum in the language, they are also other 
subjects—other language users in the culture. Here is where the second theoretical 
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assumption the divided subject is meant to confer in the model is revealed. The subject’s 
body is not just an object for the subject thought to inhabit it—it is also an object for 
other subjects. The limited conclusion here would be that the body is an object to be used 
by other subjects—but this makes it seem like the relationship is strictly predatory or 
immoral. It is predictable to assume (in a properly Kantian fashion) that the person 
should never be used as a means to an end. But, while not dismissing the ethical 
importance of Kant’s maxim, what Lacan is teaching here goes much deeper. As Ragland 
explains,  
Desire is also the structure of a lack (of wholeness) in being. But traits of desire 
become attached to specific words and images as we strive to represent ourselves 
to other subjects (signifiers). Each subject-to-be ‘desires’ initially only through 
the medium of ‘the desire of Other.’”94  
As Serge André puts it, for the subject, “what remains … is to inhabit it or to reach [the 
body] of the Other, however the subject “can only do so by way of the signifier, since it is 
the signifier that, to start with, tells us that we have a body.”95 Andre’s suggestion that the 
subject is destined to inhabit or reach the Other’s body means, in a sense, there is nothing 
authentic or direct about the experience of the body as it is always mediated by the desire 
of the other and the alienation experienced in the gap between signifiers and the soma. 
Thus, the symptom of the divided subject is evident in all the ways subjects use signifiers 
(assuming of course the drive of desire is to be or have) present in the experience an 
individual has when they adorn their bodies with jewelry or tattoos, or imitate the dress of 
celebrities. Since the body is dependent on the signifier, the ways in which the body can 
be objectified are only constrained by language itself.  
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The radical impact of the divided subject in discourse, separated from the body 
and divided by the desire of the other, is therefore fundamentally important to consider in 
rhetorical analysis. This impact can be explained in two ways. First, the body is divided 
from the subject or agent by signifiers and is therefore treated in the language as an object 
of speech. The second impact builds off the first, since it is the case the body is an object 
of speech, and the object of speech is constituted as the desire of the Other, then the 
subject or agent is divided by the Other’s desire in so far as the Other mediates the 
experience of the body for a person or individual.  
Desire has two impacts that we recognize as rhetorical critics. The first is subjects 
are always divided by signifiers, that is to say language divides our subjectivity between 
the reality of our existence and the existence of the language that preceded our individual 
experience of reality. The second impact desire exacts on subjects is that they are always 
divided from the idealized image. The subject identifies with an image, but as they are 
not that image, they are continually reminded of the gap between the image as an ideal 
and the reality of their lived experience. Lacan calls the sum total of these alienating 
effects on subjectivity the “divided subject.” It is important to note the subject can never 
not be divided; division is an irreconcilable symptom of speech. Language precedes us as 
people or individuals. We are borne into the already ongoing conversation that is the 
language in the culture and are in this respect merely heirs to its enduring presence. The 
divided subject is the effect of language on the individual person, and every attempt to 
remedy the division in the subject is a fantasy supported in the discourse.  
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Discourse  
To recapitulate and elaborate on the definition of discourse I proposed in the first 
chapter, discourse for Lacan is a social link or bond that requires a language for its 
activation. Discourse structures the different kinds of relationships that individuals or 
people form with each other in a culture. The sum total of these always changing 
relationships in the culture make-up what we call society. As Lacan stresses, “...discourse 
should be taken as a social link (lien social), founded in language,” not unlike “what is 
specified in linguistics as grammar...”.96 Lacan is trying to explain how speech is put into 
service by people or individuals in order to manage or regulate their intrapersonal, 
interpersonal or intersubjective relationships. As Paul Verhaeghe puts it,  
As discourse produces an effect in the Other, it also forms a social link. A 
discourse exists before any concretely spoken word; even more: a discourse will 
determine the concrete speech act. This effect of determination is the reflection of 
the Lacanian basic assumption, namely that each discourse delineates 
fundamental relationships, resulting in a particular social bond.
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Since discourse is defined as a social link, and speech in language is what constitutes the 
link, the rhetoric comprising the speech that serves the linking function must necessarily 
transform every time the agent or subject constructs or changes interpersonal, 
intrapersonal and intersubjective relationships. Managing these relationships via speech is 
what constitutes rhetorical agency. This means rhetorical agency is certainly operative 
when rhetoric (in keeping with the humanist paradigm) is invented by a speaker to 
persuade an audience to change some belief or behavior. But this definition of discourse 
as a social link encourages us think about agency as something that is produced or 
created in speech by rhetoric in order to connect with or distance ourselves from other 
people in the culture. Viewing agency as a function of discourse, the aim of which is to 
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create a relationship with the Other (the culture) or the other (other people or objects in 
the culture), frees our conceptualization of rhetorical agency from the theoretical 
shortcomings of the humanist paradigm. If agency is not a function of the speaker, but 
instead is conceived of as a discourse practice wherein the agent or subject creates a 
relationship, then we can begin to see how agency is as varied as the kinds of 
relationships people or individuals pursue in the course of their everyday lives. However, 
this conclusion should not suggest that relationships formed between subjects or agents 
and the Other are wholly arbitrary; there are consistent features that persist in discourse 
that drive the structure of a discourse and determine the distribution of surplus jouissance 
in the rhetoric. The divided subject is then a key theoretical feature of Lacan’s theory, but 
it only makes sense when it is related to the other features that make-up a discourse for 
the subject or agent. 
The Master Signifier 
In addition to the divided subject, the next key feature inherent in all of Lacan’s 
discourses is the master signifier, S1. In a discourse, the master signifier is always the 
signifier the subject invests their identity in or derives their identity from in a set of 
oppositional constructs—otherwise referred to as dis-identification. As Bracher defines it, 
the master signifier is “any signifier that a subject has invested his or her identity in - any 
signifier that the subject has identified with (or against) and that thus constitutes a 
powerful positive or negative value.”98 He continues, arguing “Master signifiers serve as 
controlling terms,” controlling the “organization and interpretation of all other elements 
in the discourse.” They exert this control virtually unrestrained in discourse, and in this 
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way demonstrate the powerful effects on discourse that a person or individual’s ego has 
in creating relationships. In this way we can see how the master signifier acts as a 
signifier meant to compel ideological acquiescence—and for this reason is helpful in 
explaining the effects of ideological pressure inherent in the language at work in a 
culture. As Bracher notes,  
Whereas other terms and the values and assumptions they bear may be 
challenged, master signifiers are simply accepted as having a value or validity that 
goes without saying. Master signifiers are thus factors that give the articulated 
system of signifiers, (S2) -- that is, knowledge, belief, behavior—currency for a 
subject: they are what make a message meaningful, what make it have an impact 
rather than being like a foreign language that one can’t understand.99  
Since the master signifier constitutes the subject’s identity and produces an understanding 
through which the subject comes to know themselves, “it is, by definition self-same, 
static, frozen and hence in a sense lifeless.”100 When an individual says they are a 
Democrat, an environmentalist, a patriot etc., they are communicating to the audience or 
receiver the thing they identify with which simultaneously reveals the lack that is the 
cause or the lure propelling their desire. In this way, these signifiers become invested 
with the subject or agent’s desire to be something that stands in for what they are not 
already; otherwise known as an ego-defense. That is not to say the investment in these 
identifications (like Republican or mother or dishwasher) is disingenuous or fake, but the 
fact that they are genuine or authentic does not mean these identification are unmediated 
by language. Identifying or dis-identifying with an image or a word is always done via 
the language through signifiers, and it does not matter how closely a signifier 
“accurately” describes the subject articulating it. The importance of the master signifier 
as a feature of a discourse structure is the part they play in conferring to the other who or 
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what the speaker or rhetor thinks they are or represent for the audience, receiver or the 
Other. I am a student, I am an American, I am a disenfranchised voter, etc.  
All of these identifications wish the subject or agent into the discourse and 
represents for the individual or person who utters them the disconnection between their 
ego-ideal, what they what to be to themselves, and their ideal ego, the signifiers that 
represent those identifications that are demanded by the other people in the culture via the 
medium of language. Rhetorical agency is driven by the signifiers the subject or agent 
invests themselves in, but these signifiers are meaningless unless and until they are 
implicated in the set of distinctions and differences that determine the precise character of 
the identification. It is here that identification as ideal ego and ego ideal meets the 
network of signifiers that are borrowed from the language in order to stabilize the ego in 
general, which is precisely the phenomenon in discourse Lacan meant to describe by 
designating it the master signifier or S1.  
Knowledge 
The distinctions and differences that create the relationships which constitute 
rhetorical agency are derived from a set of terms, the interaction of which should be 
rightly construed of as knowledge. Knowledge for Lacan is a function of the relationship 
between the signifiers that the subject or agent invests themselves in and the collection of 
signifiers that gives the signifier its meaning in relation to the other signifiers in the 
language. In this way, Lacan’s theory is clearly rooted in Saussure’s linguistics, but I 
would submit Lacan enriches Saussure’s theory considerably. What constitutes 
denotative meaning in psychoanalytic theory is derived from the system of distinctions 
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and differences (in Derridean terms, the différance) that sustains language use generally. 
Meaning is always deferred and slips away as soon as it is grounded in the articulation of 
language. The very fact that meaning is only produced in a system of differences and 
distinctions means ambiguity or doubt about the status of identity according to the 
signifiers is unavoidable and irresolvable. The meaning of a signifier is always deferred 
unto the other signifiers that make a difference or distinction possible, and this is why 
identity as such is unstable and constantly undergoing revision. If one’s identity is only 
fixed because it is neither here nor there, it is neither this or that, it is only identifiable in 
so far as it is distinguishable or different from other identities, then there is nothing stable 
or foundational about the speaker or author. In this way, psychoanalytic theory hews 
closely to the subjectivity posited by postmodernism, but there is a reason to the 
workings of discourse that makes knowledge in the theory into something more than 
simply a metanarrative about the fragmentary and divided nature of subjectivity.  
Knowledge is produced in the rhetoric that structures a discourse by virtue of the 
fact that the signifiers the subject or agent identifies with or against are instantiated 
within a field or network of already existing signifiers we call language, the interplay of 
which is what people or individuals use to make sense out of what would otherwise be an 
incoherent concatenation of noise. These signifiers are always in the background, and 
only become foregrounded when they are articulated through the medium of language by 
a subject or agent, which happens every time the ego asserts itself and recognizes a 
signifier to identify or dis-identify with. Lacan’s theoretical account of knowledge is not 
to be confused with epistemology in that he is not trying to describe how we know what 
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we know. Instead, the teaching here suggests that knowledge is literally the systematic 
ways metonymy and metaphor pull and push signifiers around in a discourse, creating the 
system of distinctions and differences that arranges speech in some meaningful way the 
audience claims they either know or do not understand—in either case, its knowledge in 
discourse. “Knowledge is something that links, in a reasoned relation, one signifier, S1, to 
another signifier, S2.”
101
 What this means is simply that speech supplies the basic set of 
associations and distinctions necessary to link them back together synchronically, thereby 
constituting knowledge as a system of distinctions and differences that locate the subject 
in some coherent fashion to the words people and individuals are familiar with in a 
culture.  
The constitution of knowledge is, however, diacritically hitched to the master 
signifier, as these signifiers are the center of gravity and control the structure of relations 
(be they associative or dissociative) at work in a discourse. This is what Lacan means in 
observing, “Knowledge initially arises at the moment at which S1 comes to represent 
something,” as he describes it “through its intervention in the field defined, at the point 
we have come to, as an already structured field of knowledge.”102 For Bracher,  
These invisible links make up the network of the subject's pleasures and pains, 
likes and dislikes, allies and enemies, etc., and thus constitutes the subject's sense 
of itself. Knowledge thus also determines the nature of the enjoyment -- 
jouissance -- that the subject is able to obtain. This is the case because even the 
most elementary pleasures of the body are situated within a knowledge; an 
articulation of signifiers, a network of relationships (associations and oppositions) 
with other sensations, perceptions, and affective states.
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However, this production of knowledge, no matter what force the master signifier 
possesses, is still always idiosyncratic and unique to every individual or person. This is 
why Bracher argues, “the force then--psychological and social--of the articulated systems 
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of knowledge” is derived from “the system’s positioning the subject at certain points 
within them and thus establishing a certain ‘identity’ for the subject.”104 As he elaborates,  
When knowledge of any type articulates itself within a subject, the subject itself is 
caught up in the signifying apparatus in a position that is in certain ways unique, 
not common to all subjects.
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These traits are distinct from the living individual, as they are predicates for the subject 
and not necessarily the subject in its totality. A person or individual is not 
indistinguishable from the signifier; the signifier is simply an instance of the subject or 
agent for the other as a bit of knowledge. However, it is the manner in which the signifier 
catches up with the subject that determines the resulting subjectivity—which is nothing 
less than the knowledge or signifiers we assume are necessary to entail and create a 
relationship with other people or individuals. The importance of knowledge for the 
purposes of rhetorical analysis consists in the way in which (a) knowledge works 
diacritically with the master signifier(s) and (b), the way knowledge is still determined by 
the subject (and not simply determined by the discourse) in the course of identifying or 
dis-identifying with signifiers in the language such that the speech creates the initial 
distinction or difference necessary to sustain the creation of a relationship.  
Fantasy 
In psychoanalytic theory, a fantasy is the relationship between the subject who 
desires and the object of desire, represented in Lacanian algebra as S ◊ a. Fantasy in this 
sense is a specialized term, and should be distinguished from the conventional meaning 
we ordinarily associate with the word. It does not suggest that there is a reality and 
everything else is distinguishable from this monolithic reality. Lacanian theory does not 
assume there is a true consciousness and everything else is distinguishable from it. The 
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teaching does suggest that relationships are fantastic in the sense that they are 
symptomatic of an idiosyncratic connection between what we wish or desire and the 
object to which the satisfaction of the wish or desire is attached. Since there is always a 
gap in the loop that would otherwise complete the connection between desire and 
satisfaction for a subject or agent, Lacan used the losange ◊ to represent the 
disconnection between the desire of the subject and the object of desire in the speech. The 
losange represents the fundamental fact of division or the fragmentary status of the 
subject in the theory, and in this way shows how the object is just a representation of an 
underlying psychological structure. More importantly though, the losange designates a 
universal aspect of psychology in the western world, which is expressed in the belief that 
a subject or agent is incomplete, divided or somehow disconnected from that which 
would make it complete, whole or purposeful. As Moustafa Safouan notes, “The function 
of the fantasy is to fix and define the subject's desire,” which explains why “human desire 
has the property of being coordinated not to real objects, but to fantasies.”106  
What is most important about this view of the role that fantasy plays in our 
conceptualization of rhetorical agency is the recognition of the fact that the fundamental 
fantasy is for the subject to achieve total unity with the signifier. The fundamental fantasy 
then is bent on unifying subjectivity through the medium of language even though this is 
not possible. Vows of silence demonstrate this point, as they are often taken on in order 
to bring the person or individual into a union with god (the Other), or to disrupt the 
impact of desire on the formation of consciousness in order to achieve a state of 
enlightenment (which is the way Zen Buddhism for example solves the “problem,” or 
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fundamental fantasy, of division--not being whole or afflicted by desire. Since the 
subject’s fantasy is always about being complete or whole or undivided, but this 
wholeness is impossible for a subject to achieve because speech represents the body but 
is not the same as the body, then speech functions as a sort of cement, patching-up 
whatever cracks or gaps that exist for that person or individual as a result of their 
idiosyncratic expression of the fundamental fantasy.  
For Lacan the fundamental fantasy is a product of the alienation every person or 
individual experiences as they acquire the language that persists in the idea that some 
signifier could close the gap between experience and the fact that we exist. The function 
of rhetorical agency as a concept then should be to identify the places where desire is 
connected to signifiers that are related to objects and causes of desire in discourse 
because it is in this relation that the discourse is structured and the transformative 
potential of agency is directed.  
Unconscious as a Function of the Other/other 
The state of any rhetorical situation is a state in which we desire the desire of the 
Other. Our discipline’s history, tied as closely as it is with a speaker and the arts of 
rhetoric as persuasion, has long recognized the centrality of artfully inventing rhetoric in 
accordance with audience (or other’s) expectations. The speaker rises to the occasion or 
seizes upon the moment only insofar as they recognize what is expected of them. But that 
should not suggest speakers know exactly what is expected of them—that is why we 
might argue great speakers do not have to think about the situation, they just respond, 
which suggests they are somehow accessing some dimension of the situation that even 
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they are unaware of in a conscious sense. If the audience is another, not the Other as in 
language but rather an other, a target for a discourse necessary for forming a social link, 
then we can begin to see how an unconscious logic is also operative in the speaker’s 
adaptation to an audience in a way that goes beyond the simple recognition that the 
speaker themselves are not “in charge” or solely responsible for the discourse. Žižek 
argues,  
“Lacan’s dictum, ‘The unconscious is the discourse of the Other’ is better for to 
be taken quite literally, beyond the standard platitudes about how I am not the 
subject/master of my speech, since it is the big other who speaks through me, and 
so on: the primordial encounter of the unconscious is the encounter with the 
others inconsistency, with the fact that the parental other is not actually the master 
of his acts and words, that he emits signals of whose meaning he is unaware, that 
he performs acts whose true libidinal tenor is inaccessible to him.
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Žižek’s analysis captures precisely the philosophical importance of the unconscious as a 
factor not only for analyzing a person or an individual’s speech, but as a factor animating 
speech itself. The unconscious as a factor in the constitution of rhetorical agency 
transforms the question of agency from one that privileges intent or counter-hegemonic 
advocacy to one that locates agency in the discourse of the unconscious of the Other 
which reveals the fragile and inconsistent nature of human subjectivity mediated by 
language. What Lacan’s theory recognizes in locating agency in the unconscious logic of 
desire is that our subjectivity is not driven by knowledge or consciousness but is largely 
(at least a surface level) driven by the search for satisfaction for what we lack. 
Agency 
Conceptually, rhetorical agency is recoverable if we expand our understanding of 
its function as a property of discourse, a way of forming a social link structured around 
the unconscious logic of desire, instead of assuming rhetorical agency refers to cultural 
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transformation or the inventive efforts of a speaker bent on changing other people’s 
beliefs or behaviors by changing minds. The reconceptualization of rhetorical agency I 
am advocating assumes rhetorical agency can be conceptualized as a speaker attempting 
to change or transform other people’s beliefs and behaviors using rhetoric, but is not 
limited to this understanding. Agency is not just counter-hegemonic or resistant to 
ideological domination. Further, Lacan’s theory of discourse shows how rhetorical 
agency is not a function of a speaker or rhetor but instead is a function of discourse 
which, if we analyze closely, reveals the underlying economy of desire (caused by lack) 
that compels or drives the subject or agent to articulate a link with the Other (the culture 
or language), and other people in the speaking situation. What this discourse theory 
presumes is that subjects or agents are always divided from the desire that drives their 
discourse and this is what causes rhetorical agency in a discourse.  
Rhetorical agency is a function of discourse, which may or may not entail a 
speaker, but will necessarily entail agency set in motion by desire. As Verhaeghe puts it, 
“I do not speak but I am spoken, and this speech is driven by a desire, with or without my 
conscious agreement,” adding,  
This is a matter of simple observation, but it is fundamentally wounding to man's 
narcissism; that's why Freud called it the third great narcissistic humiliation of 
mankind.
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In this regard, any conceptualization of rhetorical agency that aligns the speaker and 
invention with agency in general is really an ego-defense—no matter what ideological 
injustice it is predicated upon. However, that conclusion does not mean we cannot assess 
the ethical consequences of a discourse practice; it simply suggests our move to judge 
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any discourse practice happens after we acknowledge the fantasy underlying the 
discourse practice in our analysis.  
To summarize and recapitulate, if the I is not identical to the I that enunciates the 
statement in which the I is a subject, then speakers or agents are never the sole 
progenitors of their discourse. What this means is where common-sense versions of 
agency err is in assuming the I is a speaker who is also always an individual or person, 
and further, that this same I, undivided and self-same in every respect, is the same as the 
speaker that consciously directs their speech to those rhetorical purposes, the reasons for 
which are transparently and directly known to the speaker. The desire to know itself is a 
product of the agent or subject’s relation with the Other, be it language, God, science or 
an actual audience. This is in part why Lacan’s theory of the four discourses bears 
directly on the study of rhetoric and in particular on the concept of rhetorical agency.  
This level of abstraction has significant theoretical advantages because it allows 
us to trade out the person or individual who is the receiver of the message with the 
theoretical construct that is the Other. This accounts for the fact that the agent in a 
statement is often simply a conduit or vessel for the speech of another subject. So, when 
someone says they are simply doing God’s work or says they are doing something in 
order to advance the mission of science, both God and science are rightly conceived of in 
these statements as rhetorical agency—the instrument or mechanism driving the change 
or transformation as it exerts its force in a discourse. It is the relationship created by the 
subject or agent’s discourse that matters most. The conceptual benefit of adopting this 
view of agency as a function or property of an agent or subject in discourse resolves the 
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impasses created when agent or subject are theoretically formulated as coextensive with 
the person or individual uttering the speech. More importantly, viewing agency as a 
function of speech inserted into a discourse structure helps distinguish discourse from 
speech for the purposes of analysis—which conforms to the seemingly simple yet 
incredibly important definition of discourse Lacan provides—thereby providing clarity 
for theorists working with and analyzing discourse practices as Gaonkar recommended 
nearly two decades ago.  
Four Rhetorical Agencies in Discourse 
The central preoccupation for rhetoricians is the illusive and enigmatic answer to 
the question: how does speech move people?  Lacan’s theory of the four discourses offers 
critical insights into the ways four specific rhetorical agencies are structured to move 
people, as Lacan’s account deals with the symbolic manipulation of desire and 
identification or dis-identification in four specific discourse structures. Folding this 
theoretical account into the analytical models Lacan provided for assessing four specific 
kinds of discourse yields four discrete rhetorical agencies—a point I will elaborate upon 
at length in this section. The purpose of this section is to provide a description of each 
type of rhetorical agency as it is constituted in each of the four discourse structures.  
To begin, it is necessary to outline the general model of discourse Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory posits. Basic communication theory is consistent with Lacan’s 
approach to the theory of the discourses, in that, at a minimum the model accounts for a 
speaker and receiver. In this way the model is familiar to rhetoricians who conceive of 
rhetoric as speaker or orator centered. Where Lacan’s models eclipse the basic 
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communication model is in providing for the representation of message generation and 
transmission in the loose category identified as the agent or subject. This means the agent 
could be the speaker, but could also be language or an image,  
There is the subject of the utterance [enounce]. That subject is quite easy to 
identify. I means the person who is actually speaking at the moment I say I. But 
the subject is not always the subject of the utterance, because not all utterances 
contain I. Even when there is no I -- even when you say, ‘It's raining' -- there is a 
subject of the enunciation [enunciation], and there is a subject even when it can 
no longer be grasped in the sentence…109 
The subject of the enunciation as agent opens the definition of agency up to multiple 
forms of communication or discourse practices. In the model below, the agent and the 
location of the production of speech is located on the left hand side of the model. On the 
right hand side of the model is the receiver who can be conceived of as audience member, 
but is really the Other because there need be no flesh and blood recipient of the message. 
The Other is perceived as a pre-given necessary feature of discourse and it is marked with 
a capital “O” to signify the receiver’s function as a function of discourse. In this way, the 
Other in psychoanalytic philosophy represents language generally.  
agent →   Other 
This means the model not only fits the standard sender – receiver, speaker – 
audience approach to studying rhetoric, it also accounts for intrapersonal communication 
(as when someone spontaneously curses, or is talking to “themselves”), and 
accommodates speech that is not necessarily produced by any one particular person or 
individual.  
As previously discussed, in contrast with theory rooted in the western rhetorical 
canon that traditionally treats rhetorical agency as a function of the speaker, and assumes 
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the self is somehow known to itself in a transparent, unmediated way, Lacan’s theory 
does not assume that rhetorical agency is the function of the speaker, but rather is a 
function of speech in discourse as driven by the unconscious. The unconscious as a 
driving mechanism for speech marks a fundamental difference between the western 
rhetorical canon’s philosophical assumptions about rhetorical agency and a 
psychoanalytic conceptualization. The philosophical value for the study of rhetoric in 
Freud’s discovery of the unconscious lies in the fact that psychologically speaking there 
is a truth that drives our expression that is not known to the subject or agent, and it is 
determined by the logic of desire and the circulation of jouissance. In adding these 
factors to Lacan’s model, we can see that the subject or agent is driven by the “truth” of 
their desire, which is below the bar because desire is always alienated from the subject or 
agent articulating the rhetoric. 
 agent →  Other 
truth       loss 
This means speech is always a product of lack, that there would be no speech if 
there were no desire, and the subject desires according to the logic of the Other. All four 
discourses Lacan articulated are comprised of four psychodynamic features that he 
maintained analytically represent the structure of discourse: S, S1, S2, objet a. This 
section summarizes these four psychodynamic features in order to explain how the 
diacritical arrangement of these factors in relation to one another in a discourse indicates 
the line of force rhetorical agency exerts in the discourse in order to create a relationship. 
The following section reproduces the analytical models Lacan devised to formulate the 
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four discourses and gives a summary of the methodology underlying these formulas for 
rhetorical analysis.  
In a characteristically difficult way, Lacan teaches that discourse is a structure and 
is not to be confused with speech or language. He says, “discourse…is a necessary 
structure that goes well beyond speech, which is always more or less occasional. What I 
prefer…is discourse without speech.”110What he is suggesting is that there are structures 
underlying the articulation of speech that persist in the language no matter what words 
are used to articulate them. As he puts it  
discourse can clearly subsist without words…in fundamental relations which 
would literally not be [maintainable] without language. Through the instrument of 
language a large number of stable relations are established, inside which 
something that is much larger and goes much further than actual utterances 
[enunciations] can, of course, be inscribed.
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Discourse here is meant to signify the process of forming relationships, and four specific 
kinds of relationships, the structure of which is clear even though the rhetoric constituting 
the discourse is different. Lacan was not trying to come up with a master theory of 
discourse or a meta-discourse, but rather was trying to develop an analytical model 
designed to explain how desire circulates in discourse generally. In his analysis, he 
applied the analytical model to demonstrate the structure of four specific types of 
discourses according to the circulation of desire. The four discourses are the hysteric, the 
master, the university, and the analyst. Because the four discourses serve different social 
functions, each respective discourse constitutes a different kind of rhetorical agency 
because rhetoric in each discourse is predicated upon the formation of a different kind of 
social link or bond. That is what Lacan means when he says discourse serves a social 
function – it links the individual to the social (the Other).112 The four features of 
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discourse are diacritically arranged to reposition rhetorical agency as the analytical 
models below demonstrate. This means rhetorical agency is affected in discourse 
according to the specific structure of the discourse in which it articulated, and by first 
identifying the signifier that represents for the subject their identity in a discourse, (the 
agent’s place in the model) rhetoricians can distinguish ego ideals and ideal ego 
projections from the intrinsic transformative property of rhetoric in order to identify those 
places were change takes place. As Lacan recognized about rhetorical agency in a 
discourse,  
If we designate the agent's place -- whoever it is, this place is not always that of 
the master signifier, since all the other signifiers are going to pass through there in 
turn -- the question is as follows. What makes this agent act?  How is it possible 
to produce this extraordinary circuit around which what deserves, strictly 
speaking, to be designated by the term “revolution” revolves? ... What inaugurates 
this agent, what brings him into play?
113
 
What brings the agent into play is desire; but desire only means something when it is 
structured in a relationship because desire is always the desire of the other person, and 
simultaneously, is the particular desire of the Other—the demands of the language which 
persist as point of irreconcilability that form the points of impossibility that creates or 
produces subjectivity. Some relationships are predicated upon the total and complete 
upheaval of the status quo’s distribution of desire, some are predicated upon the 
perpetuation of the status quo, but the resolution concerning any distribution of desire 
consists in the end of only the desire that structures the relationship and not the rational 
concern for prestige or knowledge or revolution per se. What Lacan is ultimately talking 
about concerns the alignment of desire according to the unconscious logic of desire 
inherent in the different discourses, and this desire is not contingent upon individual or 
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personal whim or fancy. Agents or subjects are acting because desire drives them to, and 
the effect of their rhetorical agency on the situation sometimes brings order to a 
situation—this is true even in the discourse of the revolutionary (the discourse predicated 
upon creating a bond with others by way of protest) Lacan is referring to in the quotation 
above. Looking at the agent’s place more closely in the discourse of the master will help 
illustrate what brings the agent to act, which is to ask, what object or imaginary 
representation or subject drives the desire in the discourse?  
The Discourse of the Master 
The diacritical arrangement of the four features of discourse in the discourse of 
the master are as follows: 
S1  →S2 
S       a 
In the discourse of the master, the speaker occupies the left-hand side of the model, and 
the audience occupies the right. The master signifier stands in place of the subject or 
agent, and signals an attachment to a symbolic identity--an avatar that the speaker or 
rhetor either identifies with or against in order to constitute subjectivity. A signifier in 
which the subject or agent maintains the consistency of their ego insofar as it is 
encapsulated by a word and is able to repress the divided subject which is the source or 
cause of the fantasy. For Žižek, “the Master is the subject who is fully engaged in his 
(speech) act, who, in a way, ‘is his word,’ whose word displays an immediate 
performative efficiency.”114 Master signifiers are ideographs, in the exact way Michael 
Calvin McGee meant in calling the discipline’s attention to those words, images and 
associations that communities invest themselves in, thereby constituting, as Charland put 
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it, “a people.” These symbolic attachments or identifications paper over the fact of the 
divided subject S, which in turn erases the workings of the unconscious in the discourse. 
The master signifier anchors a constellation of signifiers and serves as a center of gravity 
that symbolically links the subject to the chain of signifiers (S2) constituted by the 
audience. The audience then passively produces the objet a. A good example of this is the 
war on terror rhetoric used to govern the United States during George W. Bush’s tenure.  
Terror was the master signifier (S1) for the president. This signifier is bent on 
repressing death in the discourse, as it literally means we will kill the people who killed 
people on September 11, 2001. This is the way the discourse actively works to repress the 
divided subject, the one made aware of the potential for death (9/11) in a literal sense. 
Rather than admit we were traumatized and make that a conscious point of our discourse, 
the President’s speech worked to repress the trauma that is the actual loss of life on 
September 11
th
. The President did not identify directly with the master signifier “terror,” 
his identity gets its consistency in relation to his opposition (or dis-identification with)  
the signifier “terror.” The audience links the master signifier to a set of additional 
signifiers which constitute the knowledge S2, which can be summarized in this case in all 
the ways the war on terror became associated with WWIII, mushroom clouds, Pearl 
Harbor, our way of life, etc. Desire is symbolically fixed to the word freedom, which is 
the objet a in the President’s discourse, the lure that symbolically acts as both the cause 
and the object of desire for the audience.  
Speakers in this discourse structure narcissistically attach themselves to words 
and violently defend the S1 in verbally aggressive ways. It is consciously articulated but 
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unconsciously driven, and therefore only appears to be the root of agency. Speakers who 
seek to master impose order in the language by way of a signifier to regulate knowledge 
and condition the distribution of desire. It is important to recognize that any protest 
movement or anti-establishment discourse will necessarily bear the trappings of the 
master because it is a discourse that is bent on imposing a new social order or cultural 
change. Insofar as the discourse is bent on transforming tradition, or authority or the 
conventional distribution of enjoyment it will register for the receiver as a discourse of 
the master even though it is not necessarily a representation of the status quo. This is how 
the discourse of the master even in the voice of the dispossessed signifies a way of 
dominating the audience. The revolutionary discourse of Fidel Castro became the 
discourse of the master once he seized power. In this way the seeds of the revolution will 
always bear the fruit of ideological domination in the end. This is why Lacan replied to 
those “revolutionaries” committed to overturning French society in the Summer of 1968 
by saying “what you want is a new master, and you shall have one.” The audience in the 
discourse is structured to be acquiescent, insofar as the discourse positions the compliant 
receiver to produce the signifier that represents the ego ideal, be it freedom, privacy or no 
taxation without representation. This is, however, the only discourse in which the concept 
of interpellation has meaning in so far as the audience becomes malleable or made into a 
ready-made object for governing. Yet, that should not imply resistance to ideological 
domination is itself fruitless because every act of mastery will drive its own discourse of 
resistance to the will of the master. In this way the discourse of the master (or governing) 
is always intimately related to and difficult to distinguish from the discourse of the 
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protester—although the distribution of material resources in the status quo and the way 
that distribution is constituted in a person’s rhetoric makes distinguishing these two 
discourses from each other possible. 
The Discourse of the Hysteric 
The analytical structure of the discourse of the hysteric is:  
S   →   S1  
a          S2 
The distinctiveness of the hysteric’s discourse is marked by the fact that the speaker 
articulates the divided subject as constitutive of their subjectivity. For the hysteric the fact 
that their subjectivity is divided is the basis of their identity. In response to the speaker’s 
divided subject, the audience produces the master signifier. The speaker in the discourse 
of the hysteric uses call and response protest rhetoric such as “what do we want?” only to 
have the audience respond with the master signifier “freedom.” In this discourse structure 
the audience represses knowledge, meaning for the speaker that only the audience has the 
knowledge. But the real objet a, what drives the divided subject or S in this discourse is 
repressed by the speaker in the language structure. The objet a is the latent feature in the 
discourse of the hysteric for the speaker, and this means it is the lack of an object, (objet 
a) that drives the hysteric’s discourse. Žižek describes the discourse noting,  
the hysterical subject is the subject whose very existence involves radical doubt 
and questioning, his entire being is sustained by the uncertainty as to what he is 
for the Other; insofar as the subject exists only as an answer to the enigma of the 
Other’s desire, the hysterical subject is the subject par excellence.115 
The environmental movement can be seen to embody the discourse of the hysteric. For 
the speaker, the divided subject S is articulated by a separation from the planet, or mother 
earth. The objet a, mother earth in this discourse, is latent because fealty to her is lacking 
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for the subject. In discourse, people will speak of the need to “get back in touch with 
mother earth,” or that “mother earth is suffering,” in both instances, “mother earth” 
confers what is lacking. Since the master signifier in this discourse is produced by the 
audience, it is useful to think of the master signifiers as those the speaker either identifies 
with or those they identify in opposition to: pollution, erosion, deforestation, global 
warming are all potential master signifiers (S1) the speaker aligns themselves in 
opposition to; whereas, “tree-hugging, earth-worshiping, dirt lover” as the popular 
bumper sticker reads, are all master signifiers (S1) the speaker aligns themselves with in 
order to constitute subjectivity. Knowledge, S2, the latent feature of this discourse, gets 
communicated in this rhetoric as “we have forgotten how to live in harmony with the 
Earth.”  What this illustrates is that for the audience, the knowledge, (how to live in 
harmony with the Earth,) is repressed or lost, but notice, the assumption in this statement 
is that we did at one time have this knowledge.  
What this means is knowledge is repressed in the sense that it’s forgotten, lost, 
and the audience is disconnected from it. The significance of this discourse structure for 
rhetorical analysis is the way this analytically models protest rhetoric, highlighting how 
audiences can be moved once the ability to connect the desire animating their subjectivity 
to the object which would make them whole or unified and therefore no longer a divided 
subject. Specifically, it accounts for the affective intensity characteristic of protest 
rhetoric caused by the active nature of divided subjectivity in this discourse structure.  
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The Discourse of the University 
The diacritical arrangement of the four features of discourse in the discourse of 
the university are as follows: 
S2_→ a_ 
S1         S 
S2  in this discourse is the active feature, which was meant for Lacan to signify the way in 
which the pursuit of knowledge, especially in the west has historically been a self-
justifying process, that is knowledge is accumulated for the sake of accumulating 
knowledge. As Žižek puts it,  
the agent of the university discourse is, on the contrary, fundamentally 
disengaged: he posits himself as the self-erasing observer (and executor) of 
‘objective laws’ accessible to neutral knowledge (in clinical terms, his position is 
closest to that of the pervert).
116
  
In this discourse the speaker treats knowledge as a transparent process and, in an ideal 
sense, is not really responsible for producing the knowledge, they simply convey what 
others already know. The scientist pursues knowledge for knowledge’s sake and isn’t 
really responsible for justifying why they are pursuing that knowledge in the first place. 
When a teacher presents knowledge in a classroom they are encouraged to do so as if 
they are an unaffected observer, a vehicle transmitting the message – baldly producing 
the facts without taking any agency for producing the knowledge. Instead, they pin the 
agency or the source onto the chain of signifiers, S2. Similarly, the scientist is simply 
conducting experiments for the purpose of generating knowledge and they are never 
doing so in a self-interested way, science is always conducting under the auspices of its 
benefit to humankind—knowledge is pursued for reasons intrinsic to the generation of 
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knowledge itself—it is knowledge pursued for knowledge’s sake alone and therefore 
external justifications seem unnecessary or irrelevant.  
This is why in the discourse of the university the master signifier S1 is latent, the 
scientist, like the teacher, is never constructing knowledge in order to reproduce their 
ego, it is the ideal ego of knowledge itself they hold out in the voice of the academic, in 
the voice of reason and the voice of science. The audience in the discourse produces the 
objet a, which in the discourse is always truth. What Lacan meant to teach here was the 
idea that what the scientist and the teacher are both trying to do with their discourse is 
reveal the truth, to teach its methods and procedures. In producing the truth, the audience 
is allowed to resist or repress the divided subject whose source is doubt and uncertainty. 
Which means in the discourse the student leaves the classroom feeling gratified that they 
know the truth and are empowered by it, and the divided subject (S) link to the lack of 
knowledge (doubt) becomes a latent feature in their psychodynamic economy.  
The Discourse of the Analyst 
The diacritical arrangement of the discourse of the analyst is as follows: 
a  → S 
S2       S1 
In the discourse of the analyst, the objet a is in the active position, and is suspended in the 
discourse by the speaker in order to produce the divided subject S. In this discourse, 
unlike the discourse of the master, the divided subject S is active. The analyst identifies 
the objet(s) and causes of desire that split the subject (S) insofar as it is represented in 
speech. As Žižek puts it,  
the analyst stands for the paradox of the desubjectivized subject, of the subject 
who fully assumed what Lacan calls ‘subjective destitution,’ that is, who breaks 
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out of the vicious cycle of intersubjective dialectics of desire and turns into an 
acephalous being of pure drive.
117
  
In this discourse, the loop of desire is itself the object; as the question is not why do you 
desire that object, but rather, why desire the desire to be or to have an object in the first 
place. As Lacan taught, this discourse structure forces the audience (the receiver) to 
repress the master signifiers – those images and symbols the ego has linked itself to in the 
discourse that not only produce alienation, but also produce any other clinical symptoms 
like neurosis and perversion. Unlike the discourse of the university where the professor or 
scientist is thought of as the subject who is supposed to know, Lacan taught that 
knowledge in this discourse is latent because the analyst is not the source of a correctly 
aligned ego or ultimate perspective on reality. The analyst does not have some privileged, 
unmediated or unbiased view of reality that they must teach the one being analyzed to see 
correctly.  
While this “ego psychology” approach may be fashionable in North America, 
Lacan’s work suggests this approach to therapy (and by extension, this kind of critical 
methodology) is fundamentally defective because no reality as such exists from which 
one could base the distortion. The source of the anxiety about reality for the subject lies 
in the fact that he or she desires, even if the subject or agent is psychotic and their speech 
bears no resemblance to what we might conventionally call “everyday reality.” In 
Lacanian discourse theory, the rhetoric in this discourse structure is distinguishable from 
the others because it is organized around the drive to manifest desire itself as the object. 
As such, the discourse reflects the relationship created when subjects or agents are 
engaged in the discourse practice of interpretation; whether the interpretation or analysis 
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is geared to help some other in a clinical setting or in a social setting in which the critic is 
analyzing discourse practices. It is my belief this discourse structure is the key to 
analyzing and interpreting rhetoric generally, as it provides an analytical way of 
modeling the type of rhetorical agency entailed whenever the relationship created by the 
subject or agent is predicated upon the discourse practice we call interpretation or 
analysis. It is the case that what we do in the discipline is analyze and interpret rhetoric. It 
is my belief this is why Lacan’s theory of the four discourses has theoretical purchase for 
the discipline, as he analytically modeled for the discipline what we rightly consider to be 
our preoccupation as a discipline: the interpretation and analysis of rhetoric.  
Summary of the Four Discourses: Methodology 
Lacan’s theory accounts for the power of desire as jouissance in rhetoric and 
therefore helps us explain rhetoric’s effects, and it does so in discourses rhetoricians 
commonly study. In Lacan’s theory, subjects or agents constitute rhetorical agency in 
four key areas of everyday life: protesting, governing, analyzing and teaching. These 
discourse structures are not exhaustive of all potential relationships in a culture, but for 
the purposes of conceptualizing rhetorical agency, they collectively represent four 
discrete and different discourses that structure relationships in a culture. In the broadest 
sense, Lacan’s theory captures how rhetorical agency transforms the discourse of protest, 
or governance, or education or analysis so that it changes social bonds or links in a way 
that is not contingent upon the execution of choice in a wholly conscious or volitional 
manner.  
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The intrasubjective, intersubjective and intrapersonal links formed in protesting, 
governing, analyzing and teaching are in this sense sources of contestation for people and 
individuals because these discourses map the regulation of desire in the culture for 
subjects or agents. The ever-changing nature of the relationships negotiated when the 
supporter of the government meets the protester, or the disaffected student meets the 
committed professor, or the psychologically damaged patient seeks out an analyst, all 
exemplify discrete instances of rhetorical agency put into motion by its configuration in a 
discourse structure. Lacan’s four discourses account for the concept of rhetorical agency 
by connecting it to the logic of unconscious desire at work in a discourse structure which 
forms the basis of all the relationships an individual or a person might have in a culture. 
Methodologically, Lacan’s theory excels because the rhetoric in a subject or agent’s 
speech is interpreted according to what the tropes and schemes suggest about the 
underlying economy of unconscious desire driving or causing the enactment of rhetorical 
agency. It is for these reasons I suggest a recuperation of rhetorical agency as a concept 
that draws upon the Lacanian theory of discourse precisely because it distinguishes 
between four different enactments of agency and gives those doing the interpretation the 
tools to breakdown the discourse into diacritical features which lend themselves to 
analysis according to the workings of desire.   
The four features of discourse describe the psychodynamic work of desire in 
speech. As speech is fitted to a discourse by a speaker, the relationships between these 
psychodynamic features stabilize the otherwise unfocused articulation of desire, giving 
the rhetorical analyst a momentary glimpse of the analytical structure Lacan theorized 
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was at work in discourse. Analyzing the speech that constitutes the discourse refigures 
the circulation of desire because the object of desire for the analyst or critic is desire 
itself. It is my argument that, analytically speaking, it is this focus on the analysis of 
unconscious desire that distinguishes posthumanist psychoanalytic conceptualizations of 
rhetorical agency from either a humanist view or a rehabilitated postmodern one. 
Studying desire is foundational to understanding how the rhetoric transforms or changes 
the culture, and this theory gives us the tools needed to conduct this work in a way that 
permits the articulation of the various ways in which rhetorical agency is enacted in 
discourse practices.
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CHAPTER THREE: GID AND RHETORICAL AGENCY 
Rhetorical Agency, Heterosexuality and Desire 
Posthumanist rhetorical agency is centrally preoccupied with desire, and nowhere 
is desire more directly implicated than in the rhetoric that constitutes a person or 
individual’s gender and sexuality. Too often desire, at least colloquially, in the context of 
sexuality and gender, is reduced to a libidinal drive, something akin to a reproductive 
instinct. Desire, when it is understood as a heterosexual instinct to reproduce and or 
gratify heteronormative sexual impulses, undercuts the informative value the concept of 
desire has for rhetorical theory. Heterosexual desire is distinguishable from desire 
generally, despite heterosexual subjective effects on agency. Heteronormativity is the 
status quo. As John Sloop rightly points out, heteronormativity is material in the sense 
that it is resistant to change, and in this way it is “disciplined in advance…understood 
through particular heteronormative understandings of the human condition.”118 Where 
neoliberal ideology divides the political-economic debate constituted by Tea Party 
rhetoric, it is my argument that heteronormativity divides the ground in the sexual-
cultural debate about the decision to include GID in the fifth edition of the DSM. Both 
are representative of the politics of the status quo.  
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Understanding rhetorical agency in the context of this case study exposes the 
materiality of heteronormativity, and provides us with the opportunity to analyze the way 
rhetorical agency in the debate forms links or social bonds via discourse predicated upon 
arresting or transforming heterosexual hegemony. At the same time, understanding the 
rhetorical agency of those engaged in the debate whose advocacy is predicated upon 
transgendered, transsexual and homosexual desire, and is not arranged according to 
heterosexual desire, is possible because GID calls into question the hegemony and 
normality of heteronormativity. Since individual and deeply personal heterosexual and 
homosexual, transgendered and transsexual economies of desire structure the discourses 
forming the social links that constitute the GID debate, an analysis of the rhetoric at work 
in the debate helps us better understand how rhetorical agency is constituted in a 
discourse according to the unconscious logic of desire. Once rhetorical agency is fixed 
upon desire as its organizing principle, it becomes clearer to what extent rhetoric 
embodies a particular enjoyment for a person or individual and does not follow a 
heteronormative pattern of arrangement or distribution on the body.  
Therefore, I maintain the controversy surrounding the decision to include Gender 
Identity Disorder (GID) as a diagnosis in the fifth edition of the DSM helps us understand 
posthumanist rhetorical agency because it exposes the transformative potential of rhetoric 
to arrest or adapt to both the conscious demands of others in the culture (parents, peers, 
etc.), and the unconscious desire of the Other (the source of enjoyment for the subject or 
agent), thereby structuring the rhetorical agency in the discourses at work in the debate. 
This case study assists us in analyzing how rhetorical agency follows the unconscious 
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logic of desire at work in the transformation or change of the cultural Law, which is 
implicitly heterosexual, and positions this portion of the study to focus on how the 
prohibition of non-heteronormative desire drives rhetorical agency, and therefore 
constitutes the formation of the discourses making up the GID debate.  
Rhetorically, what is also significant about Lacan’s theory of the four discourses 
is what they say about the relationship between jouissance, or surplus enjoyment, and 
rhetorical agency. In essence, jouissance is enacted in the rhetoric to affect the economy 
of desire that regulates the distribution of enjoyment in the discourse for the subject or 
agent’s body. Lacan offers the following maxim: ‘Reality is approached with apparatuses 
of jouissance,”119and what he means is that language is an instrument or a tool for the 
subject or agent; the mechanism through which jouissance is enacted in everyday life, or 
reality. Hence, he says the “formulation I am proposing to you,” is contingent upon “the 
fact that there’s no other apparatus than language. That is how jouissance is fitted out 
(appareillée) in speaking beings.”120 Lacan’s theoretical treatment of discourse presumes 
that agency is a product of unconscious desire which makes itself felt in a discourse by 
way of jouissance. In the GID debate, the cause of unconscious desire at work in a 
discourse is the prohibition of non-heterosexual jouissance. Since the culture is 
heteronormative, and transgenderism is culturally prohibited (or, at minimum, seriously 
marginalized), Lacan’s theory is especially well-suited for analyzing the rhetorical 
agency structured in the discourses that constitute the GID debate because it accounts for 
prohibition or constraint in the formation of a discourse practice. It can account for 
rhetorical agency when it is driven by the restriction of enjoyment for those to whom 
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enjoyment is forbidden (because it violates some unwritten rule operative in the culture 
concerning what and how people or individuals enjoy). In this way the theory accounts 
for counter-hegemonic rhetoric which results from the cultural repression or prohibition 
of desire.  
It is my belief studying counter-hegemonic rhetoric in the context of this debate is 
especially important because some theorists working on the relationship between agency 
as a concept and its prohibition maintain postmodern or post-structuralist theory is 
intrinsically heterosexist and phallocentric. As Lois McNay contends, “recent theoretical 
work,” on gender identity and agency, which she maintains is principally derived from 
Lacan and Foucault, “offers only a partial account of agency because it remains within an 
essentially negative understanding of subject formation.”121 For McNay a negative 
understanding of subject formation is the theoretical presupposition that the subject is 
“formed through an originary act of constraint.”122 In her view,  
If, in following the work of Michel Foucault, the process of subjectification is 
understood as a dialectic of freedom and constraint—‘the subject is constituted 
through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through the 
practices of liberation, of liberty’—then it is the negative moment of subjection 
that has been accorded theoretical privilege in much work on identity construction 
(Foucault 1988:50).
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It is certain Lacan’s writings about the subject cannot be understood as a dialectic 
between freedom and constraint, and I am equally certain Foucault’s work as a whole 
should not be read as presuming he accorded “theoretical privilege” to constraint as 
foundational to subjectivity, however, setting her interpretation aside momentarily, it is 
clear McNay is also making a broader point, as she is specifically arguing it is the 
incorporation of these two theorists into the general discussion about agency that 
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produces an emphasis on constraint as originary to the formation of the subject and 
gendered or sexualized identity—what she is calling the negative paradigm of agency. In 
her criticism we can also see a parallel to the question of agency that vexes speech 
communication theorists. If agency is a function of the negative as McNay surmises, then 
rhetoric is always counter-hegemonic. The negative view of agency McNay is criticizing 
assumes rhetorical agency, according to poststructuralist rhetorical theory, prefigures the 
subject as one recognizable as such only by virtue of its counter-hegemonic possibilities. 
As I have tried to establish, Lacan’s theory of the four discourses as a solution to this 
question concerning agency should give McNay some solace, as it does suggest a 
resolution to the impasse her critique of Lacan posits.  
No matter what familiarity McNay demonstrates with Lacan, it is her contention 
too often the literature about agency begins with the idea that gender or sexuality are 
culturally constrained, and the task of the author then becomes to point out how the 
individual or person’s gender or sexual expression subject to normativity by the culture 
(constrained freedom) nonetheless overcomes the cultural constraint (freedom 
unconstrained). For McNay this means theorists of agency predominantly assume agency 
exists wherever there is resistance by a person to the normalizing effects of the culture on 
an individual’s expression of gender and sexuality. However, she argues  
The idea that the individual emerges from constraint does not offer a broad 
enough understanding of the dynamics of subjectification and, as a consequence, 
offers an etiolated understanding of agency.
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So, while McNay acknowledges the negative paradigm of the subject does offer a theory 
of agency, it is her contention nonetheless that “it leaves unexplained the capabilities of 
individuals to respond to difference in a less defensive,” and as she sees it, “a more 
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creative fashion.”125 Since Lacan and Foucault, in her view, promote the idea that 
constraint is foundational and forms the coherence of the subject, and since these two 
scholars inform much of the work on agency in the literature about gender and sexuality, 
it is McNay’s contention that much of the literature fails to explain or account for the 
generative and creative forces of agency that drive the expression of gender and sexuality 
that are not predicated upon constraint(s).  
McNay is not arguing theorists should reject the “negative understanding of 
subject formation” wholesale; that is, no theorist in her view should underestimate the 
value of analyzing the constraints upon gender and sexual expression in the culture for 
their effects upon agency. However, she does question  
the extent to which [the negative paradigm—”subjectification as subjection”] is 
generalized in much recent theoretical work on identity to become an exhaustive 
account of all aspects of subjectivity and agency.
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McNay’s central point of contention with the negative paradigm is “that coherent 
subjectivity is discursively or symbolically constructed.”127 This post-structuralist 
account of subjectivity and discourse, which for McNay assumes the subject is a passive 
effect of discourse, results in a theory about subjectivity that is discursively deterministic. 
“This idea of discursive construction becomes a form of determinism because of the 
frequent assumption, albeit implicit, of the essential passivity of the subject.”128 Passive, 
discursively constructed subjectivity is theoretically flawed in her view because it 
presumes a “uni-directional and repressive dynamic,” that is “reinforced by the 
exclusionary logic that is used to invest the subject with levels of self-awareness and 
autonomy.”129 McNay’s argument is exclusionary logic, or the system of distinctions and 
differences that compel subjectivity by subjecting individuals or persons to culturally 
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derived gendered and sexualized constraints, assumes that the resistance by individuals to 
the cultural constraints is what drives “self-awareness and autonomy” for the subject. 
Even though it is clear neither Lacan nor Foucault advocate this version of 
poststructuralism, nor do they advocate whatever rhetorical agency such a view of 
poststructuralism implies, it remains the case in McNay’s view that   
The predominance of a primarily negative paradigm of identity formation—of 
subject as subjection—comes from the poststructural emphasis on the subject as 
discursive effect and is a theme common to both Foucauldian constructionism and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis.”130  
Two difficulties with McNay’s criticism are immediately apparent. In keeping with 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, I made the argument that the subject or agent is an effect 
of discourse and only an effect of discourse because presuming as much is theoretically 
necessary to disentangle people or individuals, who are also subjects and agents in a 
theoretical sense, from the flesh and blood body that is an individual or a person. 
McNay’s argument clearly conflates the two. Maintaining the distinction is necessary for 
preserving a place for theory and rhetorical agency. The only acceptable form of criticism 
in her eyes is one that follows an essentially historical arc bent on reproducing the 
specific material constraints a person or individual experiences in a culture bent on 
regulating the expression of sexuality and gender. McNay’s rhetorical agency is, in this 
respect, anti-rhetorical, but more importantly what she is seeking to recover was not 
misplaced. Lacan’s theory of agency assumes that sex and gender are constraints, but 
what she fails to recognize in both Foucault and Lacan is the theoretical understanding 
that repression, suppression, or negation, as McNay would have it, only produces power 
and desire. Negative subject formation is a result of the culture and the language, but 
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does not determine the formation of subjectivity at the expense of some positive 
rhetorical agency. McNay’s affinity for this “negative subject formation” theoretical 
approach makes it difficult for her to give full weight to the structural constraints that 
drive an individual or a person to articulate desire as a subject or agent.  This is why in 
her words the term constraint refers to the “seemingly compulsory nature of the sex-
gender system,”131 which implies there must be some non-compulsory nature at work in 
the sex-gender system. Her approach presumes some pre-discursive space in which 
subjectivity arises. Why else would she qualify the argument by using the word 
“seemingly”? It is my belief no such pre-symbolic or pre-discursive space exists because 
the subject or agent is always an effect of the signifier and, even if her argument was 
persuasive, there is no way to theorize about this pre-discursive body without recourse to 
language. 
The substance of her indict against Lacan’s theory of discourse and, by default, 
post-structuralist  theory, is that it follows “a relational theory of meaning, the assertion 
of the subject’s identity is explained through a logic of the disavowal of difference,” 
which means, “the subject maintains a sense of self principally through a denial of the 
alterity of the other.”132 McNay’s argument takes issue with “the poststructural emphasis 
on the subject as discursive effect,” because for her, this theoretical assumption means 
gender and sexuality are produced by constraint (gender and sexual normativity), and the 
resulting theory of agency then “tends to think of action mainly through the residual 
categories of resistance to or dislocation of dominant norms.”133 The conclusion she 
reaches is Lacan’s theory is inadequate because it makes the subject or agent a passive 
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effect of speech whose only reason for being is to resist the imposition of 
heteronormative constraints. McNay’s criticism ignores the fact that Lacan’s theory of 
discourse does make allowances for and tries to engage the formation of subjectivity in 
discourse that is not predicated upon the assumption that discourse is either hegemonic or 
counter-hegemonic. 
McNay however considers it more important to point out  
The difficulty with Lacan’s linguistic account of subjectification, it is widely 
argued, is that the ahistorical and formal nature of the paradigm forecloses a 
satisfactory account of agency.
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Yet, as I have already laid out, Lacan’s assertion that the subject or agent is an effect of 
speech does not suggest the person or individual is incapable of creating change or taking 
“action,” as McNay puts it, in either specific historical or material aspects. On the 
contrary, it is my argument Lacan’s thinking about agency suggests a more nuanced and 
varied approach than McNay’s reading of Lacan would lead one to conclude.  For her, 
this means “it is difficult to see how [Lacanian theory] connects to concrete practices and 
achievements of women as social agents,” but Lacan did not propose a reductive theory 
of agency that cannot account for concrete practices;  Lacan simply points out that 
whatever achievements it is that the critic identifies are not simply derived from that 
subject or agent’s command of knowledge or resistance to constraints, but rather the way 
the discourse puts desire into play in a discourse structure, which in turn arrests or 
advances the redistribution of desire in the culture. McNay is looking for some positive 
affirmation of subjectivity, but her failure to see the theory of power as productive that 
both Lacan and Foucault provide prevents her from seeing rhetorical agency in both 
thinkers in its full detail. What I think makes McNay’s argument more visible is the 
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exposure of her assumption that discursive effects are indistinguishable from constraints, 
and constraints are therefore indicative of gendered or sexualized agency. According to 
McNay’s assessment of Foucault and Lacan, since constraints produce the subject, and 
constraints necessarily imply a passive subject, that is a subject produced as a result of 
some gendered or sexualized normativity, the theories Lacan and Foucault lay-out can 
only be limited because they are passive theories of agency. If, as McNay assumes, Lacan 
and Foucault argue the dialectic between freedom and constraint determines agency, and 
the discourse therefore determines the subject because of the gendered or sexualized 
constraint, then the discourse theory both Lacan and Foucault offer cannot account for the 
counter-hegemonic potential of an individual or person’s advocacy, nor can it account for 
the political power of feminist advocacy generally. Again, I think the argument amounts 
to the same “phantom criticism” I articulated in the first chapter. Whether negative or 
positive, posthumanist rhetorical agency means to account for both.  
Posthumanist rhetorical agency, as opposed to McNay’s “negative paradigm of 
identity formation,” assumes desire and not constraint guides the analysis of rhetoric. 
Lacan’s philosophy does account for constraint by demonstrating how the imposition, or 
subjection (to use McNay’s terms), of gender and sexual normativity in the culture 
produces a lack for an individual or a person at the level of the unconscious because, as is 
explicitly the case with GID, at the level of the unconscious there is no signifier for the 
lack that constitutes the differences between the sexes. There is no sexual relationship, 
Lacan claims, because a) no other person or individual will ever wholly or fully fulfill the 
complementarity expected of the perfect love, (every great romance is only romantic 
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when “lovers unite”), and b) because the notion that the penis and the vagina are 
necessarily complements to one another is unconditionally false, and c) because the 
fundamental fantasy upon which every subject who is not psychotic operates under 
assumes there is something (which does not mean it’s not someone, but, as is often the 
case, the thing is a person or persons) who could fix or repair the incompleteness that 
underlies the psychic economy for a subject or agent. The divided, the alienated or 
subjectified subject would cease to exist if it were possible to become some whole or 
unified, complete or otherwise unsubjectified and an inalienable thing. But the end result 
would require an exodus from the very structure of language itself—a renunciation only 
the religiously devout or spiritually pious seem willing to make. Agency as such always 
suggests these varied ways in which rhetoric affects subjectivity. 
It is clear we want our theory to account for the rhetoric employed to protest or 
resist domination from the state or the culture because so much of our work contains a 
general suspicion and awareness about power inequities caused by discrimination and the 
injustices prejudice creates. McNay’s assessment of Lacan, in its general dismissal of 
poststructuralism, fails to acknowledge Lacan’s accounting of the historical and material 
constraints that impose themselves upon the subject in a discourse. Lacan’s emphasis on 
desire in his philosophy advances this interest because it locates cultural domination 
within the economy of desire that influences how jouissance is distributed in a discourse. 
The GID debate illustrates the limits of a conceptualization of rhetorical agency that does 
not account for sex and gender, as these central concerns at work in the GID debate 
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cannot be interpreted without accounting for the entanglement of rhetoric, sex, desire, 
and gender in the discourse.  
Lacan’s theory accounts for the discourse designed to resist or protest the 
domination of heteronormativity by describing the relationship between a prohibition and 
its effect on the subject or agent in causing rhetorical agency. It also accounts for the 
enjoyment subjects or agents experience when they are enforcing cultural norms. Doing 
the work of policing the culture is a source of enjoyment for some agents and subjects in 
a culture, and Lacan’s theory accounts for this fact in addition to any counter-hegemonic 
potential the discourse might have for subjects or agents. Lacan’s theory assumes the 
economy of desire in the culture is not identical with the economy of desire that drives 
the subject or agent, as what an individual desires is a result of the cultural norms 
regarding what is permitted, at the same time that it is also a product of the individual 
person’s experience of sex and gender as social constructs. Lacan’s teachings concerning 
sex and gender presume the fundamental importance of these concepts for articulating 
agency and provide the resources needed to account for the connection between rhetoric 
and sex and gender in discourse.  
By applying the theory of the four discourses in conjunction with Lacan’s 
teachings concerning sexuation to the GID debate, it is the purpose of this chapter to 
demonstrate how psychoanalysis facilitates the conceptualization of posthumanist 
rhetorical agency. To do so, I analyze the circulation of jouissance in the rhetoric that 
constitutes the GID debate to demonstrate how first, rhetorical agency is a function of the 
unconscious logic of desire, and second, how the unconscious logic of desire structures 
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four different kinds of agencies, and third, how the rhetorical agency constituting these 
four different discourses transforms intersubjective, intrasubjective or interpersonal 
relationships to arrest or encourage cultural transformation or change.  
Posthumanist Lacanian Agency, Sex, and Gender 
In his later years, Lacan increasingly stressed the fundamental importance of sex 
and gender in the formation of the subject. As he put it in Seminar XX,  
Everything that’s said, expressed, gestured, manifested, assumes its sense only as 
a function of a response that has to be formulated concerning this fundamentally 
symbolic relation—Am I a man or am I a woman?135  
This question is central because “…the symbolic is what yields us the entire world 
system,” as he explained in The Psychoses, “It’s because man has words that he has 
knowledge of things,” which means “the number of things he has knowledge of 
corresponds to the number of things he is able to name.”136 This line of reasoning 
suggests that the answer to the question, “Am I a man or a woman?” is contingent upon 
the signifier and is not a function of anatomy alone.  
The symbolic provides a form into which the subject is inserted at the level of his 
being. It’s on the basis of the signifier that the subject recognizes himself as this 
or that. The chain of signifiers has a fundamental explanatory value…137 
However, he adds, “there is no doubt either that the imaginary relation is linked to 
ethology, to animal psychology,” as he maintains “The sexual relation implies capture by 
the other’s image.”138 The symbolic, he contends, “appears to be open to the neutrality of 
the order of human knowledge,” which is a sign or name, whereas the imaginary, “seems 
to be the very domain of the erotization of the object.”139 Since the erotization of an 
object depends upon the imaginary investment of desire in an object by a subject or 
agent, but subjects and agents invest signs in the culture with value differently; the 
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imaginary domain functions according to a peculiar logic. The uniqueness of the 
imaginary order lays in the opposition between men and women as a basis for ego 
identification. What this means is that the answer to this question exposes a “fundamental 
dissymmetry,” which Lacan asserts is no accident 
one of the sexes is required to take the image of the other sex as the basis of 
identification. That things are so can’t be considered a pure quirk of nature. This 
fact can only be interpreted from the perspective in which it’s the symbolic 
organization that regulates everything.”140 
Additionally, there is no place for agency enacted by a subject or agent that is not 
a function of discourse, i.e., no pre-discursive space for the subject or agent exists. There 
is no non-constrained space from which gender and sex could exist for humans. 
Discourse exists in a relational structure in both the first and last instance for humans, and 
it structures the distribution of jouissance even in cases of extreme gender ambiguity. As 
Lacan argues,  
In the final analysis, there’s nothing but…the social link. I designate it with the 
term ‘discourse’ because there’s no other way to designate it once we realize that 
the social link is instantiated only by anchoring itself in the way in which 
language is situated over and etched into what the place is crawling with, namely, 
speaking beings.
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Lacan’s argument is that subjectivity is contingent upon discourse, which means it 
is in the formation of social links, which happens every time a person or individual 
communicates with other people and individuals, that the subject or agent—in his words 
“speaking beings”— form the interpersonal, intrapersonal and intersubjective 
relationships that constitute rhetorical agency in the culture. However, this agency is 
always a function of how the signs articulated are invested with desire and fitted into the 
economy of enjoyment at work in the culture. Lacan contends,  
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Culture, insofar as it is distinct from society, doesn’t exist. Culture is the fact that 
it has a hold on us (ça nous tient). We no longer have it on our backs, except in 
the form of vermin, because we don’t know what to do with it, except get 
ourselves deloused. I recommend that you keep it, because it tickles and wakes 
you up. That will awaken your feelings…142  
Lacan is trying to draw a distinction between culture as a natural or original state which 
precedes persons or individuals and the necessity of forming social links to be a subject 
or agent, thereby creating a culture. The reason people or individuals form social links is 
to access jouissance, which is why the source of jouissance for the subject or agent is 
driven by the Other, the Symbolic and Imaginary progenitor of the ways in which the 
body may serve as an instrument of enjoyment, or as enjoyment’s object. In this way, 
psychoanalysis assumes no individuals or persons decide to be straight, gay, lesbian, bi, 
transgendered or transsexual; there is no choice exercised here because enjoyment is 
driven by the unconscious logic of desire. This seems to be the most enduring and 
important criticism of humanist agency Lacan’s teaching provides. Rationality, choice or 
knowledge does not affect the unconscious logic of desire that drives the jouissance for a 
subject or agent, which is why you cannot unlearn a sexual orientation. No therapy could 
ever “correct” for sexual orientation unless said therapy involved re-education, or, 
“reparation.”  
The structure of desire for an individual or a person therefore manifests itself in 
various ways that defy reductive explanations which conform to the heteronormative 
order. Some people or individuals desire nonconformity, and therefore they break the 
gender and sex norms, rules or laws. Some people derive pleasure from conforming to the 
law, others get pleasure out of enforcing the law on themselves and others. In every case 
the point remains it is desire and not consciousness or choice or knowledge that is 
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operative. Lacan’s theory of discourse gives rhetoricians a way of interpreting rhetoric 
that assumes desire is unconsciously generated and persists in the cultural do’s and don’ts 
that define the limits of enjoyment which are (im)permissible in a particular relationship 
between individuals and other people in the culture. While individuals can and do self-
identify as lesbian or bi or transgendered or straight or gay or otherwise, the underlying 
connection between the rhetoric employed to self-identify, and the subject or agent’s 
economy of desire, is not consciously derived. Lacanian posthumanist conceptualizations 
of rhetorical agency assume sexual orientation is a product of the unconscious. Desire, in 
the sexual gratification sense, is an unconscious function of jouissance which is unique to 
each individual or person. The fundamental question then becomes: How does the 
underlying economy of desire in the discourse of a transgendered subject or agent affect 
rhetorical agency?  
Historical-Cultural Context of the GID “Debate” 
Transgendered people, and as I will contend here, in particular transgendered 
children, are stigmatized by psychologists. GID is presently recognized by psychologists 
in North American circles as a pathology consisting of “strong and persistent cross-
gender identification (not merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being 
the other sex),” and also a “persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of 
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.”143 Further, any diagnosis of GID must 
also determine the “disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition,” and 
find “the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”144 The definition of GID is 
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presently undergoing revision, but there is little doubt at this point it will remain an 
official diagnosis in the next edition. 
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The diagnosis is not limited to adults or even adolescents, as it is also applied to 
children as young as two who display behaviors not typically associated in the West with 
masculinity, assuming the child is born biologically male (i.e. with a penis), or femininity 
if the child is born biologically female (i.e. with a vagina).
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  The present diagnosis is in 
large part a product of the theory and research amassed by psychologists Ken Zucker, 
head of the Gender Identity Service Clinic, Child, Youth, and Family Program, and Ray 
Blanchard, who supervises Zucker as the head of the Centre for Addiction and Mental 
Health in Toronto. Zucker is also on the sub-committee responsible for revising the 
diagnosis for the fifth edition of the DSM, so he is strategically placed to ensure its 
inclusion in the next edition. Blanchard, Zucker and the North American psychiatric 
community generally insist GID, while its “epidemiology” remains uncertain, is 
nonetheless a treatable psychiatric disorder.
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Zucker’s conclusions concerning GID as a diagnosis, and his insistence on 
reparative therapy as the clinical method for treating it, are powerful forces within the 
culture. The fact that he is often interviewed and is regularly and widely cited in North 
American media circles (not to mention the journals) speaks to his perceived importance 
as a public expert on GID. Given the enormous weight his opinions bear for North 
American audiences, we should take what he says seriously and scrutinize it, especially 
since his opinions as an “expert” are so easy for anyone who is not an “expert” to adopt 
and later repeat. 
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Analysis of Rhetorical Agency and GID 
For the purposes of rhetorical study, I want to focus on the rhetorical agency 
constituted in the broadcasts as it is produced by transgendered children, their parents, 
and the psychologists and psychotherapists who treat them because jouissance for 
transgendered children is considered to be a disorder or pathology. The entire debate 
exposes the significant force desire exerts in discourse, as the debate is fundamentally 
about how the economy of desire distributes and regulates jouissance. Transgendered 
children affect the economy of jouissance because they do not conform to the cultural 
expectation that a person or individual’s anatomy corresponds with their articulation of 
desire and gender identity. The rhetoric collected for analysis consists of Gender 
Confused Kids, the October 29, 2008 Dr. Phil television broadcast, and a National Public 
Radio broadcast from May 7, 2008. In each of the artifacts, the discourses that constitute 
the GID debate are clearly represented and, while this is but a sample, it is my contention 
the analysis of the rhetoric in the artifacts gives us a detailed look at how the discourses 
that constitute the debate generally function. To elaborate, I offer the following analysis 
of the discourse of transgendered children, their parents, and the psychologists and 
psychotherapists who contributed to the broadcast.  
The NPR production I selected for analysis includes interview segments with 
Zucker and psychologist Diane Ehrensaft, as well as the mother and father of Jonah, and 
the mother (the father did not want to be interviewed) of Bradley, parents of “two boys 
conflicted,” as the lead-in by host Michele Norris says, with GID.148 To begin the 
broadcast, host Melissa Block establishes the customary tension expected of news stories 
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by framing it as a question concerning “parents who face difficult choices about what's 
best for their child,” as she goes on to say, “Both have six year-old sons who believe they 
were born into the wrong body—boys who say they are actually girls.”149  Norris adds, 
“Now this is nothing new—men who feel they're actually women and vice versa. What's 
less well known is that this conflict can also affect children.”150  What is most important 
to see at work here are the signifiers believe, wrong, and conflict, as these are the places 
in the speech were words meet the system of opposites that give the rhetoric its 
heteronormative footing.  
Does belief imply children are mistaken? If there is a wrong body, does that 
necessarily imply there is a right body?  What is conflicted gender—or better, what is 
conflict-free gender? The lead-in suggests what underwrites all of these assumptions 
about gender, and this is also consistent with other portions of the broadcast, is the 
unconscious desire to know the truth of another person’s body. If there is a conflicted 
gender, then there must be some conflict-free gender, which implies what is desired is the 
jouissance of knowing the truth about someone’s gender identity. It is the desire for the 
truth that is unconsciously driving the rhetoric, thereby unconsciously conforming to the 
heteronormative order which assumes gender identity is known already, as the rhetoric 
suggests, in the conflict-free gender. Further, this entails there must be doubt about the 
status of the conflict-free gender, and in this way is symptomatic of the heteronormative 
order’s inability to fully explain (or contain) gender and sex. Above all, the lead-in 
suggests what we want to know is: are these children boys or are they girls? 
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The two children are Jonah and Bradley, but they are not (for ethical and legal 
reasons), included in the NPR broadcast. They are silent. Instead, their parents recount 
how their respective children exhibited non-conforming gender, which they noticed in 
their child’s play, choice of playmates and toys and later, after acquiring some command 
of the language, the insistence that they were not boys, they were girls. Jonah’s parents 
supported his transition, and he started school as a girl. His parents were encouraged to 
support Jonah’s gender transition by their therapist, Diane Ehrensaft. I will return to 
Jonah in just a moment, but first I should point out Bradley’s story is almost exactly the 
opposite.  
To put Bradley’s story into context, it is important to know that while his 
experiences, at least as they are communicated on the broadcast, are made to match 
Jonah’s, his mother Carol’s feelings about supporting Bradley’s gender are influenced by 
something that happened when he was five. Bradley came home after an outing at the 
playground with a deep wound in his forehead. As Carol recalls in the broadcast,  
What had happened was two ten-year-old boys had thrown him off some 
playground equipment across the pavement because he'd been playing with a 
Barbie doll, and they called him a girl. And so that sort of struck me that, you 
know, if he doesn't learn to socialize with both males and females, he was going 
to get hurt.
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At the time the NPR show aired, Bradley had been undergoing reparative therapy for 
eight months. At this point in the broadcast the audience is introduced to Zucker. As 
Spiegel narrates,  
Carol decided to seek professional help. Bradley's school referred her to a 
psychologist, a gender specialist in Toronto named Dr. Ken Zucker, who is 
considered a world expert on gender identity issues, and who runs a clinic in 
Canada specifically devoted to these kids.
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As Spiegel explains, “Dr. Zucker has been treating kids with gender identity problems for 
close to thirty years.”153    
Now that Zucker’s credibility is prominently established, the broadcast begins to 
craft the distinctions that make Zucker’s approach different from the one Jonah’s parents 
and their therapist eventually supported. As we learn, “his goal whenever he encounters a 
child under the age of 10 has been the same,” he attempts to “make the children 
comfortable with the gender they were born with.”154  At this point in the broadcast, the 
audience is again caught-up in the desire to want to know the truth of Zucker’s 
knowledge, as it is learned “there’s a lot of debate about Zucker’s approach,” since some 
“mental health professionals” make the argument that “trying to force children with these 
issues to accept the sex they were born with” is like “trying to force homosexuals to be 
straight, that it’s unethical.”155 What is important about the unnamed group of therapist is 
the place they occupy in the rhetoric as opponents to Zucker’s view that GID is a disease. 
Zucker assumes gender is amenable to change through the introduction of changes to the 
child’s environment. Children treated with reparative therapy are made to conform 
strictly to the cultural expectations their biological sex confers. If the child has a vagina, 
then the parents are instructed, among other things, to take away whatever toys are 
stereotypically associated with masculinity in the culture, to encourage the child to 
identify with female characters, and to symbolize femininity in their art, etc. This is all 
done to teach the child how to be more comfortable with their biological sex. As Zucker 
argues, therapy is  
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helping kids understand themselves better and what might be causing them to 
develop what I call a ‘fantasy solution,’ that being the other sex will make them 
happy.
156
  
But what is it that makes a child’s solution to the problem of being sexed either 
masculine or feminine a fantasy; that is to say, a delusion?  Are there any solutions to this 
problem that Zucker would not consider fantastic or delusional? Does this not suggest the 
only rhetorical agency at work in the discourse is the heteronormative one because 
Zucker knows the truth about sexual orientation and can therefore judge the delusional or 
fantastic expression of sexuality in the children he diagnoses and treats? In the broadcast, 
the audience is made to know that the leading psychological authority on the subject 
maintains  
The more you engage in a behavior, the more likely it's going to continue. If a 
little boy is only cross-dressing and only role-playing as a female, only playing 
with toys in the culture that we associate with girls, I think that that gets into a 
feedback loop that reinforces their identity or fantasy that they are a girl or that 
they're like a girl.
157
  
Rhetorical agency in the discourse Zucker is structuring regulates the circulation of desire 
and is resistant to change, but the very imposition of the heteronormative imperative itself 
transforms the rhetorical agency embodied by these children in the discourse. This is a 
key issue for rhetorical agency, as it begs us to consider how gender is both a point of 
resistance to the heteronormative order but also a source of transformation in which the 
hegemony of heterosexuality is directly called into question. Lacanian posthumanist 
versions of rhetorical agency account for how a prohibition of jouissance generates a 
rhetorical agency of resistance without recapitulating the narrow role constraints play in 
McNay’s criticism. 
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To elaborate, according to Ragland “...Lacan argued that the sexes are not 
fundamentally equal and symmetrical. Nor can they be made so by clinical treatment, or 
reeducation,” but this does not mean the lack of a sexual difference does not matter, 
“whether it is said to be created by words and language games or by genes and 
biology.”158  Lacan maintains the child’s desires are unconscious because they stem from 
the earliest experiences humans have with a caretaker. All the wiping and feeding and so 
on produces a link between the actions of another and our experience of jouissance. 
When these touches and feedings and the like are withheld, as they inevitably are, the 
child learns to link the use of language to their return. Demand enough and a desire will 
be acknowledged. But that only produces a loop of never-ending demand and desire. It 
habituates a certain pattern of substitution whereby the signifier is made to stand-in for 
the original affects that command the desire of the child. Thus, the bodily enjoyment 
becomes mediated by the signifier.  
As an adult, language crafts a sort of net that sections off the various areas of our 
bodies and makes them into a sign for us, and Zucker assumes, since language is 
transparent for him, that these erogenous zones, these ways of manipulating the body so it 
conforms to the desire to be desired is a product of biology and environment, but not the 
unconscious. Zucker’s account makes homosexual, transsexual and transgendered desire, 
and the rhetorical agency upon which these economies of desire are predicated, appear 
abnormal, variant or disordered. Lacanian posthumanist rhetorical agency shows us how, 
while the economy of desire may differ from one person to another, the fact that they are 
different does not mean they are necessarily abnormal, variant, or disordered. The 
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normative preference for heterosexuality is exposed in this way and therefore accounts 
for the specificity of transsexual, bisexual, etc. unconscious desire without reference to 
biology or instinct.  
All of the children in the NPR broadcast are biological males, and each of the 
children articulate jouissance or surplus enjoyment in and through objects associated with 
femininity in the culture. It is this preoccupation with the children’s interest in objects 
associated with femininity in the culture, their desire to dress and act feminine, and their 
desire to be a female body, that derails the heteronormative economy of desire for 
someone like Zucker. But these objects are what transgendered children have invested 
with desire, and are therefore what serve as the basis for their articulation of agency. We 
can see this especially in the objects associated with femininity, such as the color pink, 
butterflies, fairies, dresses and make-up, and transgendered children’s preferred style of 
play. This preoccupation with the object is clear in Jonah’s mother’s recollection of the 
events leading up to the purchase of Jonah’s first dress. As Alix Spiegel narrates,  
Around the age of 3, Jonah started taking his mother Pam's clothing. He would 
borrow a long T-shirt and belt, and fashion it into a dress. This went on for 
months — with Jonah constantly adjusting his costume to make it better — until 
one day, Pam discovered her son crying inconsolably. He explained to his mother 
that he simply could not get the T-shirt to look right, she says.
159
 
Pam concluded that the time for Jonah to purchase a dress had come. Spiegel continues,  
Pam remembers watching her child mournfully finger his outfit. She says she 
knew what he wanted. ‘At that point I just said, you know, you really want a dress 
to wear, don't you? And [Jonah's] face lit up, and she was like, Yes!...I thought 
she was gonna hyperventilate and faint because she was so incredibly 
happy...before then, or since then, I don't think I have seen her so out of her mind 
happy as that drive to Target that day to pick out her dress.’160 
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Jonah’s increasing frustration with the improvised T-shirt and belt dress produces a crisis, 
what Lacan’s teaching suggests is a lack of jouissance or a place where the discourse 
signifies some limitation on the subject which generates desire. While Jonah’s desire, just 
like anyone else’s desire, will not be satiated by the trip to Target to purchase a dress, the 
dress still functions as an object that connects Jonah’s demand to a cause or source of 
desire in the Symbolic and Imaginary orders that produce jouissance for the body.  For 
Bradley, it is the color pink.
161
 In either case, the unconscious truth is no object could 
ever completely remedy the anxiety a subject or agent experiences, and this is especially 
clear when we are talking about gender and sexuality, but that does not stop most from 
investing the object with value in order to sustain jouissance as Jonah and Bradley have. 
Jonah’s jouissance, her “out of her mind” happiness, starkly contrasts with the 
increasing frustration she outwardly experiences in her discontent with the make-shift 
outfit. Jonah’s frustration turns into a demonstrable privation; that is, the symbolic and 
imaginary failure of the improvised dress persists as a reoccurring anxiety, and this 
anxiety builds until it traumatically disrupts the Symbolic and Imaginary order in 
discourse, thereby compelling Pam as other to act. For Jonah, the inadequacies of the 
improvised dress moves from a persistent anxiety to experiencing a total loss—without 
the dress, she experiences an inability or loss of ability to use certain parts of the body in 
conformity with the unconscious logic of desire that is driving her jouissance. In 
theoretical terms, the agent or subject in this discourse is constituted in the split between 
the object lost and the effect of loss or lack on the subject or agent, as represented by the 
S.  
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The division in the discourse is constituted in part in the alienation Jonah 
experiences in not being the unary trait, the identification with the signifier “girl” that her 
unconscious desire urges her to be. This shatters her ego and the consistency of her 
access to jouissance (objet a) is interrupted in a way people who conform to social norms 
regarding heteronormative gender never experience.  
Jonah’s experience is however typical in the sense that every person or individual 
questions their identity from time to time, a practice which Lacan describes as hysterical. 
The hysteric in Lacan’s teaching is not pejorative, it is a fundamental exercise all subjects 
or agents undergo in order to create an identity, which is why Lacan claims hysterical 
speech is the “most elementary mode of speech.”162  Lacan believed “the discourse of the 
hysteric is fundamental … because it discloses the structure of speech in general.”163  
Since desire is always the desire of the Other, we can see how subjectivity itself is 
contingent upon an answer from the Other about what “I” am to other people, but the 
deeper audience is the Other—the language or culture. Lacan’s dictum, the signifier is a 
subject for another signifier, brings out the importance of resolving the signifiers 
associated with identity, as what we are as subjects depends upon other people 
acknowledging the signifiers we want to have associated with us by other people I light 
of the Other as language or culture. As a result, it is easy to see how agency often 
originates in this discourse structure due to the ego’s inability to find a signifier that 
adequately represents itself to itself due to the demands of other people, but more 
importantly, the demands of the Other.  
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Jonah’s discourse illustrates how the ego is subservient to the demands of the 
language and culture, or Other. The reality of the dress for Jonah is real because, in her 
discourse, the dress signifies for the subject to other signifiers that there is nothing 
missing here, which is another way of saying the dress completes her or fills some void in 
her being. In this way the dress is a metaphor for Jonah being the object of desire. 
 Rhetorical agency in the discourse directly transforms once the dress becomes the 
object of desire and is no longer prohibited to the child, and it is in the exchange in the 
symbolic order that desire is suspended for Pam. For Jonah, the dress is a metaphor, the 
meaning of which is both Imaginary and Symbolic, but nonetheless Real because it 
signifies the gap in the Symbolic order. The fact that the dress repairs the Symbolic order, 
or fixes the symptom, only proves there is a Real gap, which signifies the lack of the 
sexual difference underlying gender identity. The symbolic enjoyment Jonah invests in 
the object comes from what the signifier is for the subject to other signifiers, and in this 
way she satisfies the demands of the Other to be a boy or a girl.. This means the dress is 
but one of many signifiers in the signifying order available, but its function as an object 
around which desire may form then simply illustrates the point at which desire forms a 
coherent structure in a discourse, thereby mediating some exchange with other people or 
individuals in the language to serve the demands of the culture. The acknowledgment of 
enjoyment by Pam in the discourse is structured around Jonah’s enjoyment, which fits 
Lacan’s dictum “the desire is the desire of the Other.” For Jonah, the Other is essential, 
because this relationship to the desire of the Other presses the circulation of jouissance 
into action in the discourse.  
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Through Pam and Jonah’s exchange we can see the interlocutors change and 
transform their rhetorical agency in a few short moments. The rhetoric constituted in the 
discourse redistributes jouissance according to the demand, and in acknowledging its 
force, rhetorical agency transforms the unconscious logic of desire from its latent state to 
an active force. As Pam remembers, in watching her child mournfully finger his outfit,  
She [Jonah] says she knew what he wanted. At that point I just said, you know, 
'You really want a dress to wear, don't you?' And [Jonah's] face lit up, and she 
was like, 'Yes!'...I thought she was gonna hyperventilate and faint because she 
was so incredibly happy. ... Before then, or since then, I don't think I have seen 
her so out of her mind happy as that drive to Target that day to pick out her dress,’ 
Pam says of Jonah.
164
 
Pam’s discourse shifts decidedly once she knows what it is that would complete Jonah’s 
disconnected circuit of enjoyment. What is key about her discourse is the way her agency 
is predicated upon a lack of doubt, a kind of certainty of knowledge that allows her to 
produce Jonah’s unconscious desire (a) in an object. Knowledge, which is a lack of doubt 
or S2, produces the a. In the discourse, this relationship between knowledge and the objet 
a is symbolized as S2→ a, which means to represent Pam as the agent on the left and 
Jonah as object of the other. Jonah in Pam’s discourse is the other, the audience, or the 
receiver, and as the other in Pam’s discourse, the result of Jonah’s identification as the 
objet a is the repression of her divided subjectivity. Specifically, this is the anxiety Jonah 
is communicating to her mother about her costume and her inability to “make it right.” 
There is a tacit acknowledgement of Jonah’s possession of the unary trait implied in 
Pam’s discourse. In other words, Pam is speaking to Jonah as a girl.  
The tacit acknowledgment of Jonah’s agency as a girl in Pam’s discourse also 
forces Pam’s explicit recognition that Jonah is not a boy, thereby repressing the master 
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signifier S1 “boy” in Pam’s discourse. Pam’s discourse renders what was a relation of 
impossibility into a relation of possibility; thereby facilitating a transformation or change 
in the discourse such that, Jonah, no longer separated from the object, becomes co-
extensive with the objet a. This is important because it shows how rhetorical agency, 
once it is made coextensive with the object, becomes a discourse whose very structure 
provides unfettered access to jouissance. What results is the discourse of the analyst.  
Jonah’s agency undergoes a transformation to the discourse of the analyst once 
her mother acknowledges that Jonah wants a dress. It is clear the discourse structures the 
relationship in a way that facilitates the child’s articulation of desire for the object (a 
dress). But more importantly, what matters is the way Pam’s testimonial demonstrates the 
excess enjoyment experienced by the child in the metaphorical condensation of meaning 
into the dress as a sign of jouissance or love. The happiness conferred in the purchase of 
the dress consciously reflects the unconscious logic of desire that structures the child’s 
discourse in the relationship as the want to be the object of desire. Having the dress is 
only important if it is worn, so it is not in having the dress that desire is lodged. Instead, 
Jonah’s discourse is structured around being the object of desire; having a dress is a 
means to that end. When Jonah wears her dress, her agency is operating from the position 
of the objet a, this is surplus enjoyment, total bliss temporarily undisturbed by alienation. 
Jonah becomes indistinguishable in the discourse from the object a, a transition marked 
in the Lacanian discourse theory by the following structure:  
a_→ S 
S2       S1 
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The agent or subject constituting rhetorical agency in this discourse is located in an object 
and it is in the redistribution of this object from unavailability to availability, or 
impossibility to possibility, that changes or transforms Jonah’s treatment of her body as 
an object. If subjects are castrated symbolically, it is because the signifier marks some 
limit to the capacity to exercise some function of the body in reality. Rhetorical agency 
transforms the discourse thereby signifying some possibility for exercising the body 
where only a prohibition existed before the distribution of desire, and hence the 
discourse, changed or transformed. The discourse of the analyst constitutes a relationship 
or a bond with the other person via the Other (language) wherein the agent or subject is 
coexistent with the source or cause of jouissance (objet a); the subject’s discourse is 
therefore driven by the unconscious truth that is excess enjoyment (jouissance), which is 
“who I am.”  
Lacan’s discourse theory accounts for rhetorical agency in analysis by 
transforming or changing the arrangement of the desire at work in a discourse by drawing 
it out of the rhetoric and isolating it. In effect, the distinctiveness of the discourse of the 
analyst is not only that the object defines the agent or subject, but that the audience or 
other is forced to reconcile the alienated or divided subject S. Specifically, this means 
every individual or person asks themselves “is this a boy or is this a girl?” Jonah’s 
discourse is a way of revisiting the very same question every subject has encountered 
regarding their own sexuation, which forces the audience to revisit the foundational trama 
of sexuation. There are various ways to reconcile the trauma of sexuation (S) and each 
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discourse reflects a discrete way of managing this trauma. This is clearly illustrated in the 
discourse of Jonah’s father.  
Jonah’s father has accepted that his “son” is a girl, but this was not always the 
case. As the broadcast indicates, before Jonah transitioned, acquaintances would mistake 
Jonah for a girl.  
…while running errands, casual acquaintances, fellow shoppers, passers-by, 
would mistake Jonah for a girl. This appeared to thrill him … Jonah would 
complain bitterly if his father tried to correct them.
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According to Jonah’s father, “What began to happen was Jonah started to get upset about 
that,” adding Jonah would argue ‘Why do you have to say anything!’ Joel recalls a 
particular instance,  
when we were walking the dogs and this person came up and said ... ‘Oh, is this 
your daughter?’ and I said, ‘Oh, no, this is Jonah.’... And Jonah just came running 
up and said, ‘Why do you have to tell! Why do you have to say anything!’166   
It is clear that Jonah’s discourse is at odds with the social opprobrium regarding gender, 
and he is responding to the social compulsion based on anatomical sex to be a boy instead 
of a girl. Jonah is clearly responding to the heteronormative imperative: if you have a 
penis then you must be a boy. Unwittingly and unconsciously his father’s discourse 
serves to reinforce the heterosexual distinction in his insistence to the acquaintance that 
Jonah is in fact a boy. In this way the father’s discourse is structured according to the 
unconscious logic of the need to master, as what he is doing is providing order to a 
situation in which ambiguity would otherwise persist.  
The key to understanding Joel’s discourse in this exchange is in the fact that he 
corrects the acquaintance using the word Jonah which implies boy but is also the master 
signifier meant to organize and identify the object of the discourse which is Jonah. Jonah 
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of course, is a proper noun and is meant to signify the person or individual who is Jonah, 
but we know from reading Jonah’s reaction that this signifier in no way reflects his 
subjectivity. Nonetheless, Joel’s recapitulation of Jonah’s name to the acquaintance 
produces for the acquaintance the knowledge that Jonah is a boy. This happens because 
Joel’s pronouncement of the name Jonah (S1, or “boy”) to the audience or receiver means 
to repress the object a (the doubt implied by the acquaintance’s question meant to 
generate an answer that disambiguates the situation), and therefore the question 
concerning his sexuation S. The implication that Jonah is indistinguishable from this 
name in the discourse permits the suppression of doubt about Jonah’s sexuation.  
S1  →S2 
S       a 
 
From Jonah’s reaction it is clear he enjoyed being identified as a girl, and in those 
moments when he was mistaken for a girl, his rhetorical agency is aligned according to 
his identification as the object a, similar to when he wore a dress.  Although Jonah could 
remain silent and acquiesce to his father’s correction that he is a boy, his unconscious 
desire is clearly manifest in his response ‘Why do you have to tell! Why do you have to 
say anything!’  Jonah’s response is hysterical in that he is articulating the question of his 
sexuation as identity (S), and it is clear that he would like to repress the master signifier 
(S1) that he is, in the discourse, referred to as a boy. Wacjman observes  
The hysteric can be said to institute a discourse when we do not cast out her 
question … having acknowledged her question, he rises to the position of master 
endowed with limitless power: here is the master of knowledge supposed to have 
the answer capable of silencing her.
167
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It is for this reason Wacjman describes the hysteric’s enunciation as an injunction: “Tell 
me!” to which we would add, “am I a boy or am I a girl?” In Jonah’s case, the injunction 
produces a question, as she says, “Why do you have to tell?” which is another way of 
Jonah saying to his father, your language matters, or “I am who you say.”168  In terms of 
rhetorical agency  
The hysteric plays it as though she commanded the Other, yet symbolically she is 
entirely dependent on him whom she begs to make her a subject. She commands 
and at once surrenders. Her question, “Who am I?” receives the answer “You are 
who I say.”169 
For rhetorical agency, the fact that the subject is contingent upon the other to tell them 
“who they are,” means that discourse “contains an essential flaw.”170 On a practical level, 
this means we are never the same as the signifiers we or anyone else uses to describe us. 
The label changes or transforms the subject into an object for the other. For the purposes 
of conceptualizing agency, this means agency is clearly a function of the discourse, 
structured primarily around the identifications Jonah is articulating to complete the 
fantasy that fundamentally animates her unconscious.  
Not only does this exchange punctuate how important this question of sexuation is 
for the subject or agent in discourse generally, it also illustrates the importance of gender 
as a relation to dis-identification—that is, the importance of gender and sexuality as a 
product of negation—“I am not that!” Just like Jonah’s discomfort with her father’s 
correction, Jonah’s sexuation, just like every other child’s would be in similar 
circumstances, is completely contingent upon the Real which is the lack of a lack, 
signified in the symbolic order as signifiers like the dress that serve as metaphors of the 
unconscious logic of desire condensed into the signs and images implied in the 
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identification with the body as an object of desire. The fundamental gender  and sex 
difference is not owed to biology or socialization, it is caused by the unconscious logic of 
desire that manifests as rhetorical agency each and every time the circulation of desire is 
rerouted or short-circuited to produce a new relationship in the discourse. Pam and 
Jonah’s relationship is a product of the realignment of desire in the discourse, and this 
realignment of the discourse produces rhetorical agency for Pam because she changes the 
availability or access to the object of jouissance. Jonah’s answer to the question is 
coherent because the underlying unconscious logic of desire driving the formation of 
relationships is structured around the reality of desire.  
Before continuing the analysis it is worthwhile to note that rhetorical agency in 
each discourse described so far is structured to either arrest or facilitate change or 
transformation to the status quo. In contrast to the traditional version of rhetorical agency 
where the speaker is intent on changing the audience’s mind, posthumanist rhetorical 
agency, according to Lacan’s discourses, illustrates how audiences or receivers are 
structured by the discourse to produce a certain kind of relationship or bond. To illustrate 
further I would now like to turn the reader’s attention to an analysis of the other child 
featured in the broadcast, Bradley.  
Bradley is undergoing treatment for GID at Zucker’s clinic presently. Recall that 
Bradley was the boy assaulted on the playground. Zucker’s solution to the violence 
Bradley experienced, and Bradley’s overall discomfort with his gender, is to make 
Bradley more comfortable with being a boy, what Zucker calls reparative therapy. For 
Zucker, GID or gender dysphoria, as he calls it, is a “fantasy solution, that being the other 
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sex will make them happy.”171  To stress this point, the reader will recall that Zucker’s 
discourse implies there is some non-fantasy, or true solution to questions concerning 
sexuation. More importantly, the statement suggests Zucker has or possesses knowledge 
of the authentic or true solution; that a person’s biology determines whether they are 
masculine or feminine. Zucker illustrates his thinking about the connection between 
biology and gender identity by drawing on a contrived clinical analogy. Zucker asks, 
“Suppose you were a clinician and a four-year old black kid came into your office and 
said he wanted to be white. Would you go with that?  I don’t think we would.”172  As 
Alix Spiegel explains,  
If a black kid walked into a therapist’s office saying that he was really white, the 
goal pretty much any therapist out there would be to try to make him feel more 
comfortable with being black. They would assume that his beliefs were the 
product of a dysfunctional environment – a family environment or a cultural 
environment, which is how Zucker sees gender disordered kids.
173
  
Even though Zucker provides no evidence of the clinical existence of “racial identity 
disorder,” his hypothetical reveals the fundamental error in his thinking. Equating race 
with the color of one’s skin is analogous to equating gender with biological sex. Just like 
race is socially constructed, so is gender identity. I think the theoretical point of departure 
driving Zucker’s conclusion is incorrect. Sexuation is unconscious and therefore cannot 
be grounded in either the nature or nurture explanation. Yet, for Zucker, there is no 
question of am I a boy or am I a girl that does not have an obvious answer: you are what 
your biological sex says you are. In this way, Zucker’s discourse is driven by the 
repression of doubt about the ambiguity (S) concerning the alignment between gender 
and biology for the subject. His discourse masters the ambiguity by asserting order 
through the master signifier, (S1), in Bradley’s case, the master signifier is “you are not a 
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girl.”  For Bradley then, the knowledge of the other is “you are a boy,” with all that being 
a boy entails in the culture. The result of the imposition of the master signifier and its 
connection to the knowledge of the other is the repression of surplus jouissance (objet a), 
and impacts Bradley, as both the cause and the source of his desire are repressed.  
Zucker’s discourse is propelled by the truth that there is no signifier in the 
unconscious for the sexual difference, (S). The biological function of the organ or the 
body that the child is equipped with does not determine the distribution of jouissance in 
the child’s unconscious, rather the distribution of jouissance determines the exercise of 
the body as one would an organ. However, the discourse of the master is not open to 
ambiguity, as it is structured to produce order, and in this regard, the confusion of the 
organ and the biological function is not an assertion of scientific fact, but rather an 
aggressive ego defense bent on erasing the ambiguity. Heteronormativity, (S1) as 
illustrated in Zucker’s discourse, is a symptom of the underlying irreconcilability of 
gender and sex.  
S1  →S2 
S       a 
 
Another good example of heteronormativity as a symptom can be found in discourse of 
Glenn Stanton, a research fellow with the Christian-based organization Focus on the 
Family who appeared on the October 29, 2008 Dr. Phil broadcast. Stanton articulates his 
symptom, arguing  
there are very few Pat – real “Pats” in the world where we just don’t know what 
they are. Either we start out one way or the other and we identify in a particular 
way, but we always identify as either a girl or a boy. We can always determine, 
‘OK, that’s girl behavior or boy behavior.’174 
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The master signifier in this discourse is clearly “girl” or “boy” which implies the subject 
is either one or the other but never neither. Knowledge (S2) in Stanton’s discourse is 
contingent upon what the culture expects out of girls and boys behaviors. Stanton’s use of 
the pronoun “we” in his discourse represents the capital O “Other” which refers to the 
order of culture and language in Lacan’s theory. The unconscious logic of desire 
articulated by an individual or a person is subordinated in Stanton’s discourse to the 
heteronormative demands of the culture, or the implicitly heterosexual Other. Knowledge 
in his discourse is indistinguishable from cultural expectation as he comments,  
If the child wants to be artistic, creative, even do ballet, you know what, 
encourage them in that, but to do it in a masculine sort of way. You think, what 
does that mean? It’s very simple. Parents know what that means.175   
In Stanton’s discourse the culture knows already. There is no need for explanation or 
persuasion because the knowledge is socially assumed. As its representative, Stanton 
serves as a sort of cultural lord, mastering the bodies and behaviors of the broadcast 
audience. As Bracher comments, 
Knowledge determines the nature of the enjoyment – jouissance – that the subject 
is able to obtain … even the most elementary pleasures of the body are situated 
within a knowledge, that is an articulation of signifiers, a network of relationships 
(associations and oppositions) with other sensations, perceptions, and affective 
states.
176
     
Rhetorical agency in the master’s discourse makes use of the master signifier S1 as a sort 
of center of gravity in which meaning coalesces and in which a chain of signifiers are 
linked. In Stanton’s discourse, when he says “masculine,” the audience is expected to 
know how to regulate enjoyment and meaning through a chain reaction ignited by the 
master signifier. The master signifier is all important because it determines the meaning 
of knowledge for the audience, as Bracher elaborates, 
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Senders use them as the last word, the bottom line, the term that anchors, 
explains, or justifies the claims or demands contained in the message … master 
signifiers are simply accepted as having a value or validity that goes without 
saying.
177
  
Master signifiers are uniquely positioned to master identities as they are used in discourse 
rhetorically to solidify and cover up latent doubts and divided subjectivities.  
Although the discourse of the master has a distinct structure, it is intimately 
related to the discourse of the university in that the master signifier which is explicit in 
the discourse of the master becomes the assumption driving the discourse of the 
university. In this case, the master signifier, “there are boys and girls and we know the 
difference,” is the assumption, and it becomes the repressed element in the discourse. The 
reason for conducting science is the demand to always know more as knowledge in the 
system is self-justifying—knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Knowledge in much of the 
GID debate is decidedly scientific, as the discourse is sustained in part by the 
disagreement among psychologists about the GID diagnosis. Science as a system of 
knowledge is clearly driving Seigel’s opening remarks on the Dr. Phil broadcast, 
The basic thing we need to realize is that there is something called a gender 
identity, which isn’t the same as the genitals you have. So your genes determine 
whether you have male genitals or female genitals, but the exposure to the fetus’ 
brain as it develops in the womb we think determines the identity, and it’s on a 
spectrum. So you can be feeling fully male. You can feel fully female or 
somewhere in between.
178
 
What Seigel’s rhetoric assumes is that gender identity is caused by biological-hormonal 
processes. Dr. Diane Ehrensaft, a Psychologist and Gender Specialist interviewed on the 
May 7, 2008 All Things Considered broadcast, shares Seigel’s basic outlook, and despite 
her indecisiveness, her rhetoric reflects the biological—hormonal theory of causality.  
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I would say that in the vast majority of cases it’s [transgenderism] constitutional – 
biological – the child brings it to us … I think that our gender identity is not 
defined by what’s between our legs but by what’s between our ears – that it’s 
somewhere in the brain. It’s pretty much hardwired.179  
The biological—hormonal explanation is the master signifier whose latent force in the 
discourse is materialized in the cause and effect relationships enacted in Seigel and 
Ehrensaft’s systems of knowledge. The unconscious truth driving the discourse is that 
there are cause and effect relationships which if properly understood, would allow the 
audience to know, and this discourse positions the audience not to know in such a way 
that it doesn’t know that it doesn’t know. Seigel and Ehrensaft’s university discourse 
provides a totalizing knowledge system—able to explain how sex and gender are caused. 
The “hard-wired spectrum” theory of gender Seigel and Ehrensaft describe neutralizes 
the capacity to change or transform the culture’s understanding of gender identity 
because the master signifiers are assumed, therefore, it is impossible to see gender 
identity in any other way other than the biological—hormonal (S1).  
In contrast to Ehrensaft and Seigel, Zucker’s university discourse is driven by the 
same assumption that gender identity is caused, but the causal mechanism in his 
knowledge system is stimulus-response behaviorism. According to Zucker,  
The more you engage in a behavior, the more likely it’s going to continue. If a 
little boy is only cross-dressing and only role-playing as a female, only playing 
with toys in the culture that we associate with girls, I think that that gets into a 
feedback loop that reinforces their identity or fantasy that they are a girl or that 
they’re like a girl.180  
Zucker’s university discourse elaborates a system of knowledge bent on explaining how 
children deviate from the norm. Zucker’s system of knowledge assumes that gender 
identity need not be predicated on a fantasy and is therefore real in a positivist and 
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scientific sense: you are a boy or a girl according to your anatomy (S1). Whereas Zucker 
uses the term fantasy to distinguish a fake or false view of the self from the reality of the 
self as Zucker sees it, a fantasy in Lacan’s teaching is meant to describe the relationship 
between the subject and the object and the enjoyment connecting them to one another. 
The unconscious truth (S1) that is assumed and drives Zucker’s university discourse is the 
presumption that there is a gender difference, this difference is conscious, and a “healthy” 
ego must simply be adjusted by a therapist so that it conforms to this biological fact. For 
Zucker, the “we” is the culture, the Other, as it is the culture that is the silent arbiter of 
jouissance. As he observes, GID is often manifest in “playing with toys in the culture that 
we associate with girls.” The Other is the “we associate,” the silent arbiter and regulator 
of jouissance in the discourse. The rhetoric suggests agency in this discourse is passive, 
as it is the culture in the sentence that has agency—Zucker is only its passive interlocutor 
or vehicle. Zucker’s cure consists of adjusting the ego so that it conforms to this 
conscious reality, a reality defined by the master signifier of biological sex.   
For Lacan, all gender identity is a fantasy and there is no non-fantasy solution to 
the question concerning sexuation. Therefore, the latent element (S) produced in this 
discourse for the audience is the elimination of the need for an answer to the question 
concerning sexuation, as well as the temporary removal of doubt about the object (gender 
identity). The impact for rhetorical agency of Zucker’s university discourse is that in 
order to introduce change or transformation to the status quo, a respondent would have to 
question the S1 which is assumed and latent in the discourse, a challenge for receivers of 
the discourse because it is not directly or explicitly operative. It is also interesting to note 
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that when speakers with conflicting knowledge systems attempt to call into question one 
another’s position, they do so by making the opposing system’s S1 explicit. For example, 
Zucker speaks of the system of knowledge outlined by Speigel and Ehrensaft, “I think the 
hidden assumption is that they believe the child’s cross-gender identity is entirely caused 
by biological factors”181 and clearly identifies and makes explicit the S1 of biological 
factors. Exposing the master signifier destabilizes the discourse, making it open to attack 
via the discourse of the master – thereby demonstrating the mutually reinforcing dynamic 
between the discourse of the master and the discourse of the university.  
Implications of Rhetorical Agency in the GID Debate 
This analysis shows how rhetorical agency is driven by desire and is constituted 
in discourse. While traditional conceptualizations of rhetorical agency would identify the 
exchange and interplay between the discourse of the master and the resistance discourse 
of the hysteric, this analysis in acknowledging desire as the “prime mover” of agency, 
reveals the nuances and highlights the specific character of desire in two additional 
discourses: the discourse of the analyst and the discourse of the university.  
The unconscious logic of desire driving rhetorical agency in the discourses does 
not lend itself to analysis according to the standard view of rhetorical agency because the 
existing conceptualization places so much emphasis on consciousness. It is difficult to 
see how a humanist paradigm with its emphasis on consciousness and intention could 
reconcile the influence of desire and jouissance on the rhetoric at work in the GID debate. 
A posthumanist conception of rhetorical agency is equipped to explain the unconscious 
logic of desire driving the rhetorical agency for all subjects or agents involved in the 
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debate. The humanist paradigm would not conceive of the interactive exchange and 
interplay of the prohibition of jouissance between agents and audience because the 
prohibition would be considered a constraint on the rhetorical situation that the speaker 
can consciously circumvent or negotiate.   
This tendency is aggravated by the ideological presupposition that the rhetoric in 
the debate is consciously derived. Even a modified version of a humanist conception of 
rhetorical agency would fail to completely account for what is not spoken in the 
ostensibly conscious and intended speech. Such an account would provide some insight 
into the analysis of the rhetoric and its relationship to the cultural constraints that separate 
the “sides” in the debate from one another, but cannot account for the complexity of the 
relationships that tie the subjects or agents in the debate to one another and provide an 
interpretive framework that allows the critic to unwind the entire debate as part of the 
discourses that structure the interaction between agents or subjects about GID. Critics are 
able to separate criticism from the act of distinguishing the true from the false or reality 
from fantasy, and instead are working at a deeper level of the psychic real (the 
unconscious logic of desire) that motivates the discourse. 
A rehabilitated humanist version of humanist agency could only account for a 
prohibition as a constraint imposed by the “culture master” and those who are attempting 
to resist this cultural domination. Lacan’s understanding of the word prohibition allows 
us to see that it is not just the cultural prohibitions that cause or inhibit rhetorical agency, 
instead it also refers to how subjects or agents themselves are driven by an internal 
psychological prohibition. The answer to the question concerning gender and sex is 
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internally derived from the acculturation process that includes language acquisition and 
care taking of child. Conceptually, rhetorical agency must account for the fact that sex 
and gender norms are not produced by the culture or only imposed by cultural norms. 
Each person’s rhetorical agency will as a result appear unique and be determined by their 
individual unconscious logic of desire.  
The rhetorical agency embodied by the discourse of the hysteric in the GID 
debate persists in the question concerning identity. Thus, rhetorical agency in this 
discourse reflects the centrality of the divided subject in relation to the question 
concerning sex and gender (i.e. am I a boy or am I a girl?). Because culturally the answer 
to this question presumes heterosexuality is natural, any individual subject or agent 
whose unconscious logic of desire is not produced by the heteronormative cultural 
imperative will be forced to face the fact that their jouissance is prohibited. This means 
the discourse of the hysteric and the rhetorical agency it structures is incredibly fragile as 
the cultural imperative to eliminate gender ambiguity is coercively and violently imposed 
upon people or individuals who do not fall into the sex-gender dichotomy. Even if 
rhetorical agency in this discourse is not overwhelmed by cultural domination, the 
ambiguity might also be snuffed out by the imposition of the university discourse.  
One defining characteristic of the university discourse for rhetorical agency is that 
it has a totalizing effect on subjects. This means the subject or agent is caught in a system 
of knowledge in which change is impossible without a challenge to the master signifiers 
underlying the system. Because the master signifiers are latent in the discourse, rhetorical 
agency structured according to the discourse of the university colonizes identity and 
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washes out its particularity in a system of signifiers. Rhetorical agency in the university 
discourse reflects the imaginary and symbolic importance of “the subject who is 
supposed to know,” a subject who is an “expert” in determining the economy of desire 
that is considered natural or normal (scientifically conforming) in the culture. Rhetorical 
agency in the discourse of the university is thus conveyed in both the expertise and 
prestige that is associated with the academic credentials and also in the cultural value 
placed on knowing and doing science. However, the humanist paradigm accounts for 
that. A posthumanist conceptualization of rhetorical agency in this context allows us to 
see how the unconscious logic of desire drives the discourse and defines its structure. The 
prohibition of jouissance that underlies this discourse is symptomatically structured 
around the anxiety caused by not knowing (i.e., gender ambiguity). The unconscious 
logic of desire at work in the discourse of the university in this debate is driven by the 
desire to alleviate doubt. The discomfort doubt creates is alleviated by the causal 
explanation that allows us to empirically account for the question of gendered and sexed 
identity.  
Rhetorical agency in the master’s discourse has incredible power, as the master 
signifier regulates the distribution of enjoyment in a culture through a system of 
prohibitions and permissions, and remains unquestioned as the fabric of the status quo. 
Rhetorical agency as it is constituted in the master’s discourse in the GID debate directly 
affects all subjects or agents in both the way that the discourse regulates how a person 
may enjoy their body, and also by reinforcing the cultural expectations associated with 
being either a boy or a girl. Rhetorical agency for the master in the debate is partly driven 
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by the jouissance experienced in denying the enjoyment of transgendered children. 
Agents in this discourse derive enjoyment from frustrating or prohibiting the jouissance 
transgendered children embody with their discourse. In this way, the rhetorical agency of 
the discourse of the master in this debate acts as a mechanism for imposing cultural 
domination and enforcing heteronormativity. Unwinding the hegemonic effects of both 
the discourse of the university and the discourse of the master in the GID debate is 
possible because Lacan provides a theory of discourse designed to isolate the 
unconscious logic of desire and expose its relationship to people or individual’s 
enjoyment.  
The discourse of the analyst denaturalizes a culture’s prohibition of jouissance, 
thereby exposing how there is nothing natural about the culture’s preferences concerning 
the enactment of sex and gender. This destabilizes hegemonic heterosexuality, and opens 
the door for ambiguous gender expression. When the unconscious logic of desire is the 
operative term, and desire and satisfaction are virtually coextensive, as they are in the 
discourse of the analyst, the result transforms the unconscious logic of desire into a 
conscious logic of enjoyment. For subjects or agents, rhetorical agency in the discourse 
of the analyst explicitly reflects the enjoyment had from the unfettered access to 
enjoyment, even if it is fleeting and temporary, as Jonah’s case illustrated. Rhetorical 
agency in this discourse allows us to see what happens when agents or subjects reject or 
ignore the repression of desire. The rejection forces the audience to question their own 
gendered and sexed identity, because it makes the master signifiers that “normally” 
determine the sexed and gendered identities of subjects or agents incoherent. Thus, 
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rhetorical agency in the discourse of the analyst is characterized by temporary enjoyment 
that forces the audience out of typical systems of signification that would normally 
explain or repress their divided subjectivities.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: TEA PARTY RHETORIC 
Historical Context of Tea Party Rhetoric 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 disturbed, perhaps for the first time 
since the Great Depression, the foundations of free-market ideology worldwide. The 
collapse of Wall Street investment banks Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, the near 
collapse (were it not for US government intervention) of insurance companies like 
American Insurance Group and banks like Citigroup, and the eventual bankruptcy of 
General Motors and Chrysler, along with countless other multinational corporations in 
Europe and across Asia, pushed global capitalism to the brink of depression. Worldwide 
wealth decreased dramatically as property values, retirement savings and investment 
earnings evaporated during the collapse, only denting more deeply the already tarnished 
neoliberal brand. To stave off a depression, governments around the world cut interest 
rates, increased government spending, nationalized or purchased corporate equity and, in 
the process, began accumulating record amounts of debt. This legislative pattern in 
western states is clearly antagonistic to neoliberal ideology, but Tea Party rhetoric gets its 
traction from the specific legislative moves undertaken in the US.  
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Congress and the Bush administration passed two separate stimulus bills to avert a 
recession before crafting the Troubled Assets Relief Program, a fund administered by the 
Department of Treasury meant to infuse the banking system with money in order to 
forced feed liquidity into the system and drive lending. In February 2009, the Obama 
administration and Congress passed a 787 billion dollar stimulus package, The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which was followed by a major overhaul of healthcare 
legislation contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act—further enraging 
those with neo-liberal ideological leanings. While neoliberal advocates and their 
supporters in the US Congress decried these laws, the nascent forces that are now part of 
the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party were steadily organizing in opposition.  
Organizations within the conservative political establishment like Freedomworks, 
Grassfire.org and RapidNet.com, among others, redoubled their efforts to reinvent the 
neoliberal brand following the disintegration of the world economy and the legislative 
responses western states crafted to avert depression. To organize consent, these groups 
and their like-minded conservative counterparts on the World Wide Web began to build 
an Internet presence early in 2008, a move that gained an increased visibility when 
CNBC on-air editor Rick Santelli screamed his now (in)famous and perhaps premeditated 
rant.
182
 Almost immediately after Santelli’s outburst, Tea Party websites all over the Web 
went online, with the first “Tea Party protest” following less than a month later. 
Promotion by cable television and radio personalities like Glenn Beck on Fox News (who 
already had established a companion movement, the 912project.com; a movement 
presently fused with the Tea Party), Rush Limbaugh, then Alaskan governor Sarah Palin, 
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and other media hosts in local markets all around the country significantly increased the 
number of people attending the next “Tea Party” on April 15th, the day US federal 
income taxes are due. Against this historical backdrop, Tea Party rhetoric, a blend of 
Revolutionary War propaganda, libertarianism, and Cold War era McCarthy-styled 
xenophobic political paranoia, seems to have carved out its own corner in American 
political life, bent on preserving a neoliberal way of life. As Hudson explains,   
Neoliberalism can be defined as the belief that the unregulated free market is the 
essential precondition for the fair distribution of wealth and for political 
democracy. Thus, neoliberals oppose just about any policy or activity that might 
interfere with the untrammeled operation of market forces, whether it is higher 
taxes on the wealthy and corporations, better social welfare programs, stronger 
environmental regulations, or laws that make it easier for workers to organize and 
join labor unions.
183
  
As I outlined above, in terms of a history of the present, neoliberalism as an ideology is 
suffering through another systemic crisis. The neoliberal response in a time of crisis for 
its advocates becomes defensive. Hudson notes, before the most recent crisis, the defense 
of neoliberalism meant  
When the promised good life fails to materialize, [neoliberal advocates] fall back 
on their ultimate defense and claim that, imperfect as the status quo may be, there 
is, unfortunately, no viable alternative. They point to the failed “socialist” 
societies of the twentieth century and warn ominously that, no matter how bad 
things get, any attempt to remedy the situation by forthrightly interfering with the 
market and the prerogatives of multinational corporations can only lead to state-
bureaucratic authoritarianism.
184
 
Post-crisis, this defense seems prescient. Western states did take over multinational 
corporations. They are interfering with the market. However accurate these perceptions 
and my characterization of them may or may not be, the fact remains: the political-
economic entanglement of western states and multinational corporations is as inseparable 
now as it has been before. Neo-liberal ideology is now more than ever before the order of 
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the day, despite the systemic crisis that threatened to undo it. It is for this reason I 
maintain the most important development in the political economic climate in the U.S. in 
the last decade is the rise of what is now loosely identified as the “Tea Party.”  
Studying the rhetoric that constitutes this political constituency helps us 
understand how rhetorical agency is designed to arrest change in the political-economic 
culture, as I believe it is clear neo-liberal ideology is what all other ideological 
orientations are compared to, at least in the United States. Lacan’s theory is helpful in 
analyzing ideological discourses because it focuses on what the rhetoric in a discourse 
says about desire, and desire is often articulated in values. This is especially true when 
analyzing the rhetoric of governing and protesting, which in American political language 
incorporates values like freedom, change, justice, liberty, limited government, etc. almost 
incessantly. Tea Party rhetoric reveals how closely the discourse structures of protesting 
and governing are related. Tea Party rhetoric is not of course the only rhetoric to mask its 
domination in the language of victimage or the voice of the outsider. In Lacan’s theory of 
discourse these two distinct forms of rhetorical agency, protesting and governing, are 
mutually reinforcing. This assumption helps us set aside the paradoxical way in which 
Tea Party advocates are proponents of the dominant ideology but position themselves in 
the political language as if their rhetoric had little or no power. However, Tea Party 
rhetoric is powerful in large part because it is fundamentally resistant to legislative 
changes enacted by the US government during the recent recession. The question then 
becomes, “How is Tea Party rhetoric structured in a discourse to resist change?”  
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To answer this question, I am limiting the texts I analyze to transcripts detailing 
the rhetoric of Rick Santelli, Bob Basso, and Glenn Beck. The discourse generated by 
each of these individuals is related to significant turning points in the development of Tea 
Party rhetoric. In the rhetoric of these influential speakers, we can see the speech begins 
to crystalize around certain signifiers and images that creates a more or less consistent 
way of speaking. These images and signifiers comprise the ideological vocabulary 
linking the individuals who comprise the Tea Party political constituency together. Tea 
Party rhetoric constitutes a discourse in the Lacanian sense, it forms a social link. What I 
am calling Tea Party rhetoric is meant to refer to a way of speaking that links people 
together. In a direct way, what I am calling Tea Party rhetoric links self-identified Tea 
Party advocates with one another in a discourse structured to form bonds predicated upon 
resisting the legislative enactments adopted to combat the recent recession.  
Tea Party rhetoric is often reactionary, aggressive and, in its extreme, can 
promote a pre-psychotic way of speaking. By pre-psychotic I mean to refer to the ways in 
which the rhetoric always confers an outsider status or, more precisely, the way in which 
the rhetoric always makes it seem as if the ideology is on the brink of being forced out of 
the language and culture. Part of the rhetoric’s appeal must consist in this idea that it 
represents the underdog or oppressed viewpoint in the culture. But the question remains, 
“What do these qualities of Tea Party rhetoric say about rhetorical agency?” How is the 
rhetoric structured in a discourse so that its affective impact is felt emotionally as envy, 
resentment, anger or jealousy, if these emotions drive the resistance to change? One need 
only recall the arguments about Obama’s citizenship, his race, his nation of origin and not 
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forget the monstrous joker-styled posters carried by so many during rallies in order to 
reflect upon the intensity of emotion generated by Tea Party rhetoric. So, while Tea Party 
rhetoric is clearly a defense of the pre-existing neoliberal order, its purchase as a 
discourse bears itself out with audiences by way of its resistance to change, and in this 
way, functions as a discourse designed to control and regulate the circulation of desire.  
Analytically speaking, what is at issue is not necessarily the alignment between 
Tea Party rhetoric and reality, but rather the relationship between desire and its 
prohibition. The sources of and context for the prohibitions that define the limits of 
enjoyment for Tea Party advocates determine the circulation of jouissance. Retracing this 
circuitry is the key to understanding how rhetorical agency is constituted in discourse. 
Within the network of signifiers constituting the TPR symbolic order is an unconscious 
hitch, a symptom, a sticking-point, persisting as an always coercive and violent, 
sometimes murderous, and essentially white, patriarchal speech.  
The victory of President Obama last year marked a point of no return—what 
Lacan would call a “dramatic conjuncture.”185  It opened up a gap in the symbolic order, 
displacing the reality of the imaginary figure of a traditional and historical white man as 
the paradigmatic political avatar and source of authority for the law. In short, for the TPR 
order, Obama’s victory displaced the patriarchal center of gravity distributing the effects 
of the white conservative symbolic economy. In a clinical setting, this type of an event 
often coincides with the onset of a psychosis, the effect of which is made known in the 
delusional speech of the patient. Where Congress serves as the source of rage in Basso’s 
speech, as will be seen below, President Obama does in the movement generally, as 
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reflected in Santelli’s rant and Beck’s speech in particular. What is distinct here is the 
importance of the white source of fatherly authority distributing the patriarchal law 
within the symbolic order because, as Lacan contends “For psychosis to be triggered, the 
Name-of the-Father--verworfen, foreclosed, that is, never having come to the place of the 
Other-- must be summoned to that place in symbolic opposition to the subject.”186  In 
terms of Tea Party rhetoric, the trigger that animates the structure of this speech is an 
absence of legitimate white authority.  
The place of the Other in the speech is only taken up when the calls to live up to 
the “greatest generation,” and the “founding fathers” fleetingly fill the gap as a sort of 
image or imaginary subject meant to remind the audience of the insufficiencies of the 
existing symbolic order. As long as TPR maintains this absence in the symbolic order, the 
signifying chain will continue until it finds a coherent set of metaphors capable of 
suspending the entropy and establishing the patriarchal order inherited from past 
generations. As Lacan says,  
It is the lack of the Name-of the-Father in that place which, by the hole that it 
opens up the signified, sets off a cascade of reworkings of the signifier from 
which the growing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, until the level is reached at 
which signifier and signified stabilize in a delusional metaphor.
187
   
Here we should be clear in saying what Lacan is talking about is not an actual father, he 
is taking about the concept of authority as it has been a part of Western Culture for 
thousands of years. It is the reason behind the reason why property, inheritance, and 
suffrage, to name a few, are relations of power based on hetero-normative patriarchal 
authority. Since this is the Rule for making rules, the Law of laws, etc., it is never fully 
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present or made fully explicit because it is already an implied anchor point in western 
people’s speech. This is what Lacan means in arguing the  
father need but situate himself in a tertiary position in any relationship that has at 
its base the imaginary couple a-a’--that is, ego-object or ideal-reality--involving 
the subject in the field of eroticized aggression that it induces.
188
  
The “imaginary couple a-a” is the process whereby a person or individual makes an 
object of their body, which is what is referred to as a “self,” and is articulated in speech 
as a set of adjectives that signify for the subject what it means to be identifiable as such—
that is, what it means to be a subject to other people (which necessarily entails the 
relation to the Other). Using adjectives to describe to other people “who you are” is 
another way of referring to what Lacan means in talking about the ego-ideal and, since 
this is an ideal description for the person supplying the adjectives, it is also best thought 
of as an ideal-reality relation. In this way, Lacan is simply recognizing in his own 
technical language what is a common current in posthumanist thinking: that the self is a 
construction. Calling the use of adjectives to describe who you are to other people as an 
“eroticized aggression” may seem strong, but the conclusion makes sense if we think 
about how the construction of the self or ego-ideal serves to condition the perceptions 
people have about one another for the purposes of creating desire while simultaneously 
revealing the workings of the unconscious source of desire for the subject—to be 
something to the Other.  
Since the source of unconscious desire is bound up with the father’s desire 
(signified by words like founding fathers) in TPR, the rhetoric is erotized in the sense that 
it is linked to the persistence of the founding father’s desire. The aggressiveness of the 
rhetoric is amplified whenever the ideal-reality is perceived to be under attack or at risk 
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of being rejected as the source of desire in the discourse. For Tea Party advocates, this 
means rhetorical agency is structured according to the demands of the father, and it is the 
desire of the father threatened, and the desire to do the father’s bidding, that forms a 
stable core from which the discourse emanates.  
The aggressive drive to protect the economy of desire that structures the 
discourse, coupled with perceived threats to this jouissance or way of enjoying, 
distributed as it is around the paternal metaphor(s), what Lacan is calling the Name-of-
the-Father—is what I am arguing initiates the pre-psychotic hitch at work in the structure 
of TPR. The foreclosure of the father’s jouissance from the economy of desire constituted 
in a discourse activates the erotized aggression of ego-ideal formation. If the father’s 
jouissance is crowed out completely, the person or individual will experience a psychotic 
episode because there is no law or rule about the access to jouissance driving the 
unconscious desire to enjoy, which is why, in part, Tea Party advocates get so aggressive 
in projecting and protecting their ideal-reality.  
What I believe is at work here helps explain why this rhetoric leans so heavily on 
Revolutionary wartime propaganda. It gets its energy in part from the desire to own up to 
or pay back previous generations of Americans to whom present day Americans owe an 
imaginary debt. Authority, tradition and prohibition are the forms in which the symbolic 
debt bears out its effects on the bodies constituting present history, which helps explain 
why President Obama has had his life openly threatened by Tea Party protesters like Ted 
Nugent—Obama signifies the foreclosure of the father’s desire from the discourse. In this 
sense, the founding fathers and other authority figures (i.e. Ronald Reagan) control the 
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distribution of the signifiers in the protester’s symbolic order, which articulates and 
positions the imaginary relations suspended in a reality that does not exist but nonetheless 
creates reality—at least in so far as someone talks about it as a “patriot” whose actions 
are justified by “our founding fathers.” But the founding fathers are foremost a metaphor 
for the unconscious logic of desire that constitutes the discourse and conditions the 
relationships that people in and out of the movement have with one another. The 
persistence of the unconscious logic of desire structured around the desire of the father is, 
in part, what makes Tea Party advocates violent and easily agitated, as the health-care 
forums held over the summer of 2009 illustrate.   
TPR consists of a set of relations between signifying elements that separate the 
audience from freedom, which circulates around a psychotic hitch, a debt to dead fathers 
of fathers who represent the law and control enjoyment by maintaining the point of 
symbolic opposition occupied by President Obama and Congress as the purveyors and 
progenitors of socialism, communism and fascism. “Our nation,” “We the people,” 
“Americans,” etc. are the targets of this symbolic opposition and freedom’s champion. 
But, as I will show in the following sections, the organization of consent along 
“freedom’s” lines will always produce slaves for freedom.   
Santelli’s Rant 
To begin, I think it most helpful to start where many agree Tea Party rhetoric 
gained national attention, “Santelli’s rant,” for it is here we start to see the contours of 
TPR coalesce. We must acknowledge Santelli is speaking from the floor of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), a billion dollar corporation where commodities brokers pay 
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hundreds of thousands of dollars in desk fees just to sit in the same room and conduct 
commodities transactions. While the rich in this room are the public face of the “working 
investor” class, the wealthy paying their salaries and commissions are also de facto 
present in their absence. This is the top two percent of all American income earners 
represented. Everyone in this room and everyone responsible for the Power Lunch 
broadcast at the CNBC network (on which Santelli appeared in making the rant) is 
affected by President Obama’s 2008 campaign pledge to raise taxes only for those 
making more than $250,000 annually. And, to be fair, Santelli has been consistent in his 
opposition to both stimulus packages (G.W. Bush and President Obama’s) and the Toxic 
Assets Relief Program (TARP). This particular rant is directed at homeowners whom he 
perceives as being irresponsible. Thus, he reduces the mass of homeowners who might be 
able to modify their existing mortgages by compressing them into a single type; an image 
defined by undeserved excesses, like “extra bathrooms,” and failure, as in “losers” who 
“can’t pay their bills.” 
RICK SANTELLI: The government is promoting bad behavior. Because we 
certainly don’t want to put stimulus forth and give people a whopping $8 or $10 
in their check, and think that they ought to save it, and in terms of 
modifications… I’ll tell you what, I have an idea. 
You know, the new administration’s big on computers and technology– How 
about this, President and new administration? Why don’t you put up a website to 
have people vote on the Internet as a referendum to see if we really want to 
subsidize the losers’ mortgages; or would we like to at least buy cars and buy 
houses in foreclosure and give them to people that might have a chance to actually 
prosper down the road, and reward people that could carry the water instead of 
drink the water? 
TRADER ON FLOOR: That’s a novel idea. 
(Applause, cheering)
189
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At this point in the rant, video evidence supports the sense even his co-hosts began to 
have, that Santelli is angry. His face and brow are pinched, and fleeting looks of 
contempt and disgust cross his face as he waves his hands and shouts; the contempt and 
disgust as effects of anger amplify the affective intensity of his appeal. The first claim, 
that the “government is promoting bad behavior” is rhetorically fused to the “stimulus,” 
in an implied denigration of Keynesian economics which assumes government’s role in 
an economy is to maintain full employment (a model opposed by the Milton Friedman 
Chicago school supply side theorists like Santelli who constitute the status quo). Santelli 
indicts “modifications” not on economic grounds, but rather on moral ones; in essence, 
for reasons of supply side, free market neo-liberal ideology. It is in this way that 
Santelli’s discourse is structured to arrest change. His advocacy suggests the government 
should not act to aid homeowners and instead demands that the “old way of doing 
business” persist.  
Rhetorical agency in Santelli’s discourse is structured according to the 
relationships between the subject, the object and enjoyment in the discourse. In Santelli’s 
rhetoric, rhetorical agency is constituted in the master signifiers that structure the 
discourse. The master signifiers are the signifiers that the agent or subject identifies with 
or against, designated in the Lacanian algebra as S1. For Santelli, capitalism and free 
markets are key identifiers, as he explicitly articulates toward the end of his speech. “All 
you capitalists that want to show up to Lake Michigan, I’m gonna start organizing,”190 
This was followed by whistling and cheering from the floor. That Santelli self-identifies 
as a capitalist, and the cheering from the floor suggests other traders (mostly men) 
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identify similarly, is significant psychoanalytically because the articulation of what I 
want to be to myself so I can recognize myself as such (which is what Santelli and his 
audience are doing) is driven by the very absence or lack of an identity in the first place. 
The signifier “capitalist” is a product of alienation, an alienation rooted in the split or gap 
that produces an ego-ideal and is symbolized in the left-hand side of the master’s 
discourse.  
S1  →S2 
S       a 
 
These signifiers are a defense constructed by the ego which represses the lack of identity 
causing the discourse. In identifying with the master signifiers, the ego maintains 
symbolic and imaginary consistency by repressing the division or alienation that would 
otherwise force a failure in the constitution of subjectivity. “Capitalism” and the “free 
market” thus serve to produce a certain consistency of identity for the audience and the 
speaker, and in so doing, the signifiers constitute a particular kind of knowledge; the 
knowledge necessary for deriving any meaning or sense from the rhetoric at all.  
Santelli’s discourse circulates largely around the master signifiers linked to 
freedom, either of a market-based kind or endorsed as a version of popular sovereignty, 
as in “Why don’t you put up a website to have people vote on the Internet as a 
referendum to see if we really want to subsidize the losers’ mortgages…”  The final part 
of his claim here about “subsidizing losers mortgages” is an instance of identification by 
dis-identification, where the rhetoric makes it clear what identity the subject or agent 
affirms by negating the possibility of being something or someone else. This is a way of 
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establishing a distinction between the master and the slave in the discourse structure. 
Hence, Santelli is not identified as a loser, but rather gets his identity from not being a 
loser. Santelli’s master signifiers structure for the audience a knowledge system (S2) 
surrounding the status quo of capitalism, which is modeled onto the version of democracy 
and popular sovereignty Santelli’s rhetoric endorses. Where the free market operates 
according to the logic of majority rule, so too does Santelli’s vision of democracy. The 
implication here is “we,” that is, the subjects, agents and the audience, have no say in the 
outcomes of the “President” and “new administration’s” actions. This means Santelli’s 
rhetoric is infused with energy based on the perception that his voice and his style of 
thought are somehow crowded out of the discourse.  
For Santelli, what is lost in the discussion about mortgage modification is a voice 
for his discourse (the objet a). If we think more closely about the way this argument 
positions the agent or subject, the “we,” in relation to its symbolic opposition, the 
“President and new administration,” it is clear that Santelli’s text communicates a certain 
sense of exclusion that means, quite literally, the audience needs to use its voice, that the 
symbolic opponents are not listening (where listening and doing are the same) and 
finally, that the majority, whatever this phrase actually constitutes, is lacking the object 
(their voice). Here is where it is clear the discourse is structuring “popular discontent” 
through the lack of voice as an effect of the rhetoric--what in political jargon is 
euphemistically referred as a “silent majority,” a term he uses later on in the broadcast. 
The trope “silent majority” reflects how jouissance is distributed in the discourse 
according to Santelli’s rhetoric. Since the trope suggests Santelli represents the 
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disenfranchised and can appear as the slave rising up against the master who is 
responsible for derailing jouissance.  
Santelli’s rhetoric incorporates the signifiers “free market” and “capitalism” to 
structure the relationship between the subject and desire in his use of a metaphor: reward 
those “who could carry the water instead of drink the water.” He poses a rhetorical 
question to convey the metaphor, saying,  
Or would we like to at least buy cars and buy houses in foreclosure and give them 
to people that might have a chance to actually prosper down the road, and reward 
people that could carry the water instead of drink the water?
191
   
What is implied here is two different types of people, two classes of persons, in essence, 
two identities are distinct from one another in so far as they derive pleasure, and hence 
arrange their desire, in two different ways of enjoying. Since we can infer that Santelli’s 
rant connects “bad behavior” and its “promoting” by the “government,” to those who 
only “drink the water,” we can conclude this is another way of saying, “we should not 
allow people to enjoy this way,” you must work if you wish to drink because work is a 
necessary requisite for enjoying in the culture. Clearly the situation is much more 
complicated than Santelli’s metaphor suggests, but what is more important is what 
Santelli’s metaphor suggests about the way desire is structured ideologically in his 
discourse. 
The discourse structure mirrors the structure of capitalism itself, because in an 
abstract way, the subject or agent of capitalism uses the worker to produce the object 
intended for consumption in the same way an audience often does the work for the 
speaker in order to produce the object of desire—usually knowledge. The slave, who in 
this discourse possesses the knowledge needed to labor, not only to produce the chain of 
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signifiers linking the system of knowledge to the master signifier, also possesses the 
practical know-how—the requisite skill for doing the work. Santelli’s audience, the slave, 
possesses the knowledge or skill to keep the money circulating in a free market system. 
Because the worker knows how to labor, they can produce the object (money in this case) 
for the master, which makes the master dependent on the worker to produce the object, 
but also returns the surplus value generated in the exchange to the master, thereby 
alienating the worker from the object. In Santelli’s rhetoric, the one who drinks the water 
but does not carry the water is a metaphor for the unconscious truth driving the discourse: 
there are some who take money (or steal jouissance) undeservedly or disingenuously 
from those masters who have a right to it.  
The energy pent up in Santelli’s speech begins to percolate and generate 
spontaneous reactions from the co-hosts and the traders within earshot of his microphone. 
And perhaps as an example of how effective the master’s discourse can be in creating an 
effect on the audience, Santelli’s co-host Joe Kernen observes, “Hey, Rick… Oh, boy. 
They’re like putty in your hands. Did you hear…?”  To which, like a typical master, 
Santelli shouts back, “No they’re not, Joe. They’re not like putty in our hands,” adding, 
“This is America! How many of you people want to pay for your neighbor’s mortgage 
that has an extra bathroom and can’t pay their bills? Raise their hand.”192  Santelli’s 
rhetoric “This is America!” suggests metaphorically that America is another signifier for 
capitalism or the free market—and in this way serves as the master signifier or S1 at this 
point in the rant. This is why Lacan says, “S1 is, to say it briefly the signifier function that 
the master relies on” and also why he teaches “that the slave’s own field is knowledge, 
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S2.”
193
 The audience is structured to produce the knowledge, which in the discourse 
structure relies upon the vast reservoir of signifiers that are already at work: hard work, 
profit, freedom, prosperity, labor for reward, etc. which are provided by the audience. 
The effect of the master signifier on the audience is to structure the economy of 
jouissance according to the speaker’s master signifier, which in turn explains why the 
audience so vehemently agrees with Santelli. In response to Santelli’s statement, the 
traders on the floor are heard booing, signifying the immediate audience’s clear 
identification with his master signifier.  
Rhetorical agency in the master’s discourse is designed to produce this kind of an 
effect on an audience. The trader’s vocal boos were followed up by Santelli posing 
another rhetorical question, “President Obama, are you listening?”194, which implies that 
in Santelli’s marshaling of the master signifier(s), the audience has begun to produce the 
objet a, which in this rhetoric is organized resistance to President Obama’s policies, i.e. 
have a Tea Party. The broadcast had begun to get uncomfortably agitated, prompting Joe 
Kernen to nervously quip, “It’s like mob rule here. I’m getting scared. I’m glad I’m…” 
only to be interrupted by Carl Quintanilla who added “Get some bricks and bats…”195  
What is important about this exchange is difficult to capture with words, because it 
becomes clear how a certain aggressive enthusiasm seemed to surround Santelli as he 
shouted out his disagreement. It is as if this outburst and the reaction it generated from 
the audience served to encapsulate or speak to the intensity and violence the Tea Party 
movement has come to embody since the rant. It foretold the kind of violent and coercive 
alignment of actors, (the administration, President Obama) and actions (subsidize and 
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promote bad behavior) that now circulate in the symbolic order, a set of tensions forming 
the nascent structure of TPR. The irony here is that democracy, that is, majority rule, the 
kind of power configuration a referendum is predicated upon, is precisely what the 
audience to the broadcast is watching. It is the agitation of the majority claiming to be the 
oppressed minority, using the mantle of sovereignty, of authority, to assert itself as if it 
were powerless and thus the last bastion of democratic rule.  
The effect on the audience is further demonstrated by the response of the traders 
on the floor who are whipped into a veritable frenzy by Santelli’s rhetoric. One need only 
pay superficial attention and get a sense of the affective impact rhetorical agency in the 
discourse of the master has on an audience. This is evidenced in the next portion of the 
broadcast as Santelli, after a brief exchange about economic data, says, “We’re thinking 
of having a Chicago Tea Party in July. All you capitalists that want to show up to Lake 
Michigan, I’m gonna start organizing,”196  This was followed by whistling and cheering 
from the floor.  
QUICK: Hey, Rick? Can you do that one more time, just get the mob behind you 
again? 
QUINATILLA: Have the camera pull way out. 
QUICK: Yeah, pull way out. Everybody listen to Rick Santelli. 
KERNEN: He can’t… I don’t think… You can’t just do it at will, can you Rick? I 
mean, you have to say something. 
QUICK: No, do it at will. Let’s see. 
SANTELLI: Listen, all’s I know is, is that there’s only about 5% of the floor 
population here right now, and I talk loud enough they can all hear me. So if you 
want to ask’em anything, let me know. These guys are pretty straight forward, and 
my guess is, a pretty good statistical cross-section of America, the silent majority. 
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QUICK: Not so silent majority today.
197
  
This exchange illustrates exactly how persuasive the master’s discourse is in constituting 
an audience and channeling their affective sensibilities into one unified mass of like-
minded people; and it was this collection of comments that the Tea Party today claims it 
owes its partial inception. We cannot let the irony escape us. Santelli is a millionaire, 
surrounded by wealthier people who work for some of the wealthiest people on earth, and 
it is their disapproval of a bill meant to unsnarl some of the most unethical, and in many 
cases unlawful, underwriting practices the mortgage industry has ever seen that is at the 
source of their agitation. Hardly a “cross-section of America,” as this group would be 
saddled with the tax burden for much of these reforms. But the structure of the symbolic 
order places Santelli and the “we” he is alluding to in the position of the oppressed, and 
explains why taxation is akin to oppression for the Tea Party advocate, even if that 
person’s taxes never go up as a result of anything President Obama proposes. Here is 
where Santelli’s rhetoric links up so tightly with Revolutionary War propaganda.  
WILBUR ROSS: Rick, I congratulate you on your new incarnation as a 
revolutionary leader. 
SANTELLI: Somebody needs one. I’ll tell you what, if you read our founding 
fathers, people like Benjamin Franklin and Jefferson,… What we’re doing in this 
country now is making them roll over in their graves. 
This fundamental antagonism symbolically erected in Santelli’s speech is but a precursor 
to the same sentiment that in part cements the moral legitimacy of the Tea Party 
movement in so far as it confers its outsider status as the defender of the status quo. In 
part, the movement asserts its legitimacy every time it reestablishes its distance from the 
power it already assumes it has, but gets its power, its legitimacy, from its political 
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heritage by making it seem like this is not political. The scheme here is to be political by 
disavowing politics; which is exactly how ideology at its most effective works--precisely 
where not having a politics is politics itself. Quintanilla in the broadcast speaks to this 
very point when he suggests Santelli should run for office, only to have Santelli answer, 
“Do you think I want to take a shower every hour? The last place I’m ever gonna live or 
work is D.C.”198  This kind of response will become part and parcel of TPR, as political 
representatives get their credibility in part by establishing their distance from the political 
establishment. 
Traditional rhetorical criticism would acknowledge Santelli’s political economic 
situation and be equipped to point out that he is indeed a master masquerading as a slave. 
The risk inherent in this view is it reduces ideology to the tired Marxist argument that 
Santelli is spreading false consciousness. The posthumanist version of rhetorical agency 
Lacan provides does not pretend to function as a tool for distinguishing between rhetoric 
and reality. Instead, Lacanian psychoanalysis is designed to articulate the underlying Real 
of jouissance at work in a discourse. Were we to apply the humanist, speaker-centered, 
consciously directed conceptualization of rhetorical agency, critics would examine the 
master signifiers being articulated as if they originated solely from the consciously 
directed motives and intentions known to Santelli, and would evaluate Santelli’s 
persuasion of the audience for its appeals to their sense of reason, while leaning on his 
stature and credibility as an anchor on MSNBC. Clearly his rhetoric is a product of neo-
liberal rationality, and critics are already equipped to recognize and critique the disparity 
between his rhetoric and reality, but that does not account for the underlying power of the 
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prohibition of jouissance. In Santelli’s case, the prohibition entails either his jouissance 
being inhibited by other’s excess pleasure (homeowners borrowing more house than they 
could afford), or his pleasure in prohibiting jouissance for others (rejecting President 
Obama’s legislative initiatives). The understanding of rhetorical agency as driven by the 
unconscious circulation of desire allows critics to see both. 
Take It Back!  
Tea Party rhetoric, if perhaps self-defined, is rhetoric of protest—that is why the 
idea of “taking the country back” is so often incorporated into the Tea Party advocate’s 
speech. While this phrase is not unique to Tea Party advocates, what is “it” exactly that 
was stolen from them and how was it taken in the discourse? What activates rhetorical 
agency in this discourse is the threat to “our nation,” or “our way of life” as these phrases 
capture the ineffable real that exists beyond discourse but nonetheless holds the 
interpersonal, intrapersonal and intersubjective relationships together. This is why the 
discourse borders on hyperbole to establish the significance of the threat to the 
established cultural order. Analytically, the rhetoric follows the structure of the master’s 
discourse.  
S1   →  S2 
S          a 
 
Although his rhetoric is distinctive for other reasons, Tom Tancredo serves as a good 
example here of what I am referring to in referring to these threats to “our way of life.” In 
a speech he made after President Obama’s inauguration, Tancredo derided voters who 
supported President Obama saying, “They could not even spell the word ‘vote’ or say it 
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in English and they put a committed socialist ideologue in the White House — Barack 
Hussein Obama!” As Tim Reid writes, in  
Decrying America’s multiculturalism, Mr. Tancredo said that Republicans and 
Democrats had voted for a black man because they felt they had to. To a standing 
ovation, he shouted: ‘We really do have a culture to pass on to our children: it’s 
based on Judeo-Christian values…This is our country. Let’s take it back!’”199 
“Taking it back” of course implies the subject or agent in Tancredo’s discourse at one 
time possessed “it.” So, rhetorical agency constituted in the signifier “our country” is, for 
the subject or agent of the discourse, generated in the act of taking back or repossessing 
the stolen object. Since what was lost (the culture) never really existed in the first place 
as anything other than a fantasy designed to connect the object (in this case, white 
culture) to the subject or agent (Tancredo’s audience, including himself) to jouissance, 
then “our country” must signify for the subject the imaginary and symbolic relations that 
derail the otherwise expected and ordinary distribution of jouissance, i.e. the way things 
were before they were lost.  
Elaborating on the jouissance from which the subject or agent is separated, and 
the implied or latent signifier driving the discourse, present in its absence, is the 
unarticulated presumption of whiteness, the objet a. It is the essential indefinable surplus 
enjoyment that is only articulated by proxy and inference (a black man in the White 
House) but is in its inability to be explicitly articulated remains as the resistant core of the 
real dividing the subject or agent in the symbolic order. When Tancredo says “Let’s take 
it back!” the “it” is the objet a, the cause or source of enjoyment, which is real in the 
psychic order and therefore remains beyond speech. It is real not in the sense that it 
exists, it is real in the sense that for the subject, there is nothing embodied in the signifier 
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whiteness that is missing--there is a lack of a lack. The latent symptom that drives the 
discourse can be identified as “Barack Hussein Obama.”  The discourse is designed to 
repress the trauma caused for the white, patriarchal subject in the event of having a black 
man in the Oval Office. This is why, in this discourse, it is all important that Tea Party 
advocates malign the president by referring to his full name in order to imply or infer 
what would otherwise be interpreted if uttered explicitly as overt racism. The repetition 
of the symptom in the discourse reinforces the sense of alienated subjectivity conveyed in 
the discourse, which means the Tea Party advocate is locked in a discourse of constant 
division and protest. The identification with  master signifiers is always a vain attempt to 
master or repress the symptom, and this can be seen in the extent to which they are 
repeated and the aggressive tone in which they are spoken.   
In the hysteric’s discourse, rhetorical agency is an effect of questioning which 
produces a demand for the other (audience) to supply a master signifier (S1). As a rather 
clear illustration of this structure in action, let us consider the You Tube speech delivered 
by Tea Party advocate Bob Basso, a motivational speaker and actor whose videos, in 
which he pretends to be Thomas Paine, embody much of what I have been arguing lies at 
the heart of TPR. The speech, viewed by almost ten million people, is entitled “We the 
People Stimulus Package.” Basso was interviewed and his speech aired on Sean Hannity 
and Glenn Beck’s Fox productions. In short, his work is central to at least the early 
formation of the Tea Party movement’s foundational rhetoric. Bob Basso introduced his 
March 2009 rallying cry to the Tea Party faithful with these opening lines:  
What would have happened in 1789 or 1942 or 9/11 if a top government official 
stepped in front of the people and publicly proclaimed “America was a Nation of 
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Cowards”?  He would have been run out of the country on a rail, packaged in tar 
and feather, at least - but that's what happened in 2009. And you did nothing! 
Have you become a nation of cowards America?
200
 
With this initial salvo, Basso launches into a wholesale attack on the 111
th
 Congress and 
President Obama. Notice in the rhetorical question, as I believe is characteristic of TPR in 
general, the gloss over the “Nation of cowards” accusation. What Attorney General Eric 
Holder actually said was  
Though this nation has proudly thought of itself as an ethnic melting pot, in things 
racial we have always been and continue to be, in too many ways, essentially a 
nation of cowards.
201
   
Omitting the context concerning race from the quotation is disingenuous and unethical, 
but it supports the radical sense of estrangement Basso feels his audience perceives as 
reality. This sense of failure, of estrangement, of political alienation is a cornerstone of 
TPR; it is symptomatic of the underlying discourse structure that forms the protesters 
relationships to one another. Tea Party advocates are united in their conviction to protest, 
and it is this shared conviction that forms the foundation of their relationship which is 
structured according to the discourse of the hysteric.  
S   →   S1  
a          S2 
 
In the discourse of the hysteric, the agent or subject’s speech is a product of 
alienation. The symptomatic expression of alienation in the discourse is formulated 
according to a simple question concerning identity. Holder’s discourse is distinct from 
Basso’s discourse because for Holder the rhetoric does not suggest cowardice is 
categorical or unqualified, but Basso takes cowardice to be a universal signifier of 
identity for the subject (S). Cowardice is the signifier that symbolizes castration in the 
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discourse, and as a symptom, constitutes the questioning of identity as illustrated in 
Basso’s rhetoric “Have you become a nation of cowards America?”202 This is another 
way of asking the simple question of identity, “Tell me what I am” and requires the 
answer from the other (audience), “America is not cowardly”. The audience does the 
work in the discourse of supplying the unary trait, the signifier that represents for the 
audience all that it means to be unified, in this case “America” (S1), the signifier that an 
ego self-identifies with in order to give its fragmented identity consistency. Keep in mind 
the signifier is arbitrarily assigned meaning; there is a chain of signification initiated in 
Basso’s rhetoric that drives a specific answer to the question his speech implies. The 
impact for rhetorical agency for the audience of Basso’s discourse is that the audience 
does the work of remedying the symptom, in this case, their individual ego is subsumed 
into the big Other: America. This means the audience expresses the desire to be the Other 
which is an active, narcissistic expression of desire. This explains how the identification 
with the nation-state colonizes audiences who then become extensions of the state’s 
prerogatives.  
As he articulates his identification with the master signifiers, Basso’s discourse 
shifts structure to the discourse of the master. No longer is Basso’s speech an effect of the 
symptom, that is to say, his discourse is not driven by the question “Tell me what I am,” 
it is instead animated by the master signifier which is designed to provide answers, and 
not persistently ask a question about identity. Basso’s rhetoric tells the audience what 
they are, as Basso argues,  
The greatest show of arrogance and disdain any congress ever showed any 
citizenry, your dysfunctionally (sic) elite, self-interested, non-representing 
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representatives passed the largest spending bill in history without reading it, and 
you did nothing!
203
   
Adding, in a string of epistrophes,  
You want them to obey your constitutional mandate and secure your borders and 
they ignore you! You ask them to enforce your immigration laws and they ignore 
you! You say stop the madness of handing three hundred billion dollars of a 
bankrupted treasury to illegal alien welfare rewarding them for making a mockery 
of your laws and they ignore you! And now in open defiance of the over 
whelming will of the people are preparing more amnesty programs. You say stop 
exporting my nation’s vital industries to foreign shores and they ignore you. You 
say no to using your money to bail out failed, corrupt and greedy businesses and 
they ignore you. You say implement the E-verify system so American jobs go to 
American workers and they ignore you.
204
  
The rhetoric creates identification by negation; by establishing what something is not, i.e. 
this discourse structures identification with secure borders, with respecting laws, with 
keeping money with people who earned it, and with xenophobic nationalism. The 
repetition of “you want and they ignore you” amplifies the intensity of the divided 
subjectivity latent within the discourse as the audience is symbolically castrated from the 
capacity to use or exercise the voice or body, which results in the feeling that one must 
recoup that which is lost.  
Basso clearly illustrates the discourse of the master’s structure in the following 
sentences  
Wake up America. While you were playing with the toys of your consumer 
wealth you lost much more than your bloated economy of living beyond your 
means. You lost your representative democracy. Your servants have become your 
masters.
205
 
According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, rhetorical agency in this series of sentences could 
be diagramed like this:  
S1  → S2 
S        a 
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“Wake up America.”   
         
                                    → 
“While you were playing with the toys of 
your consumer wealth you lost much more 
than your blotted economy of living 
beyond your means.” 
“Your servants have become your 
masters.” 
“You lost your representative democracy.” 
 
What the structure illustrates is how the discourse of the master drives is made 
explicit in Basso’s rhetoric. The master signifier is “America”, and the demand to “wake 
up” metaphorically treats the signifier “America” in the rhetoric as if it were a person or 
individual, and it is no coincidence that this is the line which orients the identity of the 
subject. The system of knowledge that follows from the demand, “Wake up,” is 
articulated according to an economy of desire. The implication is that one should not 
enjoy excessively, and there is a veiled protestant consumption ethic that one should be 
frugal, or at least not conspicuously consume. By extension, this criticism of individual 
consumption habits is also meant to indict the federal government. The object of derision 
in the system of knowledge Basso’s rhetoric constructs is an infantilized consumer who 
plays with toys like a child, which is another way to endorse a specific mode of 
enjoyment – that to be identified as a subject according to the rhetoric is to be mastered in 
way. The affective impact of the indictment is designed to encourage action on the part of 
the audience, caused by the lost object – the objet a – “your representative democracy.” 
What is important in this sentence is the word “your” because it represents in Basso’s 
rhetoric the narcissistic subject who aims to repossess representative democracy as if it 
were theirs alone. The authentic or genuine “representative democracy” constituted in 
Basso’s rhetoric is one that represents the subject, “me” in their entirety. In other words, a 
  177 
representative democracy is only defined as such when it re-presents “me” or my 
interests. In this way, Basso’s rhetoric turns around a paradox, as representative 
democracy is defined by the active narcissistic exclusion of all others from representation 
if they do not mirror Basso’s belief structure.  
It is important to keep in mind that Bob Basso is dressed in colonial garb, 
complete with the Constitution as back drop, two large old-looking books, a burning 
candle and his tri-corner hat. He is doing his best to speak from a position of authority 
embodied by Thomas Paine. The costume speaks to the unconscious truth that is driving 
the discourse which is that Obama is an illegitimate source of authority. The servants, a 
metaphorical way of referring to Obama in the speech, are “running the house.”   The 
rhetoric articulates this symptom in the phrase “Your servants have become your 
masters,” and it is here the latent racism in the discourse surfaces.  
Basso’s discourse is designed to manufacture a protesting subject. He exhorts the 
audience to reject, “Taxation without representation, is tyranny but still you look to 
government to solve problems they created in the first place. You’re sucking at the hind 
tit of a dead cow.”206  The argument Basso is making reinforces the cause or source of 
desire in the rhetoric to restore white patriarchal authority, which temporarily surfaces as 
a part of the subject’s identity in the form of a series of rhetorical questions.  
Why isn't there a three million 'We the People” march on Washington? A nation-
wide taxpayer revolt? Thousands of cars and trucks surrounding your nation’s 
capital, bringing your failed government to a standstill?
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The rhetorical questions position the audience’s identity to be fragmented, to be unable to 
reconcile the current state of affairs, and to lack what they want to be aligned with: 
specifically a movement bent on revolt.  
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The temporary hysterical positioning of the subject shifts back to the discourse of 
the master. Basso has amplified the castration, the divided subjectivity and the 
importance of the missing objet a. For rhetorical agency, the discourse of the master 
compels the audience through the generation of anxiety about the subject-object-
enjoyment relation. Desire in the discourse is castrated and is used as a lever to animate 
and move the audience to adopt the speaker’s desired ends. This sets the “master,” the 
subject or agent up to provide an exhortation,  
Democracy doesn't repress power - it unleashes it to We the People! Take it now! 
They dictated an economic salvation plan to you, now it’s time to stick it to them 
with a ‘We the People Stimulus Package’.208  
In this line the audience does the work of imagining a chain of signifiers that forms the 
knowledge circulating around revolution (S2). In so doing, the audience is primed to 
“take the country back” and the latent remainder produced is the unstated pleasure of 
reinstating the reactionary cultural ideal – the objet a. The importance of this line is that it 
gives form to the nascent movement and targets its disaffection with the US government.  
Basso continues his speech by linking the audience to previous and future 
generations, and gives the reactionary cultural ideal some depth by generating more 
anxiety, 
Wake up America - you have allowed yourselves to become little more than 
cowering spectators, watching the nation your grandparents built, the richest, 
most powerful, most self-sufficient republic, in history with the highest standard 
of living any nation ever achieved. Now in the middle of the greatest 
unprecedented decline in modern history. The world’s only superpower can’t 
defend its borders, balance its budget, win its wars, manufacture its own products 
or protect its own currency. You’re total government debt obligation in the next 
several years is approaching the gross domestic product of the entire world!  
You’ve diminished the future of your children, grandchildren and ten more 
generations of Americans.
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The audience is moved to action in part because of the way the rhetoric ties the listener to 
a symbolic debt owed to an imaginary generation of Americans. The affective impact of 
these claims is guilt, and the guilt in turn pushes the audience to take up the action Basso 
advocates. The rhetoric functions to establish what the audience does not want to be, and 
they react against that image. And the reason the audience is expected to conform is owed 
again to a symbolic debt, conferred in Basso’s histrionics,  
Two hundred and thirty three years ago the silent majority in Boston got fed up 
with Taxation without representation and held a little Tea Party to prove the anger 
of We the People is on the march. It started the first American revolution. Now 
it’s time to start the second American Revolution. Take an envelope, put a teabag 
inside, simply seal it and send it to your non-representing representatives in 
Congress. They'll get the idea. We are mad as hell and we want our country 
back.
210
  
The fusion of present discontent with historical circumstances surrounding the American 
revolution not only gives the rhetoric its definition, it also constructs the necessity for 
action and gives it its moral purpose. Action in the present is morally necessary in order 
to vindicate the generations who have already sacrificed or who will sacrifice in the name 
of the country.  
In the end, Basso encourages the audience to “Look in your mirror, there's your 
leader, phone your talk radio host,” before imploring them to “call for a tax protest, set 
your internet communities on fire with the idea, but if you decide to do nothing again 
then buy a gun. You'll need it.” Adding,  
My name is Thomas Payne. Don't give up hope America. Your country needs a 
new greatest generation, answer the call, get into the fight. It’s a good time to be a 
patriot! The second American Revolution has just begun.
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The moral force the rhetoric picks up by association with the American Revolution also 
links Tea Party advocacy to the violence associated with war.  
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The Tea Party rhetoric evolved from the capitalist morality defining audiences in 
Santelli’s rant to a more xenophobic and nationalistic form of speech in Basso’s “We The 
People Stimulus Package.”  The violence that is implied by Basso’s rhetoric is more 
clearly and fervently articulated in Glen Beck’s rhetoric.  
Glenn Beck 
Glenn Beck’s rhetoric is actively narcissistic. The ego defense in the rhetoric is so 
strong that the speech constructs wildly divergent systems of identification and dis-
identification; all of which function to patch up the fragmented subject or agent at work 
in Beck’s speech.  A good example of active narcissism in Beck’s rhetoric is his lament, 
“Because if you are a white human that loves America and happens to be a Christian, 
forget about it Jack.”212 The master signifiers that Beck identifies with “white, Christian 
American” are indistinguishable from the subject or agent in the discourse and it is 
narcissistic because his self-image is contingent upon the fact that it is under attack or at 
risk in the discourse; in other words the stability of his identity depends upon the 
knowledge about its instability in relation to the other. The anxiety for the subject or 
agent in the discourse is generated by the concern about your ability to be yourself.   
For Beck, identification with the master signifier “America” assumes whiteness; 
to be American in his rhetoric is to be white. As Beck articulates, “African-American is a 
bogus, PC, made-up term. I mean, that’s not a race. Your ancestry is from Africa and 
now you live in America.”213  What is driving this discourse is that blackness, or persons 
of color are seen as the source of derailment in the economy of desire, and this 
unconscious impulse condenses into the metaphor or image of President Obama in all its 
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various guises, and that is why his inauguration is traumatic for the subject of this 
discourse. As Beck makes clear,  
Barack Obama … chose to use his name Barack for a reason – to identify, not 
with America – you don’t take the name Barack to identify with America. You 
take the name Barack to identify with what?  Your heritage?  The heritage, 
maybe, of your father in Kenya, who is a radical?  Is – really?  Searching for 
something to give him any kind of meaning, just as he was searching later in life 
for religion.
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The signifier “America” is a categorical term in the speech which washes out all other 
races and ethnicities, but in so doing it entrenches whiteness as an invisible center; the 
implied arbiter of identification in the rhetoric. Beck makes this clear in his rhetoric in 
saying “you don’t take the name Barack to identify with America” which implies an 
African name is incongruent within the signifier “America” his rhetoric assumes.  The 
strongest source of dis-identification is President Obama, which is why he is most often 
the symptom driving the discourse.  On the surface of his discourse, there is a critique of 
Obama for his policies, but the latent symptom of the divided subject is racist--the 
signifier Obama represents for the subject the sign of “black power.” Because Beck does 
not distinguish between America and whiteness, anything President Obama does not 
support is not whiteness, which is why Glenn Beck thinks,  
This president I think has exposed himself over and over again as a guy who has a 
deep-seated hatred for white people or the white culture....I'm not saying he 
doesn't like white people, I'm saying he has a problem. This guy is, I believe, a 
racist.
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Here, Beck in a pattern consistent with his speech generally, uses the trope accismus to 
pretend to refuse or to deny what it is that he actually desires or thinks. Beck’s comment 
“I’m not saying” prefaces what he actually does want to say – that Obama does not like 
white people. And although his speech suggests there is a difference between hating 
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people because of the color of their skin and being racist, this is a distinction without a 
difference. The trope reveals the working of the unconscious truth driving Beck’s 
discourse which is that blackness is an illegitimate source of authority.   
Being the object of God’s desire explains why Beck’s rhetoric is also constituted 
to dis-identify President Obama and Christianity.  
When you're getting Christianity from that trio, after growing up in a family 
environment — no fault of his own — where your father is a Muslim, an atheist, 
your mother at least is not practicing any religion, your stepfather is non-
practicing Muslim, your grandparents in frequent something called the “Little Red 
Church,” I don't even — I mean, is there any wonder why so many Americans are 
confused by him? They don't recognize him as a Christian. No.
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The master signifiers of identity for Beck are white, Christian and American and the 
signifiers of dis-identification for the discourse surround Barack Obama. In other words, 
the knowledge that would be produced for the audience of this discourse is a mutually 
exclusive relationship between anything associated with Obama and its antithesis: white, 
Christian, America.   
In Glenn Beck’s rhetoric, rhetorical agency is structured according to the 
discourse of the master, but also relies on the discourse of the university. Once the 
speaker or agent has established the master signifiers organizing the identity, this 
alignment can then be elaborated upon as a system of knowledge. As Bracher describes, 
“It is precisely because of the more and more extreme uncovering of the discourse of the 
master that the discourse of the university finds itself manifested”217 The master signifiers 
in the discourse of the university are latently driving the discourse, and are therefore 
assumed in the system of knowledge. The discourse of the university is apparent as 
Beck’s rhetoric is at times characterized by his use of chalk boards and references to 
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supplement his broadcast material as if to give it an intellectual credibility; the subject 
who is supposed to know, and in this way Glenn Beck acts as a kind of teacher. For Beck, 
the US government under Barack Obama’s leadership is a socialist, fascist, communist 
totalitarianism.  
I am not saying that Barack Obama is a fascist. If I’m not mistaken, in the early 
days of Adolf Hitler, they were very happy to line up for help there as well. I 
mean, the companies were like, ‘Hey, wait a minute. We can get, you know, we 
can get out of trouble here. They can help, et cetera, et cetera.
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Beck employs accismus which betrays the unconscious truth in the discourse, “Barack 
Obama is a fascist.”  In this quote Beck’s rhetoric constitutes a system of knowledge 
which is designed to teach the audience by way of analogy how to understand the Obama 
administration and its relationship to private industry is analogous to the relationship 
between Hitler and fascist incorporation in Third Reich Germany. On a surface level this 
is simply guilt by association, but despite the factual inconsistencies that separate one 
instance from the other, the rhetoric is effective because it teaches the audience the truth, 
which is the cause or source of enjoyment in the discourse structure.  For Beck this is a 
consistent system of knowledge,  
This is not comparing these people to the people in Germany, but this is exactly 
what happened to the lead-up with Hitler. Hitler opened up the door and said, 
‘Hey, companies, I can help you.’  They all ran through the door. And then in the 
end, they all saw, ‘Uh-oh. I’m in bed with the devil.’ They started to take their 
foot out, and Hitler said, ‘Absolutely not. Sorry gang. This is good for the 
country. We’ve got to do these things.’ And it was too late.219  
Again, Beck uses accismus, but the unconscious hitch in his discourse reveals the truth 
about the system of knowledge that purports to explain how Obama and these companies 
enjoy. Obama in this fantasy is one who will take excess pleasure, take advantage of 
others and trap them for this own purposes. The audience is exposed to a system of 
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knowledge the support of which is a fantasy about the way Obama and Hitler enjoy 
similarly. The cause or source of enjoyment in the discourse is generated in the work the 
audience does to understand the distribution of enjoyment that Obama shares with Hitler. 
Hitler, and by association, Obama, in Beck’s rhetoric represent death, not just an end to 
life, but also symbolically an end to the capacity to use your voice or to speak. That is 
why Beck says, “I fear a Reichstag moment. God forbid, another 9/11. Something that 
will turn this machine on, and power will be seized and voices will be silenced.”220 In 
actual death, no one can speak and so symbolically the inability to use the voice figures 
as an imaginary death in the rhetoric. The inability to use or incapacity to exercise some 
part of the body, including the voice, signifies what psychoanalysis calls castration.  
In Beck’s rhetoric, history gives the knowledge articulated a degree of credibility 
–it becomes the foundational assumption driving the veracity of the discourse. What 
happened in the past comes to life in the form of this analogy which bears directly on the 
present circumstances as a result. Beck claims,  
I know the progressives are using progressive tactics. They’re not using Nazi 
tactics. The real answer is the Nazis were using early American progressive 
tactics. And that’s not my opinion, that’s historic fact.221 
By speaking from a historical subjectivity, Beck’s discourse is driven by the latent master 
signifiers inherent in this system of knowledge. As Dean comments, “What is hidden 
under the facts, however, what the facts want to deny, is the way they are supported by 
power and authority S1.”
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  For a historical system of knowledge, one assumption driving 
the credibility of this discourse is that what happened in the past is known objectively and 
the facts described speak without interpretative bias. That history repeats itself is a further 
assumption in this discourse, and in the system of knowledge told through Beck, 
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audiences get to temporarily suspend their doubts about what is as well as make 
predictions about what will come. History provides explanations of how events unfold, 
and as Beck aligns Obama with Hitler, and provides the a chain of signifiers linking 
them, the audience is structured to continue the production of knowledge providing 
further linkages as well as inferring the effects of the system. Beck further invokes the 
comparison,  
This is fascism. This is what happens when you merge special interests, 
corporations, and the government. This is what happens. And if people like you 
don’t take a stand … at some point, you know what poem keeps going through 
my mind is ‘First they came for the Jews.’  People, all of us are like, well, this 
news doesn’t really affect me. Well, I’m not a bondholder. Well, I’m not in the 
banking industry. Well, I’m not a big CEO. Well, I’m not on Wall Street. Well, 
I’m not a car dealer. I’m not an autoworker. Gang, at some point they’re going to 
come for you.
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The affective impact of linking Obama to Hitler is the generation and amplification of 
fear, when Beck says “They’re going to come for you” in the university discourse this is 
seen as inevitable.  
Lacan’s dictum that desire is the desire of the Other is all important in accounting 
for the distinctiveness of Beck’s Christian rhetoric. What Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory 
is trying to explain is how the subject or agent’s desire is derived from the desire of the 
Other. For Lacan, the Other in the discourse can be another person, an image, a signifier 
or something else that acts as a cause or source of unconscious desire for the subject or 
agent. Since desire is the desire of the Other, and the Other as God or founding fathers 
figures prominently in Beck’s rhetoric, Lacanian psychoanalysis is uniquely positioned to 
analyze Beck’s Christian rhetoric. Beck’s Christian rhetoric is distinctive in part because 
the subject or agent in the discourse is an object of the Other’s jouissance. This means the 
  186 
subject or agent in the discourse is a passive object of the Other’s desire, and the Other in 
the discourse is the one who actively enjoys for the subject or agent. In Beck’s rhetoric, 
the Other activates the libidinal drive for the subject or agent in the discourse, and the 
subject or agent then is structured to serves as a sort of conduit for communicating the 
desire of the Other—whether it be God or some other signifier representing the Other in 
the rhetoric. On Beck’s television show, he said,     
God is giving a plan I think to me that is not really a plan. ... The problem is that I 
think the plan that the Lord would have us follow is hard for people to understand. 
... Because of my track record with you who have been here for a long time. 
Because of my track record with you, I beg of you to help me get this message 
out, and I beg of you to pray for clarity on my part.
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Beck’s rhetoric structures the subject or agent in the discourse to be the object of God’s 
jouissance. God, or the Other to whom Beck’s rhetoric is directed, provides the discourse 
with the object of desire, “a plan.” The “plan” activates the subject or agent’s drive to 
desire, and the aim of desire in the rhetoric is to receive the object, “God is giving a plan 
I think to me.” The object is invested with a value (it is a “message”) that “is hard for 
people to understand,” but “understanding” or “clarity” functions in the discourse as 
signifiers meant to confer the satisfaction of desire. In other words, the subject or agent in 
the rhetoric is driven by the desire to understand clearly, which is another way of saying 
the subject or agent enjoys in the rhetoric by making sense (jouis-sense) of God’s speech 
(the plan or message). The subject or agent functions as a sort of decoder machine, as a 
tool for producing God’s desire. While the passive positioning of the subject or agent in 
the discourse is common in religious rhetoric generally, in Beck’s rhetoric it is especially 
obvious that rhetorical agency for the subject or agent is structured to transmit the desire 
of the Other or God. The subject or agent in Beck’s rhetoric is simply an intermediary or 
  187 
transparent channel for the desire of the Other, or in other words, the object of God’s 
desire.  
Beck’s rhetoric reflects the tension caused by the desire of the Other in the 
unconscious as his rhetoric is ambivalent and conflicted yet nonetheless remains 
committed to God’s desire.  
I'm only writing a few bullet points. And I am doing that so I don't get in the way 
of the spirit, in case he wants to talk...if you would just pray that I would be able 
to hear because sometimes -- sometimes he's screaming at me and I still can't hear 
it.
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The inability to use the ear correctly in the service of God’s desire illustrates the source 
or cause of the subject or agent’s divided subjectivity in the discourse. Rhetorical agency 
in the discourse gets its force from channeling the desire of the Other, in this case God. 
Beck’s divided subjectivity in part stems from his subjectivity or agency as a passive 
libidinal object. Beck’s rhetoric unconsciously driven by his desire to be the object, but 
because the subject or agent in his discourse can never be fully integrated into the 
signifier God, (what we commonly call sin), the discourse for the subject or agent 
remains fixated upon integrating this excess and in this way it structures the fundamental 
fantasy.  
God’s desire or the desire of the Other is so strong that at times the subject or 
agent becomes virtually indistinguishable from God’s desire. “The plan that He would 
have me articulate, I think, to you, is get behind Me -- and I don't mean ‘me,’ I mean 
Him. Get behind Me. Stand behind Me.”226 The impact on rhetorical agency of this 
fusion is that the person or individual is no longer directly morally responsible for their 
actions. Which means rhetorical agency in this discourse is driven by the Other’s active 
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articulation of the libido, “get behind Me”. The subsumed identity of the subject is 
evident in the struggles to disentangle “Him” and “me”.  
 Beck’s rhetoric is not however, exclusively constituted in God’s desire, his 
speech also incorporates the desire of the Founding Fathers as the Other. Beck makes this 
linkage clear with respect to the Founders in the following quote, 
Tea parties believe in small government. We believe in returning to the principles 
of our Founding Fathers. We respect them. We revere them. Shoot me in the head 
before I stop talking about the Founders. Shoot me in the head if you try to 
change our government.
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Beck’s insistence that he should be shot in the head if he fails them indicates his relation 
to the source of the active libido in the discourse signified in the “Founding Fathers”. Just 
as his ears will never be able to listen completely to service God’s desire, he will never be 
able to talk enough to service the Founders. No signifier in the language could possible 
eradicate the demand or the desire of the Other. The desire of the Founding Fathers, 
constituted in the customs, traditions, history and hegemonic authority, are an effect of 
the violent and aggressive derailment of desire.  
It is also absolutely critical that we note the Other in Beck’s rhetoric is generally a 
man, (God is referred to with masculine pronouns in Beck’s rhetoric, the Founding 
Fathers are represented this way); the desire of the Other is always already patriarchal. 
The active libido exerting its force in the discourse is the direct result of the demands 
made by these patriarchs, which is why Beck and so many other Tea Party advocates 
back up their arguments by appealing to God, to Ronald Reagan, the Founding Fathers, 
and Jesus etc. The masculine gender of the Other in the rhetoric produces the phallic 
signifier in the discourse. For Lacan, the phallic signifier is a metaphor meant to confer 
  189 
conceptually where the rhetoric gets its force or power. The phallus is not to be confused 
with the penis, the phallus is the signifier in the discourse that represents the energy 
propelling the generation of speech for the subject. The phallus represents the capacity to 
survive, to reproduce, regenerate, etc. and in this way, is directly connected to the system 
of prohibitions that constrain the circulation of desire in the culture. But the phallus also 
signifies the very structure of unconscious desire, which is, the desire to be the desire of 
the Other. Lacan incorporated the term “Name-of-the-Father” (NotF) into the 
psychoanalytic nosology to capture the nuances of the phallic function in discourse. 
The term “Name of the Father” indicates that what is at issue is not a person but a 
signifier, one that is replete with cultural and religious significance. It is a key 
signifier for the subject’s symbolic universe, regulating this order and giving it its 
structure. Its function … is to be the vehicle of the law that regulates desire – both 
the subject’s desire and the omnipotent desire of the maternal figure [mOther]228 
The paternal metaphor generates desire because it limits the circulation of jouissance in 
the culture. What this means is, the system of prohibitions (rules, norms, what Grigg is 
calling the vehicle of the law) constitutes the Father’s desire to order and regulate desire 
but in the very act of regulating and ordering, these rules, norms and laws generate desire. 
In either case, the introduction of the phallic signifier into the discourse produces an 
imaginary castration. Imaginary castration refers to the lack which is signified in the 
rhetoric in all the ways custom, tradition, history, and white male capitalist hegemony is 
eroding. Ultimately the mOther’s desire is to sustain desire itself, which implies desire 
will always find new signifiers in which the libido is invested. In speech, the phallic 
function is articulated as what Lacan called the paternal metaphor. As Grigg describes, 
…the paternal metaphor is an operation in which the Name-of-the-Father is 
substitutes for the mother’s desire, thereby producing a new species of meaning, 
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phallic meaning, which heralds the introduction of the subject to the phallic 
economy of … castration.229  
Because the Name-of-the-Father is only a substitution, it is a constant source of 
anxiety and imaginary castration in the discourse, but it nevertheless attempts to 
temporarily suspend the castration through order. In this way, order is always 
superimposed on the subject or agent by the imaginary relations that exist with respect to 
the Other in the rhetoric, whether it be the Founding Fathers, Ronald Reagan, God (Him), 
Jesus etc. The castration that Beck is attempting to suspend in his discourse, if it were 
reconnected, would allow the subject or agent to activate the desire of the (m)Other—
which in this case is the values and ideals represented in the discourse by the signifiers 
“Founding Fathers,” Reagan, etc. The signification of the paternal metaphor by the 
subject or agent represents the Name-of-the-Father, which conceptually refers to the 
speech in the discourse that constitutes the disruption of the otherwise unfettered 
repetition of custom, tradition, history and authority in the culture. The discourse is 
structured so that President Obama can never be a source of active libidinal enjoyment; 
Obama and his administration are constituted in the rhetoric as a block or short – circuit 
that derails active libidinal enjoyment. As the quotation illustrates,  
When you see the effects of what they're doing to the economy, remember these 
words: We will survive. No -- we'll do better than survive, we will thrive. As long 
as these people are not in control. They are taking you to a place to be 
slaughtered!
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Although cryptic, what is clear is that “they” or “these people” (meaning the Obama 
administration), are directly threatening the capacity for Beck’s audience to survive 
which also constitutes a direct threat to the Other. Not only does the quotation link the 
administration to death, but symbolically, this signifies how the Obama administration is 
  191 
constituted in the discourse as the very antithesis of the phallus. The only power the 
Obama administration has in the rhetoric is the power to produce death, and his discourse 
is driven by the phallic signifier, which represents the “survival instinct,” “life-force” or 
libido necessary for speech to continue as all discourse requires a substitute for the 
mOther’s desire (otherwise the subject or agent becomes psychotic).  
In order to restore the relationship between libido and desire, Beck’s rhetoric 
incessantly appeals to masculine imagery in order to realign the economy of jouissance, 
which is defined by the knowledge of enjoyment signified by the Founding Fathers. The 
Founding Fathers in the discourse operates as the signifier Lacan calls the paternal 
metaphor because it defines what is impermissible, i.e. “taxation without representation,” 
“big government,” “deficit spending” etc. But the Founding Fathers also signify what is 
permitted, in other words there is a specific knowledge of enjoyment embodied in the 
image and signifiers constituting the Founding Fathers that constructs the economy of 
jouissance driving Tea Party advocates. The impact of the paternal metaphor in Tea Party 
rhetoric affectively unites advocates in the desire to prohibit surplus enjoyment. This 
means Tea Party rhetoric derives pleasure from the pain produced by the prohibition of 
surplus jouissance. There is no word that in English that captures this impulse better than 
what Germans call schadenfreude; taking pleasure in other’s misery.  
Glen Beck’s rhetoric is also distinctive in that his speech reflects periodic, pre-
psychotic moments in which there is a conflation of the subject and object. The phallic 
meaning is absent in psychosis, but for Beck whose discourse is pre-psychotic, the phallic 
meaning is not absent, it is simply impotent. Unlike full blown psychosis, Beck’s rhetoric 
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merely flirts with foreclosure. In a full-blown psychotic, there is no “no” in the language, 
and the no is foundational for subjectivity.  Beck describes his own sense of foreclosure 
from the social discourse, “Because if you are a white human that loves America and 
happens to be a Christian, forget about it, Jack.”  In effect, Lacan’s teaching allows us to 
see how rhetorical agency in the example is contingent upon the near erasure of the 
subject or agent’s master signifiers, those words in the speech that represent the subject 
as an object to the subject (self-consciousness). Agency in this respect is not linked in any 
way with the speaker, as the speaker in this instance is clear delegating their agency to an 
other (God). In this way, Beck’s rhetoric illustrates the fading of the subject from the 
discourse in the quotation cited above when he said “Shoot me in the head before I stop 
talking about the Founders. Shoot me in the head if you try to change our government.” 
What this means is if your master signifiers are unable to be represented in the 
social discourse, then you might as well be dead. This is a symbolic death for the subject 
as indicated by Beck’s constant insistence that if the relation is disturbed he would rather 
not identify at all— “shoot me in the head.” The master signifier S1 is missing from the 
social discourse and the subject is unable to provide a substitute for the mOther’s desire 
(paternal metaphor), and therefore the trauma of the symptom so overwhelms the subject 
or agent that they constitutes themselves in the discourse by the very nature of their being 
crowed out of the discourse. When Beck says “Shoot me in the head” this represents a 
suicidal motive that is an enigma of psychosis: the subject either exists in the discourse 
structure or the subject doesn’t exist at all. The reason Beck’s otherwise hysterical 
discourse becomes pre-psychotic is because in there is a getting out from underneath the 
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desire of the Other so that the law no longer exists and the subject is no longer bound by 
the discourse.  
Moreover, the “maternal figure” in the speech structure, a point to which I have 
only hinted at so far, concerns what this speech is always geared to reproduce: freedom. 
The phrase “lady liberty,” is not transparent. The reason freedom, which goes by 
“liberty” in the phrase, is feminized is because it is the thing subordinated in the speech. 
If freedom is always the rallying cry, then it is the thing we are always lacking. 
Otherwise, why would we want more of it?  It is this way in which freedom and its 
rhetorical equivalents are used to push the audience into political action. The connection 
to the maternal figure eludes us only if we do not at least consider by way of analogy the 
ideal relation between the child and its mother. Since the infant is dependent upon the 
mother for comfort and nourishment, anything that distracts the mother from the infant 
would be regarded by the infant as an imposition estranging it from its only source of 
satisfaction. Whatever this distraction is, be it the father as psychoanalysis for Freud 
contended, or the phone or the dog, no matter what it is that distracts, that there is an 
interruption at all is what matters for human psychology. For Lacan, this interruption 
which functions to intervene in the articulation of the mother’s desire is called the 
paternal metaphor. Again Grigg explains 
The paternal metaphor is an operation in which the “Name-of-the-Father” is 
substituted for the mother's desire, thereby producing a new species of meaning, 
phallic meaning, which heralds the introduction of the subject to the phallic 
economy of the neurotic and, therefore, to castration. This phallic meeting, as 
both a product of the paternal metaphor and the key to all questions of sexual 
identity, is absent in psychosis... in psychosis, then, the foreclosure of the Name-
of-the-Father is accompanied by the corresponding absence, foreclosure, of the 
phallic meaning that is necessary for libidinal relations.
231
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For our purposes, what this mean is that freedom is the metaphor that stands in for the 
mother desire. Since freedom is a political value we inherited from our father's fathers 
(our founding fathers according to the Tea Party movement). We are not so much cut off 
from the founding fathers as they are “excluded” from the Tea Party symbolic order by 
President Obama and the Congress. We are rendered impotent without them—hence the 
importance of libidinal relations. This also helps explain why the Tea Party movement 
seems bent on advocating economic issues but nonetheless gets wrapped up in other 
conservative establishment imperatives like hetero-normative marriage (the libidinal 
relations imply the ability to reproduce, which is what got us here and will ensure there 
are more of us in the future). This is why understanding how socialism, fascism and 
communism fit into this structure is important, as these elements function to cancel the 
access to freedom for the audience. “If there is socialism in the world, then there can be 
no freedom,” goes the simplified version of these structural relations.  
To contextualize and illustrate why liberty or freedom is somehow like a mother, 
we need only look at the way it is always positioned as something left lacking, something 
the audience is made to want because, like the mother, it is the source of satisfaction, 
whose attention is distracted by the specter of communism, socialism or fascism 
(sometimes all three). The patriarchal signifier operates according to the desire that 
supposes if we want her back, then we must suppress, repress, destroy, fight, and so on, 
those things which keep us from having her. This is the paradox of freedom, for those 
who assert it will get a new master so long as they are a slave to freedom. And that is 
precisely what TPR is designed to do. 
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Conclusions: Rhetorical Agency and Tea Party Rhetoric 
What does Tea Party rhetoric tell us about rhetorical agency?  The discourse of 
the hysteric and the discourse of the master are mutually reinforcing. Subjects or agents 
can prime an audience to be mastered by intensifying a sense of alienation, in a sense 
intensifying the trauma of identity fragmentation experienced by the subject. Intensifying 
the trauma of identity fragmentation is manipulative and results in a coercion of the 
audience which produces the effect of indoctrination.  
While at times hysterical, Tea Party rhetoric is structured most often according to 
the discourse of the master. The agent or subject in the discourse of the master will 
attempt to repress the divided subject, which for Tea Partiers is marked by the symptom 
of President Obama by articulating master signifiers of either identification or dis-
identification. It is divided subjectivity that produces the feeling of castration which in 
Tea Party rhetoric is expressed in all the ways the movement is not listened to, does not 
have a voice, as well as in the perceived lack of white patriarchal capitalist power. The 
discourse structures a specific way of enjoyment defined in the rhetoric by the disdain for 
excess procured by those who “didn’t earn it.”  This circulation is a form of psychosis, 
where the symbolic order has no point from which power is legitimately directed unless it 
is necessarily produced by the servant who wishes to become a master. Speakers or 
agents in this discourse work to master the audience through the use of master signifiers, 
and the effect of the master signifier on the audience produces an automatic response, 
wherein the audience hears or sees the signifier and immediately works to produce the 
system of knowledge surrounding the signifier. The master signifier is totalizing in that 
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they provides the otherwise fragmented identity with a series of unary traits which catch 
the person or individual up in the symbolic order so that the ego attaches to the signifiers 
as if they were self-same. The rhetorical agency in the discourse of the master is actively 
narcissistic and this is why Tea Party rhetoric is often aggressive and violent, and also 
why Tea Party advocates are resistant to any form of compromise or discussion of other 
perspectives.  
How does the circulation of desire driving the rhetoric affect rhetorical agency?  
In the discourse of the master the prohibition of jouissance takes place in a fundamental 
fantasy that the speaker is separated from their jouissance because of a perceived slave 
who gets to enjoy surplus jouissance. This fantasy defines the agency of the master 
discourse in that rhetoric will always be clung to in an attempt to relieve this perceived 
injustice. This discourse further attempts to entrench the status quo and is very powerful 
in aligned audiences to its rhetorical looping. It essentially defines who subjects are in an 
egoic attempt to repress the fact that identity can never be fully consummated by any 
signifier. Thus, the agency of speakers aligned in the master discourse is one of constant 
speaking, as subjects attempt to “master” their own divided subjectivity as well as the 
audience’s subjectivity with master signifiers, and is one in which rhetoric will often be 
repeated, shouted, and consciously affirmed, all the while playing off of the unconscious 
divided subjectivity of the audience. The need to consciously affirm the master signifiers 
is never done, as subjects repress and are haunted by a looming unconscious divided 
subjectivity.  
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Overall this is a powerful discourse, as its structure facilitates the indoctrination 
of subjects. The rhetoric constitutes a sort of discursive machinery that automatically 
engages subjects or agents and is driven by intense anxiety about the cause or source of 
desire. Yet, as resistance to Tea Party rhetoric also suggests, the process of interpellation 
is not totalizing. Lacan’s theory of discourse helps us see this point as well giving the 
analysis a pivot point in desire by which interpretation of the rhetoric in the discourse can 
proceed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Posthumanist Rhetorical Agency, Discourse and Ideology  
Since its publication nearly twenty years ago, Gaonkar’s criticism of the Neo-
Aristotelian interpretive turn and his indictment of the humanist paradigm of agency have 
remained central to the discipline’s dialogue about the conceptualization of rhetorical 
agency. Gaonkar maintained the humanist paradigm of agency was theoretically 
defective because it assumed the “conscious and deliberating agent,” is a “seat of origin” 
for discourse rather than a “point of articulation” in a “discourse practice.” 232 Assuming 
that the speaker is a “seat of origin” for the discourse results in criticism that reads a 
“given discourse practice (or text) as a manifestation of the rhetor’s strategic 
consciousness,” thereby marginalizing as “so many items in the rhetor’s design”233 those 
“structures that govern agency: language, unconscious, and capital.”234  Although 
scholars like Campbell, Crowley, Geisler and Cloud remain suspicious of the postmodern 
alternative Gaonkar’s line of argument seems to suggest, I have shown how the 
disagreements can be clarified through recourse to Lacan’s theory of the four discourses 
and psychoanalysis generally, as they aid us in refining the theory and methods that 
underlie our analysis of discourse and ideology, and hence, rhetorical agency.  
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With respect to the first issue Gaonkar’s criticism engendered, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis clarifies what Gaonkar vaguely referred to as a “discourse practice,” 
because, for Lacan, discourse is defined succinctly as a social link—an interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, or intersubjective bond between subjects constituted in language. Thus, 
what is considered a discourse practice in a Lacanian framework is not thought of as 
merely “a point of articulation,” but instead is an articulation meant to create a 
relationship between speaking subjects. This gives the phenomenon Gaonkar meant to 
identify some definitional precision, which in turn aids rhetorical critics in the process of 
analyzing the rhetoric constituting the bond between subjects in a specific practice. The 
second issue Gaonkar’s criticism engendered concerns ideology, and here too I maintain 
a Lacanian framework clarifies what some in the discipline see as a key defect implied in 
the postmodern turn Gaonkar advocated.  
For some theorists, as Crowley’s essay illustrated, postmodern theory replaces the 
humanist subject with a conceptualization that is so theoretically fragmented and de-
centered by discourse that agency becomes unimportant, or worse, is cancelled out by 
ideology. However, as Alcorn concludes,  
Lacan's understanding of the subject, as composed of components and processes 
essentially divided and self-alienated, neither reduces, devalues, nor eliminates 
either the importance or the phenomenal character of the subject.
235
  
This mistaken belief about the postmodern or post-structuralist subject, and in particular, 
the belief postmodern or post-structuralist subjectivity implies the subject or agent is 
virtually powerless to resist the effects of ideology, as Campbell and Cloud attest, is often 
based upon Althusser’s conceptualization of interpellation. Despite Althusser’s reading, 
Lacan’s Imaginary order and the rhetorical agency it entails, does not assume that 
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ideology interpellates the subject in some totalizing fashion. Instead, Lacan’s theory of 
the four discourses shows that, while the subject can get caught-up in the discourse, and 
in this sense becomes bound to the ego identifications that support an affirmation of an 
ideology, subjectivity remains split—this means the fundamental structure of subjectivity 
itself means the effect of ideological speech is never totalizing or deterministic. As long 
as there is a speaking subject, subjectivity as such can never be fully determined or 
totalizing. Therefore, while Althusser remains a resource for many in the discipline, his 
misreading of Lacan renders his notion of interpellation suspect, and for this reason, 
encourages us to return to the nuances of Lacan’s theory of discourse to explain how 
ideology affects rhetorical agency.  
Since Lacan’s theory does not assume discourse determines the subject or agent, 
but is capable of explaining how subjects or agents are affected by discourse in non-
totalizing ways, the theory of the four discourses allows us to see that rhetorical agency in 
a discourse is capable of both resisting change and acting as its conduit. Even if rhetorical 
agency is conceptualized as either counter-hegemonic or hegemonic, as Cloud and many 
other critical theorists maintain it should, it remains the case that our conceptualization of 
rhetorical agency needs to account for both. In light of this demand, Lacan’s theory of the 
four discourses and the conceptualization of rhetorical agency it entails accounts for 
rhetoric’s resistive and acquiescent possibilities in discourse practices. As Alcorn 
observes,  
For Lacan, relations between discourse and the subject are two-sided.  The subject 
operates upon the discourse, and discourse operates the subject.  This dialogical 
interaction between subject functions shaping discourse and social forces 
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providing the original matrix of discourse is useful for understanding the 
particular nature of speech products.
236
 
Since it is the case rhetoric is put to the service of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
ideological possibilities, sometimes in the same discourse practice, it is necessary to 
employ a conceptualization of rhetorical agency that accounts for either possibility. 
Lacan was focused on desire as the key ingredient underlying the structure that drives the 
articulation of rhetorical agency, whether this desire manifests itself in hegemonic or 
counter-hegemonic discourse practices or not. Therefore, it is my contention it is Lacan’s 
theory of discourse which gives rhetoricians a key resource for analyzing rhetoric in 
ideological circumstances.  
 While Gaonkar certainly advanced the conversation about rhetorical agency, and 
many have join it, I meant to add Lacan’s teaching as yet another voice in the discussion 
because it is clear psychoanalysis enriches our understanding of discourse, ideology and 
the relationship both have with rhetorical agency. However, we should also be certain to 
acknowledge that, for Gaonkar, what was missing in the humanist paradigm, and what 
any rehabilitative effort must restore to the concept of rhetorical agency, are those 
features that govern the generation of agency: the unconscious, language and capital. As 
Gaonkar rightly points out, a satisfactory effort at recuperating rhetorical agency should 
account for these governing features. While Campbell, Crowley, Geisler and Cloud all 
contend in their own ways with this conceptual burden, I have shown how Lacan’s 
account of the unconscious, language and capital in discourse is directly responsive to the 
defect Gaonkar identified. Therefore, as I will reiterate next, in this dissertation I have 
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also tried to establish how Lacan’s theory of discourse accounts for the unconscious, 
language and capital as governing features of rhetorical agency.  
Posthumanist Rhetorical Agency: The Unconscious, Language and Capital 
As I indicated above, Lacan is certainly not the first to address the need to account 
for the unconscious, language and capital in explaining agency. However, the advantage 
of including Lacan as a resource is his theory addresses these concerns without resorting 
to a rehabilitated version of humanist agency to account for them. Rehabilitated versions 
of humanist agency are especially ill-equipped to account for the unconscious as a factor 
in the production of rhetorical agency—although it is clear (even to those who endeavor 
to rehabilitate humanist rhetorical agency), that rhetoric “persuades” or “compels” people 
or individuals in ways they cannot account for consciously. This is why Lacan always 
assumed psychoanalysis and rhetoric were so closely related. As Lacan said in a letter to 
Chaim Perlman, “it is on the basis of the unconscious’ manifestations, which I deal with 
as an analyst, that I have developed a theory of the effects of the signifier that intersects 
rhetoric.”237  What sets Lacan’s theory of the four discourses apart, is his insistence that 
agency is not preoccupied with subject positions or even “situated around the subject,” it 
is an unconscious expression of desire. Desire or jouissance is what drives the subject or 
agent, which why Lacan insists “the key [to agency] lies in raising the question of what 
jouissance is.”238   
While Lacan does not dismiss the value of the humanist subject, as he says “the 
entry of the subject as agent of discourse has had very surprising results,”239 the criticism 
or interpretation of discourse should not be predicated upon the humanist agent of 
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discourse. Instead, he insists “the key to all the mainsprings is to be found…in 
jouissance.”240  The subject’s rhetoric is symptomatic of the unconscious desire for 
jouissance, which is what the posthumanist paradigm assumes is the source of rhetorical 
agency. Rhetorical agency then, is the realignment of rhetoric in discourse in an attempt 
to regain access to the jouissance, which is transformative because it changes the 
circulation of desire in a relationship. Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory allows us to see how 
the unconscious logic of desire drives different manifestations of agency in discourse. 
This approach gives critics an analytical tool for identifying the effect of desire on 
subjects, and a means for rearticulating desire to change and analyze the interpersonal, 
intersubjective and intrapersonal relationships that constitute our everyday life. In this 
way and for these reasons I am claiming Lacan’s theory of discourse satisfies Gaonkar’s 
first conceptual demand—that a conceptualization of rhetorical agency should account 
for the unconscious as a governing feature of agency. What remains to be seen is how 
Lacan’s teaching informs the remaining conceptual demands Gaonkar pointed out, 
language and capital.  
The theory of the four discourses and the conceptualization of rhetorical agency 
they entail are grounded in the theory of language Lacan developed, which emphasizes 
the role speech plays in producing human subjectivity. In this way, Lacan’s theory of the 
four discourses satisfies Gaonkar’s expectation (and one our discipline expects 
generally), that agency in a postmodern vein account for language as a fundamental 
aspect of human existence. Lacan’s earliest thinking, as Gunn illustrated with his work on 
the Imaginary order, is preoccupied almost entirely by language and the role it plays in 
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the formation of subjectivity. As Lacan’s thinking evolved, one only finds an increasing 
emphasis placed upon the Symbolic order. No matter what stage we consider in Lacan’s 
career, it is clear he remains faithful to the advancement of rhetorical agency as a 
distinctly Symbolic and uniquely human activity.  
The theory of the four discourses and the conceptualization of rhetorical agency it 
entails also accounts for the final requirement Gaonkar specified: capital. Lacan’s theory 
explains how the subject regards the accumulation of the satisfaction of desire as 
something akin to the accumulation of capital. As Lacan’s analysis of Marx’s theory of 
surplus value reveals, for the subject, admittedly at a significant point of abstraction, the 
accumulation of surplus value is indistinguishable from the accumulation of surplus 
jouissance. That is why Lacan claimed the master-slave discourse did not disappear with 
the prohibition of slavery—it was merely generalized into the basic underlying character 
of capitalism. While the remaining discourses do have a part to play in the analysis of 
capital and its effects on rhetorical agency, in particular it is the discourse of the master 
(and the dialectic it sets in motion) that models most closely the way in which desire in a 
global capitalist system operates in discourse practices. 
Lacan’s strength as a theorist in part rests upon his understanding of the value 
subject’s invest in the exchange of desire through speech in the interest of accumulating 
satisfaction. In Lacan’s theory of the four discourses, the subject seeks the satisfaction of 
desire in the same way the capitalist seeks the satisfaction of capital through the 
accumulation of wealth. The posthumanist conceptualization of rhetorical agency which 
emerges from Lacan’s theory of the four discourses accounts for Marx’s theory of surplus 
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value in its conceptualization of desire as surplus jouissance. For Marx, surplus value 
was a necessary function of capitalism, but he does not make the psychological 
connection to the way in which surplus value reflects the underlying economy of desire 
for the subject. Lacan accounts for the satisfaction associated with surplus value by 
creating a conceptualization of surplus jouissance. Lacan’s theory of the four discourses 
incorporates Marx’s insight about the centrality of surplus value in a capitalist order into 
an economy of exchange predicated upon the unconscious and its formation in the 
language making up a culture. 
In Lacan, we can see Marx’s basic suspicion about capitalism joined to a theory 
of language and its unconscious workings in an underlying economy of desire. The only 
difference, with respect to the theory, is the insistence upon jouissance as a conceptual 
requisite. The conceptualization of rhetorical agency which emerges ties together capital, 
the unconscious, and language into a comprehensive theory that rises to the challenge 
Gaonkar initially laid-out. Therefore, as the preceding paragraphs established, not only 
does the theory of the four discourses and the conceptualization of rhetorical agency it 
entails account for the unconscious, language and capital, thereby satisfying Gaonkar’s 
conceptual burden, it also helps us to see past the theoretical impasses Gaonkar’s 
criticism spawned within the discipline about the relationship between discourse, 
ideology and rhetorical agency. The Lacanian subject or agent is neither determined by 
discourse, nor is the agent or subject in the theory powerless to create changes with 
discourse—Lacan’s subject or agent is only encumbered by desire. Desire, not 
knowledge, explains how discourse structures the subject or agent, and it is desire that 
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accounts for how the subject or agent changes the discourse structure with rhetoric. For 
these reasons, I submit Lacan’s theory of discourse offers rhetorical theorists an 
alternative framework for conceptualizing rhetorical agency along posthumanist lines.  
The Posthumanist Conceptualization of Rhetorical Agency 
Lacan’s theory of the four discourses provides both the terminology and the 
theoretical foundation needed to examine rhetorical agency in any subject’s speech by 
providing models that identify and distinguish between different articulations of desire in 
distinct discourses. The rhetoric constituting the discourse reveals the subject or agent’s 
unconscious desire, and in distinguishing between the different ways in which desire 
manifests itself in the speech, we can begin to differentiate between different 
manifestations of rhetorical agency. The analysis of the GID debate and Tea Party 
rhetoric shows the four rhetorical agencies at work in discourse practices as they function 
according to the unconscious logic of desire, thereby demonstrating the utility of Lacan’s 
theory of discourse in action for rhetorical analysts. I turn first to Tea Party rhetoric. 
Posthumanist Rhetorical Agency and Tea Party Rhetoric 
 The first discourse structure and the rhetorical agency it entails that I discuss in 
this section is the discourse of the master. In the analysis provided in chapter four, I 
showed how rhetorical agency in the discourse of the master is driven by the desire to 
produce order in the knowledge-system. The subject or agent in the discourse of the 
master provides the signifiers necessary to make the interlocutor’s knowledge coherent, 
to provide some organizing principle, a signifier, or some systematic attempt to resolve 
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confusion. Basso clearly illustrates the discourse of the master’s structure and the 
rhetorical agency it entails in the following example,  
Wake up America. While you were playing with the toys of your consumer 
wealth you lost much more than your bloated economy of living beyond your 
means. You lost your representative democracy. Your servants have become your 
masters.
241
 
The loss of jouissance, signified in the word “representative democracy,” confers for 
Basso the truth of the unconscious desire driving the discourse structure, which is 
established in the order Basso makes out of the knowledge-system in his rhetoric with the 
sentence “Your servants have become your masters.”  
I think we can hardly overlook his metaphor as just a coincidence, as what he is 
saying suggests the inversion is not only a political one, as the words “representative 
democracy” suggests, but is also plainly a statement about the inversion of the racial 
hierarchy Obama’s presidency represents. The signifier “slave” in Basso’s rhetoric orders 
and makes coherent for the subject or agent how the economy of desire presently 
distributes jouissance, and thus, what remains, and what Basso exhorts the audience to do 
is take back what was usurped while Americans “were playing with toys.” The 
unconscious desire to not only order, but to do so in the interests of serving the old order, 
is what makes the rhetorical agency of the master into a structure worth noting. The 
discourse to which I turn attention to next is the discourse of the hysteric. 
The discourse of the hysteric and the rhetorical agency it entails, like the 
discourse in the GID debate, is predicated upon the subject or agent’s identity. A good 
example of the discourse of the hysteric and the rhetorical agency it entails is contained 
in the following quote, 
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Tea parties believe in small government. We believe in returning to the principles 
of our Founding Fathers. We respect them. We revere them. Shoot me in the head 
before I stop talking about the Founders. Shoot me in the head if you try to 
change our government.
242
 
In Beck’s rhetoric in the quotation, his rhetorical agency is caused by the identity crisis 
he experiences when the signifiers that represent his identity are called into question in 
the opposition to Tea Parties and reverence for “the Founding Fathers.”  What is also 
typical about the discourse of the hysteric and the rhetorical agency it entails, is the way 
in which Beck’s rhetoric conveys its most extreme articulation by proposing that he 
would rather be dead than not be identified with the “Founding Fathers.”  This is another 
way of saying that if I am not identified, and therefore do not take on this subjectivity, 
then I am dead to the symbolic order. Beck’s identity crisis reflects the unconscious logic 
of desire to have a true identity in the Symbolic order.  What the discourse of the hysteric 
does here, as it did in the GID debate also, is position the subject or agent (Beck) as the 
one demanding that the interlocutor provide the signifier that would restore the coherence 
of Beck’s subjectivity in the Symbolic order. The jouissance Beck’s rhetoric implies is 
driven by the unconscious desire to be recognized in the symbolic order so that the 
subject or agent enjoys when other people affirm the identifications in his discourse.  
Before turning to the discourse of the university and the rhetorical agency it entails in Tea 
Party rhetoric, we should note that the discourse of the hysteric creates a rhetorical 
agency that questions identity, but in this context, it sounds like a kind of political protest. 
As Beck’s rhetoric demonstrates, the political protest is fixed around the search for the 
signifier that would make Beck’s identity complete, and in this search for the signifier 
that closes the gap in the Symbolic order, we see the discourse of the hysteric as plainly 
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here as we did in the GID debate. This feature is what makes the discourse of the hysteric 
and the rhetorical agency it entails distinguishable from the other discourses. To close the 
gap in the Symbolic order, it is necessary for Beck to use discourse to make links or 
bonds with other subjects or agents that will result in the production of the signifier.  This 
is why his rhetoric demands the interlocutor produce the signifier and be identified with 
the “Founding Fathers.”  
 Turning attention now to the discourse of the university and the rhetorical agency 
it entails, I think it is again useful to revisit quotations I cited in the section on Beck’s Tea 
Party rhetoric. As Beck says, 
God is giving a plan I think to me that is not really a plan. ... The problem is that I 
think the plan that the Lord would have us follow is hard for people to understand. 
... Because of my track record with you who have been here for a long time. 
Because of my track record with you, I beg of you to help me get this message 
out, and I beg of you to pray for clarity on my part.
243
 
Beck’s rhetoric structures the subject or agent in the discourse to be the object of God’s 
jouissance.  God is the Other to whom Beck’s rhetoric is directed.  In this way, Beck’s 
rhetoric functions much like the university discourse in the GID debate, except that the 
knowledge-system that Beck’s rhetoric is referencing is not premised in the culture or the 
language. Instead God plays the knowledge-system in Beck’s rhetoric for which he is 
simply a passive conduit or channel. The knowledge-system Beck’s rhetoric suggests 
exists independent of his experience of it as he is not responsive to other people with his 
rhetoric, because he is only responding to God. The subject or agent in the rhetoric is 
driven by the desire to understand clearly, which is another way of saying the subject or 
agent enjoys in the rhetoric by making sense (jouis-sense) of God’s speech (“the plan” or 
“message”). The subject or agent is a tool for producing God’s desire. While the passive 
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positioning of the subject or agent in the discourse is common in religious rhetoric, and 
also appears in the examples I showed from the GID debate, in Beck’s rhetoric it is 
especially obvious that rhetorical agency for the subject or agent is structured to transmit 
the desire of the Other or God. The links or bonds his rhetorical agency creates mean to 
transmit the unconscious desire to know and therefore speak the truth.  
 The final discourse and the rhetorical agency it entails is the discourse of the 
analyst. The discourse of the analyst is structured to produce the object of desire which is 
the truth of the unconscious desire that underwrite the drive to desire itself. Because 
rhetorical agency in Tea Party rhetoric is grounded in the prohibition of jouissance, is 
fixated upon the fragmentary nature of identity, and assumes the knowledge-system is 
either a product of God or inherited from Founding Fathers, the discourse of the analyst 
remains absent.  Since the unconscious desire to desire itself is never enjoyed explicitly 
in Tea Party rhetoric, the objects of desire remain symbolic shields that paper-over the 
gaps in subjectivity. Perhaps this absence of the discourse of the analyst in Tea Party 
rhetoric explains why the interlocutors remain resistant to change or introspection.  
In illustrating the four rhetorical agencies at work in the rhetoric of Tea Party 
advocates like Santelli, Basso and Beck, it becomes clear how Lacan’s theory of the four 
discourses helps to shape the analysis of the transformation of desire in discourse, as each 
discourse structure lends itself to analysis according to the unique way in which the 
unconscious logic of desire drives each discourse in distinctly different ways. In the next 
section, I will again use the rhetoric analyzed in the previous chapters to illustrate the 
four rhetorical agencies as they are constituted in the GID debate.  
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Posthumanist Rhetorical Agency and GID 
The unconscious desire to know the truth of another person’s body drives the 
debate generally, but it is in the discourse of the hysteric that I think we can begin to see 
how rhetorical agency is reflected in the desire to know the truth of the body’s gender in 
the GID debate. Rhetorical agency in the discourse of the hysteric is manifest in the 
unconscious desire to have the other identify the subject or agent by answering the 
question: “Am I a boy, or am I a girl?” For Jonah, we can see rhetorical agency operating 
according to the discourse of the hysteric in the exchange she had with her father.  
Before Jonah transitioned, “passers-by and acquaintances would mistake Jonah 
for a girl,” and her father would correct them. As Jonah’s father relates, his corrections, 
meant to answer this fundamental question about gender, only prompted “bitter 
complaints” from Jonah. According to Jonah’s father, “What began to happen was Jonah 
started to get upset about that,” adding Jonah would argue ‘Why do you have to say 
anything!’ Joel recalls a particular instance,  
when we were walking the dogs and this person came up and said... ‘Oh, is this 
your daughter?’ and I said, ‘Oh, no, this is Jonah.’…And Jonah just came running 
up and said, ‘Why do you have to tell! Why do you have to say anything!’244  
In the rhetoric Jonah’s father is reiterating, we can see how the answer to the question 
Jonah’s father provides creates a breakdown in the Symbolic order for Jonah, and her 
demand, that he not say anything, reveals how jouissance in Jonah’s rhetoric is tied to the 
signifier “girl.” The attribution of the signifier “boy” to Jonah is what drives her 
rhetorical agency, as it is the imposition of this signifier and all that it entails in the 
culture that causes her to exclaim “Why do you have to say anything!” which implies if 
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she cannot be identified as a girl, then she is restricted from the jouissance suggested by 
the signifier “girl” in her economy of desire.  
The restriction of jouissance is what causes her rhetorical agency, as Jonah’s 
rhetoric is clearly predicated upon maintaining the satisfaction of desire she experiences 
in her identification with the signifier “girl,” which is lost or lacking from the discourse. 
In this way, Jonah’s rhetoric follows the hysteric’s discourse, as it is structured to compel 
her father (as it would other interlocutors or an audience) to provide the signifier(s) that 
would produce the subject’s identity in the Symbolic order, thereby completing the loop 
of satisfaction Jonah has invested in the signifier “girl” in the discourse structure. Jonah’s 
exclamation reveals it is the absence of the signifier “girl” that is most uncomfortable to 
her, and for the purposes of subjectivity, it is this signifier for Jonah that fills the gap in 
the Symbolic order. This search for the signifier that closes the gap in the Symbolic order 
is what makes the discourse of the hysteric and the rhetorical agency it entails 
distinguishable from the other discourses. To close the gap in the Symbolic order, it is 
necessary for Jonah to use discourse to make links or bonds with other subjects or agents 
that will result in the production of the signifier.  
 Jonah’s discourse is bent on creating an interpersonal bond with her father, and 
an intersubjective one with other people, but these bonds are not predicated on what other 
people or her father desire. For Jonah, the rhetoric suggests the link or bond underlying 
the discourse is the desire of the Other—the language and the culture in which the 
signifier “girl” is invested with meaning and hence, is the ultimate source of her 
unconscious desire to be identified as a boy or a girl. This is why other people’s, her 
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father’s, and especially her intrapersonal desire in the discourse are all subordinate in 
importance to the Other’s desire, which she expresses in the signifier “girl.” For the 
hysteric, hearing the signifier in the discourse of the other implies that the truth of the 
body is no longer in doubt, and in this way, maintains the loop of satisfaction that 
connects the object of desire (what being a “girl” in the culture means to Jonah) to the 
jouissance for the subject (what being called a “girl” does for Jonah’s relationship to her 
body as an object).  
Before turning to the discourse of the university and the rhetorical agency it 
entails in the GID debate, we note two points about rhetorical agency in the hysteric’s 
discourse. First, agency in Jonah’s discourse is caused by the failure of other people to 
supply the signifier that would complete Jonah’s subjectivity in the Symbolic order, 
which is symptomatic of the unconscious desire Jonah invests in the desire of the Other, 
signified in the word “girl.” Second, since the drive to be desired by the Other is what 
drives the discourse, but the rhetoric supplied by other people fails to supply the signifier, 
Jonah’s rhetorical agency is bent on creating links or bonds with her discourse that will 
make the signifier “girl” appear in the Symbolic order. Hence, rhetorical agency in the 
discourse of the hysteric is structured around the subject or agent’s symptom to be 
identified generally, which in Jonah’s case in particular is constituted in the signifier 
“girl,” as its alternative, the signifier “boy” in the rhetoric signifies for Jonah’s what she 
is not identified with to other persons, thereby suggesting what she is to the Other. The 
discourse of the hysteric and the rhetorical agency it entails is predicated upon producing 
the desire of the Other in the actual rhetoric of other people’s speech, and in seeking out 
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this signifier, rhetorical analysts can begin to interpret the rhetoric constituting the subject 
or agent’s subjectivity.  
While Jonah’s rhetorical agency is caused by the imposition of the signifier “boy” 
in the Symbolic order, which negates her identity and therefore drives her desire to create 
a different set of social links with other people that affirm what she desires to be the truth 
about her body, the desire driving the discourse of the university is the unconscious 
desire assumed to be the truth the body reveals as an object for all subjects or agents. The 
rhetorical agency this discourse structure entails is predicated upon the elimination of 
doubt for other subjects or agents in the discourse, which in the context of the GID debate 
means asserting the truth about the body’s gender despite what the subject or agent tells 
us about the truth of their body. Zucker’s rhetoric exemplifies the rhetorical agency this 
discourse structure entails, as his rhetoric is bent on creating relationships with other 
people that assume the Other (the culture and language) knows the truth about the body, 
and his rhetoric is therefore simply conveying what the Other knows. We can see this 
manifestation of rhetorical agency in a couple of examples. 
First, as Zucker expresses in the following analogy, he knows what the subject or 
agent does not, and therefore takes it as his task to convey this information to the subject 
or agent so that they will produce the truth of his rhetoric in their discourse. Zucker asks, 
“Suppose you were a clinician and a four-year old black kid came into your office and 
said he wanted to be white. Would you go with that?  I don’t think we would.”245  As 
Alix Spiegel explains,  
If a black kid walked into a therapist’s office saying that he was really white, the 
goal of pretty much any therapist out there would be to try to make him feel more 
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comfortable with being black. They would assume that his beliefs were the 
product of a dysfunctional environment – a family environment or a cultural 
environment, which is how Zucker sees gender disordered kids.
246
  
Zucker’s rhetoric in the hypothetical example assumes that “we,” which is the signifier 
that represents for Zucker the culture and the language or the Other in his discourse, 
know the truth about the body because the truth in the culture or language is that 
biological sex, were it not for dysfunction in Zucker’s view, would determine a person’s 
gender. The assumption his knowledge makes in the rhetoric is that there is some 
conflict-free or non-dysfunctional expression of gender underlying the behavior 
transgendered children enact, and his discourse is predicated upon correcting for the 
fantasy or confusion exhibited by transgendered children.  
As Zucker argues, reparative therapy is “helping kids understand themselves 
better and what might be causing them to develop what I call a ‘fantasy solution,’ that 
being the other sex will make them happy.”247 In this example, we can see how Zucker’s 
rhetoric assumes that he knows the reality underlying the “fantasy solution,” and how his 
rhetorical agency is predicated upon creating a link designed to erase the fantasy and 
restore the reality that sex determines gender which would otherwise manifest itself were 
it not for some dis-order in the psychological make-up of the child. His rhetoric assumes 
that if the child simply accepted the latent truth, which is Zucker’s object of desire in the 
discourse, then their body would no longer reflect the fantasy that gender non-conformity 
belies.  
In this way, Zucker’s rhetoric has a paternalistic feel to it, just like a discourse 
would any time the rhetoric suggests the subject or agent who is speaking “knows what is 
best.” This is precisely how the discourse of the university is structured to manifest 
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rhetorical agency, as Zucker’s rhetoric presumes he is simply doing the work of the 
culture in some innocuous way that will improve or correct the dysfunctions that disrupt 
the otherwise natural relationship that would be expressed if the child’s sex determined 
their gender. Zucker’s rhetoric reflects the ostensibly objective and dispassionate 
manifestation of rhetorical agency that is characteristic of the discourse of the university, 
as he is simply doing his part in the heteronormative knowledge-system which exists 
independent of his interaction with it. His rhetoric then is not responsive to the speech of 
the child, as he has invested his agency in the truth conveyed in the culture and is 
therefore only responsive to the heteronormative, “sex determines gender” knowledge-
system in which his truth is unconsciously invested. Before turning to the rhetorical 
agency embodied by the discourse of the master in the GID debate, we note that 
rhetorical agency in the discourse of the university is predicated upon the subject or 
agent’s unconscious enactment of the desire to produce the truth of the Other’s 
knowledge. In this particular case, producing the true knowledge-system means 
entrenching the heteronormative order which is Zucker’s object of desire, as his rhetoric 
unconsciously invests the heteronormative knowledge-system with jouissance. In this 
way, Zucker does not derive jouissance directly, as he is only the passive steward 
accumulating jouissance on behalf of the Other. This is why rhetorical agency in the 
discourse of the university, as it does in Zucker’s case, sounds as if the person 
articulating the discourse is just passively enacting the preferences of someone or 
something else. The agent or subject in the discourse of the university enjoys the 
satisfaction of jouissance through the Other, as if they were merely the conduit for 
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conveying the truth which exists independent of their knowledge about it. Rhetorical 
agency in this discourse is therefore distinctive because the subject or agent articulating 
the rhetoric only enjoys jouissance if the Other accumulates the excess and is therefore 
satisfied. 
Where jouissance in the discourse of the university assumes rhetorical agency is 
driven by the truth of another person’s body as it relates to the knowledge-system, the 
discourse of the master is driven by the desire to order the knowledge-system itself. 
Rhetorical agency in the discourse of the master manifests itself in the ways the subject 
or agent imposes a signifier to clarify or make sense of the knowledge-system. We can 
see an example of the unconscious desire to impose order on the knowledge-system in the 
same series of excerpts used above to demonstrate the discourse of the hysteric and 
Jonah’s rhetorical agency. Rather than focus on Jonah’s rhetoric, and look instead more 
closely at Joel’s rhetoric in the excerpts, it becomes clearer how his discourse is bent on 
providing signifiers in the Symbolic order that eliminate ambiguity in the knowledge-
system. As his answers to acquaintances and passers-by when asked about Jonah’s 
gender suggest, his rhetorical agency is driven by the unconscious desire to tell the truth 
about another person’s body. As Joel recalled in one particular instance, “…we were 
walking the dogs and this person came up and said... ‘Oh, is this your daughter?’ and I 
said, ‘Oh, no, this is Jonah.”248 Joel’s rhetoric suggests his rhetorical agency is driven by 
the unconscious desire to tell the truth, even though it is obvious to him his response is 
greatly unsettling for his child Jonah.  
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The cause of Joel’s rhetorical agency in the excerpt is not, however, Jonah’s 
discomfort, as his rhetoric suggests it is actually caused by passers-by and acquaintance’s 
confusion. The object of Joel’s desire in the rhetoric is not to provide Jonah with a 
signifier, at least not at this stage in their lives prior to Jonah’s transition; it is to provide 
other people with signifiers that order the knowledge-system. In this example the link or 
bond Joel’s rhetoric constitutes in discourse is based upon resolving the 
miscommunication or confusion expressed by other people. Joel’s discourse is structured 
to provide the signifier that orders the knowledge-system for the interlocutor by 
providing the truth. In this way, the discourse of the master functions as the obverse of 
the discourse of the hysteric, as it is structured to provide the signifier that tells the truth 
to the interlocutor who is demanding it. Joel could provide the signifier to Jonah, and if 
and when he did, his discourse of mastery would simply tell the truth of Jonah’s 
unconscious instead of telling the truth of another person’s body.  Whether Joel’s 
audience is Jonah or other people, however, does not change the structure of the 
discourse because, in both instances, the unconscious desire driving the discourse 
remains the satisfaction of the jouissance which results when the subject or agent tells the 
truth that orders the knowledge-system.   
Before turning the reader’s attention to the final discourse structure, the discourse 
of the analyst, we should note the rhetorical agency entailed in the discourse of the master 
is distinctive because, unlike the discourse of the university, it is structured to provide the 
truth, whereas in the discourse of the university, the discourse is structured to produce the 
truth from the interlocutor. The discourse of the hysteric is also structured to produce the 
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truth from the interlocutor, but what the hysteric seeks is not the unconscious truth of the 
knowledge-system, but rather the unconscious truth of their identity. Rhetorical agency in 
the discourse of the master is structured to deliver the signifiers that order the knowledge- 
system for the subject or agent, and in this way can be used, as Joel’s rhetoric mildly 
suggests, to order the knowledge-system in ways that preclude access to jouissance for 
other subjects—including Jonah. Clearly, Joel supported Jonah’s transition, and in this 
way his discourse of mastery accommodates Jonah’s jouissance, but the discourse of the 
master is not always so flexible, and can be just as easily employed to frustrate access to 
jouissance. Before elaborating further on this feature of the discourse of the master any 
further, as I will with Tea Party rhetoric in just a moment, I want to explain how the 
discourse of the analyst drives the fourth and final kind of rhetorical agency at work in 
the GID debate. 
The best example of the rhetorical agency the discourse of the analyst entails is 
constituted in Jonah’s relationship to Pam and the dress she agrees to purchase for her 
daughter. To recall this moment, in the broadcast we learn  
Pam remembers watching her child mournfully finger his outfit. She says she 
knew what he wanted. ‘At that point I just said, you know, you really want a dress 
to wear, don't you? And [Jonah’s] face lit up, and she was like, Yes!...I thought 
she was gonna hyperventilate and faint because she was so incredibly 
happy...before then, or since then, I don’t think I have seen her so out of her mind 
happy as that drive to Target that day to pick out her dress.’249 
What Pam’s discourse reiterates about Jonah’s rhetorical agency in this moment is how 
agency is bound-up with the signifier; in this instance it is the jouissance Jonah invests in 
the dress that underwrites the discourse. However, rhetorical agency for Pam in this 
discourse is driven by the desire to provide the jouissance Jonah has invested in the 
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object, and in this way, her rhetoric exemplifies how the subject or agent in the discourse 
of the analyst is bent on transforming the relationship by producing the truth of the 
subject or agent’s symptom. In this instance, Jonah’s discontent prompts Pam to 
transform the distribution of desire in the Symbolic order by acknowledging Jonah’s 
symptom and the unconscious truth it contains. In this way, the cause of Pam’s rhetorical 
agency in the excerpt is the desire to make Jonah’s unconscious desire itself an object in 
the Symbolic order via the dress. This means, as is characteristic about the discourse of 
the analyst generally, that the unconscious logic of desire in the discourse is the truth 
about desire. The unconscious truth about desire is the fact that humans desire to desire in 
the first place, and unless their rhetorical agency is structured to produce the unconscious 
truth about desire itself, as is the case with the discourse structure of the analyst, then this 
fact of desire goes unnoticed or, more accurately, remains unconscious and therefore, 
latent in the discourse.  
The reason Pam’s discourse produces jouissance, or, in paraphrasing Pam, 
Jonah’s out of her mind happiness, is because her discourse is structured to create a 
relationship with Jonah that circumvents the gap in the Symbolic order, and in this 
instance, if only for a brief moment, the desire for objects, and not just the object itself, is 
made manifest in the discourse. The rhetorical agency the discourse of the analyst entails 
is rightly viewed as the midway point between the discourse of the hysteric and the 
discourse of the master, as in it we can see how rhetorical agency in Pam’s discourse 
takes Jonah’s hysterical symptom, signified by the dress, and transforms it into 
jouissance via the discourse structure of the analysts—the result of which, once the dress 
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is purchased, is the imposition of the signifier that masters the knowledge-system in 
which the dress is a sign for the culture that answers the question: “Am I a boy, or am I a 
girl.”  
 As I have shown in both the GID debate and examples of Tea Party rhetoric I 
cited, rhetorical agency bears itself in discourse in discrete structures that lend themselves 
to analysis by rhetorical critics in systematic and distinguishable ways. Lacan’s theory of 
the four discourses and the concept of rhetorical agency I have extracted, allows us to 
understand why some audiences are indoctrinated into particular discourses affecting 
their rhetorical agency. Jouissance circulates in predictable and well-worn pathways that 
can become cultural dogma, as people or individuals in a culture base their relationships 
with one another in part upon the predictable and previously traveled pathways of 
culturally permitted jouissance. Since the structure of the discourse is caused by the 
prohibition of jouissance, but is also designed to restore access to jouissance, Lacan’s 
posthumanist rhetorical agency is resilient enough to explain both how discourse is 
structured to arrest cultural change, or facilitate its transformation. It is for this reason 
above all else that Lacan deserves consideration as a more visible contributor to the 
discipline as a theoretical resource for our posthumanist critical practices. 
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